

RELIGION AND THE
GROWING MIND

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

LIFELONG EDUCATION

THE APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

SPIRITUAL VALUES IN ADULT EDUCATION

RELIGION AND THE GROWING MIND

BY

BASIL A. YEAXLEE

M.A., B.LITT., PH.D.

LECTURER AND TUTOR IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

LONDON: NISBET & CO. LTD.

22 BERNERS STREET, W.1

First published June, 1939
Reprinted - - May, 1945

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

PREFACE

IN the writing of this book there has been a threefold purpose. First I have attempted to show that modern psychology, especially in its most recent developments, does not invalidate religion, but on the contrary makes even more clear the necessity of religion if men are to attain completeness and fulness of life. Then I have traced the way in which the natural psychological development of infancy, childhood and adolescence leads to growth in religious consciousness and experience. Finally I have pointed to those elements in Christian faith and practice which answer to the needs of the maturing personality and are themselves grounded in objective reality, in the existence, nature and purpose of God as these are revealed in Jesus Christ.

It has seemed best not to attempt to set out these components of the argument in the form of distinct sections or parts of the book. They will be found in every chapter. But the starting-point is in every case the child or the adolescent as we find him, and as advancing psychological knowledge enables us to understand him. This is not to be taken to mean that religion is merely a product of social evolution and of individual growth. It is a response to that which exists independently of the human mind. Nevertheless, we may legitimately begin with the native propensities and capacities of the normal human personality in order to see as clearly as possible what evidence there is for the belief that the truth and the life manifest in Jesus Christ are what men need if they are ever to become indeed full-grown.

To deal adequately with all the themes which must inevitably be touched upon in any treatment of this subject, and to include even slight reference to the many more which readers may well think I ought to have mentioned, would necessitate a volume three times as large as this. I hope, however, that nothing vital has been omitted. It may perhaps be thought that I have quoted overmuch, especially in the first four chapters of the book, but if so I should like to make two observations. Nothing is easier than to distort people's opinions when one is trying to summarise them, and in discussing what some of the most eminent psychologists mean it is important that one should be accurate concerning what they say. If, further, a book of this kind is to be kept within due limits of length, quotation is often advisable for the sake of conciseness.

I have not written for the erudite, whether in psychology, in educational theory, or in theology. At the same time I have not hesitated to use such simple technical terms as are necessary in a serious discussion* of this sort. But I trust that this is not the same thing as being either unreadable or unintelligible. Above all, I hope that the last two chapters will not be found to be the only practical ones.

OXFORD, *April* 1939.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	ix
I. INTRODUCTORY—PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION	i
II. BEGINNINGS	30
III. THE WORLD OF FANTASY	59
IV. IS IT TRUE?	88
V. THE NEW SELF AND THE OTHER SEX	119
VI. THE MATURING MIND	147
VII. A CHAPTER FOR PARENTS	178
VIII. A CHAPTER FOR TEACHERS	198
BIBLIOGRAPHY	217
INDEX	221

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I AM greatly indebted to the Authors, or their representatives, and Publishers of the books mentioned below for the courtesy by which quotation has been permitted:

Adler, A., *Social Interest, a Challenge to Mankind* (Faber & Faber); Berdyaev, N., *The Destiny of Man* (Blès); Bovet, P., *The Child's Religion* (Dent); Brown, W., *Psychology and Psychotherapy* (Arnold); *Mind, Medicine and Metaphysics* (O.U.P.); Buber, M., *I and Thou* (T. & T. Clark); Bühler, C., *From Birth to Maturity* (Kegan Paul); Cattell, R. B., *Psychology and the Religious Quest* (Nelson); Clavier, Henri, *L'Idée de Dieu chez l'Enfant* (Librairie Fischbacher, Paris); Cook, S. A., *The "Truth" of the Bible* (S.P.C.K.); Dalbiez, *La Méthode Psychanalytique et la Doctrine Freudienne* (Desclée de Brouwer et Cie, Paris); de Burgh, W. G., *Towards a Religious Philosophy; From Morality to Religion* (Macdonald & Evans); Ely, Bishop of, *This is Our Faith* (Hodder & Stoughton); Freud, Anna, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence* (Hogarth Press); Freud, S., *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (Allen & Unwin); *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis; Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety; Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego; The Ego and the Id; An Autobiographical Study* (all Hogarth Press); Grensted, L. W., *Psychology and God* (Longmans, Green); *This Business of Living* (S.C.M.); Griffiths, Ruth, *A Study of Imagination in Early Childhood* (Kegan Paul); Isaacs, Susan, *The Children We Teach* (U.L.P.: Hodder & Stoughton); Jacks, M. L., in *The Headmaster Speaks* (Kegan Paul); James, E. O., *Comparative Religion* (Methuen); Jung, C. G., *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* (Kegan Paul); *Psychology and Religion* (O.U.P.); Kennedy, J., *The God Whom We Ignore* (Hodder & Stoughton); Klein, Melanie, *The Psycho-analysis of Children* (Hogarth Press); Kretschmer, E., *Physique and Character* (Kegan Paul); Leuba, J. H., *God or Man?* (Kegan Paul); *A Psychological Study of Religion* (Macmillan); Luccock, H. E., *Christianity and the Individual* (Hodder & Stoughton); Macaulay, A. B., *The Death of Jesus* (Hodder & Stoughton); McDougall, W., *Religion and the Science of Life; Psycho-analysis and Social Psychology; Social Psychology* (Methuen); Miller, E., *The Generations* (Faber & Faber); Mumford, Mrs. E. E. Read, *Understanding Our Children*

(Longmans) ; Norsworthy, N., and Whitley, M.T., *The Psychology of Childhood* (Macmillan) ; Nygren, Anders, *Agape and Eros* (S.P.C.K.) ; Phillips, Margaret, *The Education of the Emotions by Sentiment Formation* (Allen & Unwin) ; Scott, E. F., *The New Testament Idea of Revelation* (Ivor Nicholson & Watson) ; Selbie, W. B., *The Validity of Christian Belief* (Duckworth) ; Selby Wright, R. (ed.), *Asking Them Questions* (O.U.P.) ; Smith, H. B., *Growing Minds* (U.L.P. : Hodder & Stoughton) ; Smith, J. W. D., *Psychology and Religion in Early Childhood* (S.C.M.) ; Soderblom, N., *The Nature of Revelation* (O.U.P.) ; Suttie, I. D., *The Origins of Love and Hate* (Kegan Paul) ; Tereshschenko, N. M. Iovetz, *Friendship—Love in Adolescence* (Allen & Unwin) ; Thouless, R. H., *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion* (C.U.P.) ; Truro, Bishop of, *Is it Reasonable to Believe?* (Hodder & Stoughton) ; Wells, H. G., *Democracy under Revision* (Hogarth Press) ; Wigley, T., in *Essentials of Life and Thought* (James Clark) ; York, Archbishop of, in *Revelation* (Faber & Faber) ; Institute of Christian Education, *The Religion Education of Children under the Age of Seven Years*.

RELIGION AND THE GROWING MIND

I

INTRODUCTORY—PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION

SHOULD we grow out of religion—or have we not yet grown fully into it? Many people who have given up going to church and say that orthodox religious beliefs make no appeal to them yet retain sufficient interest in religion to discuss it vigorously whenever an opportunity occurs. They do not assume, as their grandfathers did, that to be respectable one must be religious; but neither do they take it for granted that when men live at their best and deepest they take no account of religion. They tend, perhaps, at present, to look at it from the social rather than from the personal standpoint. They ask whether the world is a better place to live in than it was fifty or a hundred years ago. Those who have children put to themselves questions more difficult to answer, but of greater moment. What will the world be like by the time these children have to face it? How should the children themselves be prepared and equipped? By what means can security and freedom be preserved? There must be a vital relationship between happiness, or general well-being, and the beliefs by which nations are influenced, since what men believe determines in the long

run the kind of morality that they practise. How does this affect the bringing up of boys and girls?

Critics of conventional religion are numerous enough. It is important, however, to remember that they are often poles asunder in the convictions which give rise to their criticisms. Thus there are people who think religion merely negligible but actually mischievous. If it is something that belongs to primitive life it surely should be outgrown as we advance in scientific knowledge and in maturity of thought. To those who argue thus, religion is a hindrance to progress, inasmuch as it prevents us from taking a realistic attitude to the facts not only of the material world but also of human nature. Consequently, they say, we cannot afford to be neutral or indifferent towards it. We ought*to be active in our efforts to rid mankind of it, and particularly to see that it does not cripple the free development of our children. To grow up should, in their view, be the same thing as to grow out of religion.

At the other extreme there are people whose impatience or aversion is due to their persuasion that the world will make no progress in any direction until those for whom religion means most are far more vigorous in thought and action, and become the effectual leaders of men in the advance towards fulness of life. As they see it the religion of the Churches is outworn, not merely in the realm of ideas or in that of scholarship, but in that of spiritual and moral adventure. They want for their children something more living and dynamic than either the teaching or the fellowship found in the average congregation appears to offer. Their great hope is that as individuals and as communities we shall grow out of our weaknesses and limitations by growing up into more genuine and vital religion. "When I became a man I put away childish things," said a master in the understanding

of human experience and the art of living—but he did not mean that he put away religion, any more than he meant that in the earlier stages he had not really been religious.

Like the words art, science and politics, the term religion is very comprehensive. "We all believe in a sort of a something." It is generally recognised that to be human is in some sense to be religious. Whether such an assumption is borne out by the facts we shall discuss as we proceed. But the attacks upon religious belief which were so numerous and vigorous during the second half of the nineteenth century were not directed against anything so general and undefined as "religion," thus understood. The rationalists and materialists were bent upon proving that the Bible was unreliable as history and antiquated in its morality and philosophy. The existence of the world could be explained, it was thought, by the theory of physical and biological evolution. Revelation was a dogma without solid foundation, devised and maintained to defend beliefs which had their origin in primitive myths and which owed their survival to the stubbornness of tradition. Morality, it was said, is really a matter of social custom. Jesus may or may not have lived on the earth two thousand years ago, but if He did it was as a simple peasant-prophet, idealistic and poetic in His teaching. Perhaps He was a visionary who expected an immediate and revolutionary world-change into what He called the Kingdom of God. The great change never happened, however. He was crucified, and His friends evolved pious legends about Him or made impossible claims concerning His relationship to God and His significance for mankind. The outcome was a powerful but reactionary institution, the Church : a strange blend of dogmatic and superstitious affirmation, the Creeds : and a clerical caste which kept alive an elaborate form of worship.

At the turn of the century the attack on Christianity was launched from another quarter. Christianity had exposed its ineffectiveness and worthlessness, so a group of opponents urged, because it had everywhere failed to champion the cause of the poor and oppressed majority against the oppression of the rich and hereditarily powerful minority. But criticism cut deeper than this. Religion, said Marx (quoting, after all, a phrase in which that pioneer of Christian Socialism, Charles Kingsley, had castigated a perversion of Christianity), was the opium of the people. Like all revulsions from an evil state of things the new economic and political movements were quick to persecute. No group which would not say Shibboleth could be tolerated. Nor could any submission to a spiritual authority be allowed if this meant the slightest recognition of a claim which might conflict with the demands of the State, whether communist or fascist. The situation in Russia and Germany to-day is essentially the same as it was in the later Roman Empire, when Nero, Domitian and Decius persecuted the Christians.

The plain fact is that of all religions Christianity exerts the most profound and vital influence upon individuals and upon communities. What is not true of its claims is still less likely to be true of other religions or of any general "religious tendency." If we are investigating the relationship between human nature, as such, and religion, as such, nothing is gained by talking of religion abstractly or vaguely. Neither is there any advantage in assuming that Christianity is anything other than a religion rooted in history, and dependent for its existence upon the fact that Jesus not only lived in Palestine "under Pontius Pilate" but was a man in whom other men found God as they found God nowhere else. However we may interpret the words, for Christians God was in Christ—which is to say not only that God exists, but that in the life, teaching,

death and resurrection of Jesus He made Himself as fully known as it is possible for men to know anything. The growth of men in the knowledge, love and service of God, which is religion, has corresponded to His progressive revelation to them of His nature, character and purpose.

It is not for us here to survey the evidence and the arguments by which these beliefs are now supported and the religious experience of Christians is nourished.¹ The rationalists and materialists made the mistake of proving too much. Biblical and theological studies have set the Old Testament and the New in proper perspective, so that we can discriminate between the earlier and the later stages in the knowledge of God through which in the course of centuries men have passed. Creeds are not regarded as cast-iron formularies, but as historic expressions of a living, growing faith which is, in substance, the same now as in the early days of Christianity, though our forms of thought and expression are different. The weaknesses of the Church are admitted, but her strength emerges in the very situations, as in Russia and Germany, which threatened her extinction. And a true Christianity is, as it always has been, the inspiration of liberty, of goodwill, and of that "looking not upon your own things but upon the things of others" with which totalitarianism in any form will have nothing to do.

These are, no doubt, articles of faith as much as elements in experience. But they are maintained by men of affairs and men of science, who hold that the most urgent and practical need of the world is to grow up in this religion. They are taught in our schools, but no longer as rigid formulæ to be learned and conventional codes with which conduct must conform. Education, and above all religious education, is now conceived as a process of

¹ Cf. C. H. Dodd, *History and The Gospel* : W. R. Matthews (Ed.), *The Christian Faith*, etc,

fostering the native powers of children and young people in such a way that they may perceive what is true for themselves and love it for its own sake. Mere indoctrination is out of date in all but totalitarian educational systems.

Our concern here, however, is in the first place with the naturalness of religion itself. No defence of the validity of what children learn and are taught as religious truth is worth anything if it is untrue that we are all, by our very constitution, creatures with a capacity for religion. Furthermore, a mere capacity is not enough. Religion in general, and the Christian religion in particular, can possess for us the supreme value and importance which it is in the very nature of religion to claim only if it satisfies, energises, unifies and directs the whole personality and the entire society as nothing else does or can.

It is here that we encounter the challenge to religion most characteristic of our time. At this point many thoughtful men and women feel that neither the rationalist, the materialist, the social nor the political assault upon the validity of religion, and especially of Christianity, has been nearly as devastating as the attack made in the name of modern psychology. In a world of deceptions, half-truths, and deliberately lying propaganda it has become imperative that we should refuse to be blinded by tradition, however venerable; and that we should not allow reason to be led astray by emotion. Obviously we can trust only that which accords with the real and actual nature of things, both in the external universe and in the depths of our own being. We cannot hope that our children will live in a nobler and happier world than our own unless they grow up to think and act in conformity with this reality, whatever it is, and whether it is the reality of God, freedom and immortality, or otherwise.

In our present discussion, therefore, we cannot take it for granted that the true growth of the human mind and spirit is growth in religion, growth in the knowledge, love and service of God as Jesus revealed Him. Nor are we on the other hand justified in merely assuming the reverse, because of popular notions that psychological knowledge forbids us to believe any such thing.

At the outset, therefore, we must ask what it is that various psychologists during the last twenty or thirty years have said. It is of still greater importance to enquire what these and other psychologists are saying now. And it is essential to rid ourselves of that fallacy of generalisation which causes so many people to pay an absurd reverence to statements beginning "Psychology says . . ." or even "The psychologists say . . ." What it is necessary for us to know is *who* said this or that, how far he speaks from genuine and tested knowledge, what is the actual significance of what he has said, and in what degree his statements are supported by other psychologists who have as much right to speak as he. To approach any subject in this way is an elementary principle of scholarship. If, as a matter of common sense, we were to apply it in our ordinary reading and discussion we should be saved from something more than inaccuracies and false judgments. By means of a little clear thinking based on sound knowledge we might achieve greater freedom from prejudice, and might attain more nearly to wisdom.

We cannot deal here with more than a few psychological points of view, but we can at any rate choose those which may be regarded as typical. By this is meant that they are taken, not simply by individuals, however eminent, but by the most clearly marked groups of those contemporary psychologists whose particular branch of the science has a bearing upon the question of religion, as most branches have.

Dr. John Watson and his disciples, professing to account for human behaviour in terms of purely, mechanical response to stimulus, outdid Laplace, who dismissed God from the universe of eighteenth-century philosophy with the words, "Sire, I have no need of that hypothesis." The Behaviourists, in effect, dismissed mind in man himself, simply ignoring in their theories consciousness, will, emotion and even instinct. To do so may be legitimate enough from the standpoint of scientific method in studying certain aspects of human activity; science always proceeds by isolating the particular phenomena to be observed, and the phenomena in this case are physiological rather than psychological, as Dr. Watson himself admits in his provocative statement that for him there is little difference between the two. But the more genuinely scientific the scientist is, the less will he be disposed to claim that what he finds true of the segregated and limited part which he has selected for the investigations proper to his special science will in the same sense be true of the whole, or will suffice to explain the whole. If Sir James Jeans finds evidence of a mathematical mind at work in the ordering of the starry heavens he does not forthwith propound an explanation of love or morality in terms of mathematics. Nor need we charge the late Professor Pavlov with inconsistency when we discover that while pursuing his experiment with salivating dogs and elaborating his theory of conditioned reflexes he retained certain religious sympathies.

Despite the enthusiasm with which in some quarters Behaviourism was welcomed as the whole truth about the doings of that apparently incalculable creature called man, and in particular as the key to really effective education, plain common sense soon disposed of the notion that, while a man may truly be described as the most complicated of all mechanisms, he is that and nothing more.

Professor McDougall's hip and thigh smiting of such "psychology" was fatal to it. But even had he not taken up the cudgels of dynamic as opposed to mechanistic psychology, the complete inadequacy of any attempt to explain human behaviour without even considering motive and purpose would have been apparent in due course. The Behaviourists themselves are being driven by sheer logic to modify Dr. Watson's original doctrine.

Dr. Freud's account of the forces at work in the unconscious part of personality and their effect upon the conscious suffered from no such obvious superficiality. Psycho-analysis is a term to which various shades of meaning have been given, and Freud himself declares that only he and those brought up in the strictest sect of his psychology have any right to the use of it. Dr. Adler and Professor Jung broke away from him upon what they, no less than he, regarded as fundamental issues in the interpretation of human experience and human motive. But, again taken simply as a method, this delving into what goes on in the hidden depths of the mind may well appear to result in very disillusioning discoveries about the actual springs of thought, feeling and action. Shakespeare could write, with poetic licence, "We are such stuff as dreams are made on." At first it seemed as though Freud's consulting-room work had proved that the word should have been nightmares. For instead of being merely pieces of physiological mechanism men and women began to look like helpless victims of powerful instincts which must either be doomed to frustration or else find expression in revolting ways of thinking and feeling, if not of acting. The only salvation, said Freud, was to be found in facing the naked facts, however painful, and adjusting ourselves to them in the name of the "reality principle." Religion, in which a man of such intellectual power as St. Augustine could find release and

self-fulfilment, was after all only a useful illusion, permissible up to a point, until education in the actual truth had had its perfect work.

Jung dissented from Freud's emphasis upon sex, differing also from him about the origin of what is found in the unconscious mind and about the immediate cause of repressions and complexes. Jung, however, for many years made a demand in much the same vein as Freud for courageous confrontation of what he regarded as reality. He therefore looked upon religion as an evasion of difficulties, one means of escape from the challenge of circumstance. Thus he interpreted religious belief and practice as a mark of regression to a state natural in childhood, when protection and dependence are essential, but unnatural and delusive when a man is full-grown. From this he has of late moved to a very positive affirmation of the vital necessity of religion if mental health is to be achieved and retained. He can now speak of "facts which bear out the existence of an authentic religious function in the unconscious mind."¹ We are concerned for the moment, however, with the situation in the earlier part of the present century.

Adler, the third of the world-famous pioneers in the healing of the mind by analytical methods, should perhaps be considered rather apart from the other two, though he began as a disciple of Freud. It may be justifiable to quote him the more fully at this point because we shall have less reason to return to his view than we shall to the views elaborated by Freud and Jung. He never wrote disparagingly of religion, and did indeed refer to God as the goal towards which, in the readjustment of our life-style on a truly social basis, we should move.² Neverthe-

¹ *Psychology and Religion*, p. 3; cf. *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*, passim.

² E.g., *The Science of Living*, p. 54.

less he has not given religion any well-defined place in his account of personality. In his last book he wrote :

“ The best conception hitherto gained for the elevation of humanity is the idea of God. There can be no question that the idea of God really includes within it as a goal the movement towards perfection, and that, as a concrete goal, it best corresponds to the obscure yearning of human beings to reach perfection. Certainly it seems to me that every one conceives of God in a different way. There are no doubt conceptions of God that, from the very start, fall far short of the principle of perfection ; but of its purest form we can say—here the presentation of the goal of perfection has been successful. The primal energy which was so effective in establishing regulative religious goals was none other than that of social feeling. This was meant to bind human beings more closely to one another. It must be regarded as the heritage of evolution, as the result of the upward struggle in the evolutionary urge. . . . Social feeling means above all a struggle for a communal form that must be thought of as eternally applicable, such as, say, could be thought of when humanity has attained its goal of perfection. It is not a question of any present-day community or society, or of political or religious forms. On the contrary, the goal that is best suited for perfection must be a goal that stands for an ideal society amongst all mankind, the ultimate fulfilment of evolution.”¹

This carries us little further, so far as origins are concerned, than the view of Durkheim and the French sociological school that religion is a product of social relationships in the course of human evolution. The outcome of it all, though Adler describes this, perhaps deliberately, in such vague terms, would appear to be only a completely sound and happy social order of a

¹ *Social Interest : A Challenge to Mankind*, pp. 272, 275.

terrestrial kind, to be enjoyed by those fortunate enough to be alive when it arrives, and by their posterity. To live for the sake of this future happy world in which he will have no part requires much altruism and idealism in the individual of to-day and to-morrow. Adler says, again it may be with deliberation, that the idea of God *includes* this. He does not identify God with it. But religion as a personal relationship with a God who can be conceived as personal is something different from what Adler had in mind. The main point is that however he thought of God he consistently, as a psychologist, held that belief in the possibility of human perfection was inseparable from belief that God exists.

In a commemorative address at Vienna after Dr. Adler's death, Dr. F. Birnbaum spoke with considerable emphasis of Adler's religious attitude.¹ Referring to Adler's belief that any psychological aberration in a child was due to the child's having been caused to "look at the world through coloured glasses," and that the child must be re-educated and given back to the community, Dr. Birnbaum continued: "Many persons have understood by this merely an education for collective existence. Adler, on the contrary, wished it to be understood not merely in a biological or sociological sense but from a transcendental point of view. For that reason he laid the greatest stress on belief in the equal potential worth of all men, despite their empirical inequality. In his own fashion he expressed the same thought as is inherent in religion. This defends us against a world that only takes account of the empirical difference between man and man, the equality of all in the sight of God which follows from their being made in His image. The equal potential worth of all men was for Adler the presupposition of human society."

¹ *Times Educational Supplement*, 11th September 1937.

However much we owe to these eminent and courageous explorers of the unconscious, there is no reason to suppose that theirs is the final word about the facts or the only possible interpretation of human personality as a whole. They would themselves repudiate any such suggestion, for they would claim to be scientists, not dogmatists or dictators. There have been many distinguished psycho-analysts and psycho-therapists, especially in this country, whose theory and practice have been based upon general acceptance of the main psychological conclusions reached by Freud, Jung and Adler, but who have found no contradiction between the facts of mental structure and process thus revealed and the religious faith which they themselves hold. Furthermore they have said that when analysis had shown them where the trouble lay, and the time for helping a patient towards readjustment and re-education had arrived, religion again and again proved to be the only effective basis upon which this rebuilding of personality could be accomplished. Other medical psychologists, however, have not agreed with this discrimination between the facts that Freud and Jung have brought to light and the interpretations which those two eminent physicians have placed upon the facts. Nor have they sufficiently remembered that the medical psychologist is of necessity dealing all day with abnormal people. The net result, therefore, has been that the psycho-therapists who maintained their own religious beliefs and applied them in their practice have too often been regarded by their sceptical colleagues as, to this extent, indulging their own personal idiosyncrasies. But these same critical colleagues have themselves taken over, quite uncritically, the Freudian philosophy and mythology along with the Freudian scientific discoveries, as though the one were inseparable from the other.

Religion has been regarded as a fantasy,^c harmless or otherwise.¹

This easy assumption that the claim of religion to be based upon reality is incompatible with a genuinely scientific psychology has spread from the professional to the lay community. Some years ago a German Biblical scholar, Professor Gunkel, wrote a book under the title *What Then Remains of the Old Testament?* As he had no difficulty in showing, far more that is of incalculable value remains than a superficial acquaintance with the Higher Criticism and its results might have suggested. But the uneasiness then felt by many deeply religious, and at the same time keenly intellectual, people about the effect of scientific Biblical studies upon religious belief was well reflected in the title of that book. That feeling has now been transferred from the Bible, which after all is but the medium whereby a living religious experience has been transmitted, to the nature and basis of the experience itself. "What then remains of religion as a necessary element in the healthy development of personality?" To speak of "religion and the growing mind" may be to start from an illegitimate assumption, unless we mean that the more the mind grows the less will it be concerned with anything as unreal as religion.

There would be little incentive to write about religion at all, however, if the only purpose to be served were that of trying to demonstrate that it has no practical value in

¹ An excellent presentation of this point of view, together with a psychologist's criticism of it, will be found in the first few chapters of Dr. Raymond B. Cattell's book, *Psychology and the Religious Quest*. The later, constructive part of the book, however, though a good defence of religion as corresponding to our experience of the real world, can hardly be said to offer a religion which either meets the needs or is within the comprehension of the common man—and still less of the growing mind. It is in fact more academic than most theological treatises.

the business of living because it corresponds to nothing real in the universe. To prove a negative is a logical impossibility, and the attempt would be only less cheerless than success, if success were attainable. Even the erudite Professor Leuba¹ and the naïve Dr. David Forsyth,² in their efforts to disprove the correspondence of Christian beliefs with realities, end by saying that if these beliefs are surrendered substitutes must be found. On the other hand, the main argument of this book would be altogether vitiated if we were to evade all prior questions about the validity of religious belief and experience in general. We must recognise, however, the existence of differing opinions as to whether religious beliefs and observances of divers forms are universal. We come back to the question to which we referred at the very beginning of this chapter. Is it true that all men are in some fashion or other religious?

The facts may indeed show that if religion is thrust out at the door it comes back again by the window—in these days under the guise of devotion to a nation, a dictator, or an “ideology.” That it is universal, however, is no proof of its validity, but may only be evidence that mankind is incurably self-deceiving. Yet religion, in that case, is still an inescapable and perpetual fact, if only in the sense that an illusion, or even a plain and blatant lie, is still a fact. As such the psychologist must take account of it if his study of human nature is to be complete. Jung puts this in a more positive way. Having carefully safeguarded the distinction between the psychological and the philosophical approaches he says: “The methodological standpoint of that kind of psychology which I represent . . . is exclusively phenomenological, that is, it is concerned with occurrences, events, experiences—in a word, with facts. Its truth is a fact and not a judgment.

¹ *God or Man?*

² *Psychology and Religion.*

Speaking for instance of the motive of the Virgin birth, psychology is only concerned with the fact that there is such an idea, but it is not concerned with the question whether such an idea is true or false in any other sense. It is psychologically true inasmuch as it exists. Psychological existence is subjective in so far as an idea occurs in only one individual. But it is objective in so far as it is established by a society—by a *consensus gentium*.”¹

The conviction which animates all that follows in these pages is that religion is in the truest sense a correspondence between normal, healthy men and God as the final, living, personal Reality.² This is not to say, however, that all forms of religion are equally true, for religion involves the whole personality, and all advance in human knowledge must mean that with the passing of the ages men are better equipped both for knowing God and for entering into conscious relationships with Him.

Religion obviously rests upon the belief that its object is real. If we are not to fall into the fallacy of taking psychology for philosophy or theology, we must constantly remind ourselves that the question of the nature of reality belongs to the sphere of the philosopher. Dr. Roland Dalbiez, in his trenchant criticism of Freud's attitude to religion, says that before describing religion as a “collective illusion” one must first show that religion itself is illusory. He castigates psycho-analysts of this type for their “psychiatric imperialism,” and their readiness to pronounce upon delicate problems in fields which are not their own. “The more exact a science is,” he says, “the more severely limited is its domain. Whenever any intellectual discipline whatsoever pretends to resolve

¹ *Psychology and Religion*, p. 3.

² “The essence of religion is not a cult, it is not an instinct, but man's spiritual *rapprochement* with a divine Person. This experience is not marked off from others by rigidly defined characteristics (*n'a rien de spécifique*).” Prof. H. Clavier, *L'Idée de Dieu chez l'Enfant*, p. 75.

problems of every kind, the logician must remind himself that he is in the presence not of a science but of a 'know-everything' ('*une pantologie*'). The greatest intelligences of mankind are divided on the problem of religion, and the necessary conclusion is that in its essence this problem is extra-psychiatric, just like any literary or scientific problem. The atheistic psychiatrist, if he wishes to remain faithful to the demands of a vigorous methodology, must regard religious belief, not as an illusion in the psychiatric sense of the word, but as a conviction which in the name of his own personal philosophy he holds to be false."¹ Psychology can only explain the processes involved when human beings feel, think and act in ways which we are accustomed to describe as religious. It cannot determine whether the assumed cause or object of this religious experience and behaviour possesses independent reality or not. That question is a philosophical and not a psychological one.

Even philosophers cannot afford to dogmatise. They too must give reasons for the conclusions to which they come. Their arguments must take account of evidence gathered from all quarters, and not from a single science such as psychology. Professor de Burgh thus makes a genuinely philosophical approach to this problem when he writes²: "Philosophy, alone of the sciences, takes all experience for its province. Within experience the facts of religion have as clear a title to be reckoned with as those of sense perception or moral conduct. It is the merest prejudice that would restrict the scope of philosophy to non-religious knowledge, or exclude God and the world-order from its purview." Further, he says: "The

¹ *La Méthode Psychanalytique et La Doctrine Freudienne : Tome II : Discussion*, pp. 495-498.

² *Towards a Religious Philosophy*, pp. 132, vi. 245. Again, on p. 36, "Religious experience can yield knowledge as verifiable and illuminative as that reached by any other line of approach."

distinction between religion and morality is found to rest on the fact that the former is not merely practical, but essentially a form of knowledge, and that its knowledge is of God. . . . Reason, taken in its full breadth of meaning, is active in all knowing, be it intuitive or discursive, of facts or of value, of objects within the sensible world or beyond it. Its activity is displayed wherever the mind grasps truth, in moral experience, in art, in religion, as well as in science and philosophy ; and in the vision, not only of truth, but of good."

In his Gifford lectures, Professor de Burgh dismisses the notion that religious experience is merely emotional. Such a view, he says, "is hardly likely to find favour with those who think." For religion involves practice. But even religious practice is secondary and instrumental, not an end in itself. "Religion has its source and its goal in knowledge. . . . Religion implies belief in the existential reality of its object, God. Its knowledge is not of an ideal, but of a fact. . . . Religion stakes its all on the truth of the belief in God. If that claim to knowledge should prove illusory, religion is robbed of the foundation on which it stands." ¹

Even the psychologist who does not trespass upon the philosopher's province, however, finds that psychology cannot be cut off from philosophy any more than it can be from physiology. The weakness of many psychologists is twofold. In the first place they make what are actually philosophical affirmations without considering any but psychological data. In the second they forget that when they confine themselves to psychological statements these are nevertheless inevitably coloured by some kind of philosophy. In all probability, the philosophy is implicit and unrecognised. When it is otherwise it has in too many instances been accepted without question. There was

¹. *From Morality to Religion*, pp. 31-33.

something to be said for the mediæval classification of psychology as a department of philosophy. This still prevails in the older universities. It is essential, nevertheless, that psychology should be recognised in its own right as a descriptive and experimental science, so long as it does not then come to be regarded, either by psychologists or by others, as scientific only when it is dealing with measurement reducible to mathematical formulæ. In considering religion as part of human experience we are confronted with the problem of whether faith is the convenient indulgence of fantasy, or whether Professor de Burgh is right in saying that "faith in religious revelation, if it be truly faith, falls, not outside, but within the domain of reason," and that "if that faith be in any measure cognitive its value must include the truth of the cognition."¹

We cannot here launch out into discussions which would carry us into the depths of philosophy. At the same time we must at every point remember that psychology, in dealing with religious experience as with any other aspect of knowing, feeling and willing, becomes mere speculation unless it keeps its feet firmly on the ground and, like any other science, depends consistently for its material upon the observation and verification of observed facts.² Keeping these two considerations in mind

¹ *Towards a Religious Philosophy*, pp. 212, 17.

² In their failure to do so, as Dr. Roland Dalbiez observes with great shrewdness, extreme exponents of the Freudian school argue in a circle—"The unreal character of religion is established by the psycho-analytic method, but the applicability of the psycho-analytic method rests in turn upon the unreal (*déréalité*) character of religion." He maintains that religion has its specific quality. "Psycho-analytic enquiry does not explain the philosophic in philosophy, the artistic in art, the scientific in science, the moral in morality, the religious in religion. The specific quality of spiritual values escapes the instrument of investigation created by Freud's genius. The fundamental problems of the human spirit remain after psycho-analysis what they were before." *Op. cit.* II, 510 f.

it will be well to glance at the change which, during the past decade, has steadily been coming over the attitude of psychologists in general towards religion.

Philosophers work more slowly than psychologists, but their criticisms of the too hasty conclusions about religion reached by some psychologists, chiefly under Freudian and Behaviouristic influence, in the first quarter of the century, have had in due time a wholesome effect. We need go no further than the writings of psychologists themselves, however, to find reasons of a primarily psychological character for declining to agree with the description of religion as "a useful illusion" or "a retreat from reality—a childish regression," to say nothing of the entire omission of it from among the facts considered relevant to the understanding and explanation of human behaviour. We might turn to these writings simply as a useful resource in an endeavour to defend religion against a damaging attack, but their importance is far greater than that. They do not leave us with the impression that religion is a question of taste, so that a man may continue to believe, and may bring up his children to do the same, without intellectual reproach. They affirm quite positively that religion is necessary to wholeness, freedom and progress. They do more than reinstate religion as a vital factor in true growth, indispensable to the achievement of genuine maturity. They illuminate and enrich it at the same time as they show how the energies which it liberates and unifies should be used for the creative development of personality and society.

The most notable pronouncement has been that made by Jung in *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*.¹ Going carefully over his case-records he discovered that the mental disorders of practically all his patients of mature age during thirty years' constant practice were traceable to

¹ Pp. 139-142.

some loss of religious faith, and that restoration to health was dependent upon the recovery of a new and stronger religious conviction—not necessarily, of course, Christian, but quite definitely religious. Behind this is “the fact that man has, everywhere and always, spontaneously developed religious forms of expression, and that the human psyche from time immemorial has been shot through with religious feelings and ideas . . . whoever cannot see this aspect of the human psyche is blind, and whoever chooses to explain it away, or to ‘enlighten’ it away, has no sense of reality.” Indeed, Jung goes on to say, many of the theories advanced by Freud himself to explain what happens in the depths of men’s minds are really truths of religion disguised in a psychological dress. As President of the International Conference on Psychotherapy held at Oxford in 1938, he devoted the final session to answering questions. The last of these with which he dealt was whether religious experience is valid. His answer was an emphatic *yes*, and in his closing sentence he averred that in so far as we are without it we are a little insane.

Professor McDougall not long ago confessed that having, as a psychologist, for fifty years “weighed the evidences and the arguments in an impartial and agnostic spirit” he was now impelled to range himself on the side of religion, albeit in a position “vague though positive,” and without committing himself to membership of any church.¹

“Science,” wrote Dr. McDougall, “cannot deny that man recognises and acclaims truth, goodness and beauty, in all their forms; but it has denied that man’s aspiration to conserve and create these values is of any efficacy. And this is the most fundamental part of the attack of science upon religion.

¹ *Religion and the Sciences of Life*, pp. viii, 5 f., 10.

For if this denial is well founded, religion is wholly illusory.

"But religion of the more positive kind goes further. It asserts that these spiritual values are not merely incidents in the experience of individual men, realised and achieved by them in their various degrees, feebly and dimly by the common man, more intensely and richly by the highly endowed and developed natures who represent the peaks of humanity. It assumes, at least as a working hypothesis, that in these individual experiences man does not merely go through peculiar phases of emotion, nor merely find in them the stimulus to strive effectively for the realisation of spiritual values. It asserts rather that in such experiences man makes contact with an aspect of the universe that is real and supremely important, an aspect which takes precedence of the physical realm. Furthermore, religion assumes that he not only makes contact with this realm but also shares in it, partakes of it, is influenced by it, and in return can contribute something, however little, to it." Thereupon Dr. McDougall asked and answered a plain question—"Do biology and psychology render untenable the fundamental postulates of religion? The answer is clear: they do not."

Professor Leuba has spent a lifetime upon the study of the psychology of religion—mainly, it would seem, with the aim of proving that religious mysticism is nothing but a sublimated expression of sex impulse and feeling, and that God as the object of religious worship and the hearer of prayer is an illusion. In his most recent book, *God or Man*, however, he appears very much in the position of Balaam.¹ "Science," he says, "does not stand in the way of a conception of ultimate Reality, of God, which would satisfy, at least partly, human yearnings for

¹ Pp. 7, 16-18, 313-318.

kinship with the Universe, for cosmic fellowship. One of the facts emphasised in this book is the presence in humanity of an urge tending not towards adaptation to what is, but to a social world in which goodness and beauty would be realised. That fact opens the door to a legitimate faith in the existence in the Universe of a Power, or a Trend, which makes for goodness and beauty—a faith possible to those who respect the findings of science.” Like the Humanists he argues that no belief in a personal God is required for the satisfaction of this universal craving or the fulfilment of this inborn propensity. “The primary and essential function” of religions, he observes, “is not to help man to avoid, but, rather, to meet reality in a practically efficient way. . . . Although religion, like magic, industry, and other human activities, consists in acquired ways of behaviour, it may nevertheless be claimed that the acquisition of these ways is made possible through the existence of innate traits. Men are so made as to hunger, fear, love and think according to uniform laws.” If, however, there are no actual divinities to evoke and respond to human religious impulses then “an equivalent to that for which God stands in Christianity must be present in the mind. . . . Two and only two conditions need fulfilment in order that man may reap the blessings ascribed to communion with God : plasticity in relaxation, and the possession of an ideal of life equivalent to the Christian moral ideal.” Dr. Leuba’s “Power or Trend” is Matthew Arnold’s “Stream of tendency, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness” all over again, while his substitutes for God and Christian morality are reminiscent of the man who said that Shakespeare’s plays were not written by Shakespeare, but by an unknown person of the same name. He is forced back upon religion as a real element in human nature corresponding to something no less real

in the universe, though he refuses to call that something God, or to regard it as personal. Much more crudely, Dr. David Forsyth,¹ dismissing belief in God as groundless, nevertheless speaks of religion as "something innate." He again, for all his desire to show that religion is incompatible with intellectual candour and with the results of psychological enquiry, succeeds only in making clear his antipathy to particular religious beliefs: he cannot deny that religion in itself is a positive force in human life.

The work of the late Dr. Ian Suttie will claim our attention to a considerable extent as we proceed. A Freudian by training and in his practice as a physician of the mind, he came to the conviction that Freud's argument with regard to religion was false. A trenchant chapter entitled "Religion—Disease or Remedy?" in his very significant book, *The Origins of Love and Hate*, gives good psychological reasons for unhesitating affirmation that the religious factor in personality is of the greatest importance and value.

Evidence such as this has a significance of its own because of the source from which it comes. Those who contribute it can scarcely be suspected of sustained prejudice in favour of religion. Even more weighty, if less dramatic, is the consistently held and thoroughly tested position of equally eminent psychologists, psychiatrists and psycho-analysts such as Dr. William Brown, Dr. Crichton-Miller, Dr. Hadfield and Professors Grensted, Bovet and Pratt. To them what Jung, McDougall and Suttie have comparatively lately been constrained by experience and maturing thought to avow has all the time been clear, both practically and theoretically. Dr. Brown may be regarded as typical of them all when he writes: "I will give you my definition of religion. It is the attitude that the whole man takes up towards

¹ In *Psychology and Religion*.

reality, or towards the determiner of his destiny. . . . We find that when we analyse ourselves or others we or they become our true selves, more capable of directing our energies along the one channel with single-mindedness and according to a single motive. So with religion ; all that analysis does of a destructive kind is to kill false religion, the short-sighted infantile outlook on life that may have held us back. It enables us really to grow up in our minds as we grow up in our bodies. As we grow in mind we do not see religion disappearing ; on the contrary, it becomes deepened." ¹

To regard their opinion concerning the reality of God and the psychological importance of religion in the development of personality as biased, or as lacking scientific detachment, merely because it is positive, and neither negative nor neutral, would be as logical as to dismiss the writings of Dr. Julian Huxley on biology because he believes in evolution, or those of Sir James Jeans on astronomy because he accepts the theory of relativity. Actually it is they who throughout have insisted not only upon the truth but upon the whole truth. They have neither confused structure with function nor insisted on the importance of the one to the exclusion of the other. It is not that they have been persistently loyal to what others supposed a lost cause, and have preserved their religious faith despite their scientific knowledge. What they have perceived is that the native energies and capacities of man find unity and direction, as well as natural expression, in religion. As psychologists in general recognise to an increasing extent that religion must be taken into account, not as a fantasy, but as a vital personal relationship to reality, it will be to the knowledge and wisdom of those who for thirty years and more have closely watched and utilised this powerful factor at work

¹ *Mind, Medicine and Metaphysics*, pp. 212, 269 f.

in men's lives that psychiatrists and psychoanalysts will turn for illumination and guidance. Religiously-minded people, on the other hand, who have dreaded the attrition of faith by the advance of psychological investigation, as the last generation feared the undermining of it by the Higher Criticism, will find the religious life quickened and reinforced by fuller knowledge of the energies involved and the way in which they are expressed, just as we now find the Bible a more living book because we know better how and why it came into existence.

What then, from the psychological point of view, is religion? The Bishop of Jarrow, in referring to the very practical illustration of what Christianity means for most people which he had observed in a great camp of Scouts from all over the world, said that the essence of religion is the worship of God and the service of man. No attribution of it to the exercise of a special faculty which men possess and animals do not would satisfy the modern psychologist. Nor would he be content to speak of a religious instinct, like in kind but superior in quality and function to the instincts which men have been said to share with animals—the food-getting, mating, fighting, building, acquisitive and other instincts. For one thing, Dr. McDougall, who taught us all to regard the instincts as the deep-hidden driving forces which we detect in ourselves and other men only through the characteristic emotion with which each is connected, and the specific type of action prompted by each instinct in the presence of situations to which it is appropriate, himself ceased to consider the instincts as ultimate elements in our psychological make-up. He came to discriminate¹ between propensities and abilities, and to maintain that while in the animal each property is usually “geared to” one ability, in the man it can be switched over from one ability

¹ *The Energies of Men*, passim.

to another, as, for example, when citizens of European countries who had been fighting each other during the Great War joined together to fight an epidemic which threatened to decimate one of those countries. Religion is not one instinct among others in the old sense of the term instinct, for it has no one characteristic emotion or form of expression. Neither is it one propensity or ability among others, for when we reflect upon religion as it may be observed in all sorts and conditions of men, women and children, of all ages, countries, faiths and communities, we begin to see that religion makes use of all the propensities and all the abilities exhibited by the human race. Dr. Raymond Cattell points out that, even from the standpoint of those psychologists who do not believe, as he does, that religion is more than a psychological disorder or illusion, "With such a range of instincts to draw upon, it is evident that the religious sentiments are capable of dominating the whole personality by the predominance of their dynamic resources."¹

The most accurate classification of religion, psychologically, is indeed to speak of it as a sentiment. The technical use of this term is of course not to be confused with the popular. A sentiment is formed by the grouping of emotional tendencies round an object in consciousness so that when one of them is aroused it tends to call the others into activity also. Inasmuch as the emotions are closely connected with propensities (*i.e.* "instincts") the latter also are stimulated, and thus action along the line of the abilities is instigated. Reason, intelligence, choice, purpose and other factors in personality will play a large part in deciding which abilities are exercised. Habit, character and will are involved. The bodily energies are brought into play as well as those of the mind and spirit. Moreover, sentiments, while each consisting of a grouping

¹ *Psychology and the Religious Quest*, p. 38.

of emotions and propensities round lesser² objects, may themselves be grouped round a greater by means of a dominant, integrating sentiment. Family life, school and college, sport, vocation, political party and Church may all be objects about which a man has built up sentiments, but all these sentiments may enter into the composition of his patriotism, which in certain circumstances may become dominant. In this sense, then, religion is regarded as a sentiment, and, apart from adherence to a particular creed or committal to the cause of one religious community rather than another, there are ample psychological reasons for holding that religion not only may, but must, become the dominating sentiment for us all if our individual and corporate life is to achieve wholeness, if security and freedom as well as health of body and mind are to be established, and if our life is to be at once conservative of all the treasures that humanity has won and creative of that which has enduring worth.

Religion thus involves and expresses the whole person in all his relationships. Thought, feeling and will, reasonable belief, disciplined and directed emotion, purposive conduct—all are bound up with it. "Religion," as Jung has said,¹ "is the fruit and the culmination of the completeness of life." It is the response of the complete man to what is supreme in his universe. Thus at every stage from birth to maturity our developing propensities, abilities and capacities are to our ripening religion as warp to woof. This book seeks to trace out that connection. The human and scientific interest of doing so would in itself make such a study worth while. If it be true that religion is not only the one dominant sentiment which touches every aspect of human personality and society but is also the sentiment most surely centred in the ultimate Reality of all existence, the practical importance of knowing how

¹ *Psychology and Religion*, p. 50.

it unifies and directs all our natural energies of body and mind at once becomes evident. For then we have in our hands, by cultivation of it in our own lives and by educating children in accordance with our own knowledge and experience, nothing less than the reshaping of our world, beginning from within ourselves by that worship of God which issues in service of men. We become ever-growing and genuinely creative persons.

Clearly, the nobler the object of our religion and the more it partakes of the essence of reality, the more fully will it elicit our response, and the more potent will it be in giving unity and direction to personal and social life. Without suggesting, even by implication, that Christianity is the religion in which alone can any truth and reality be found, it is, as was indicated at the beginning of this chapter, the response of men to the self-utterance of God in Jesus Christ with which we shall here be concerned. While most of what has already been said and of what will follow holds good of every religion in which the whole personality, body, mind and spirit, is honestly, sincerely and without reserve engaged, it will appear as we proceed that the Christian religion, with its belief in God as the author of creation and redemption and as the Father who is also Sovereign Lord, the religion centred in a historic incarnation and manifest in the transfiguration of men by the Spirit of Jesus, meets as no other does the psychological as well as the moral and spiritual needs of men. The confessed aim of Christianity is to produce, in St. Paul's words, a full-grown man. Our question is, how are the natural forces of growing minds related to the nature and development of such a religion?

II

BEGINNINGS

WHAT does a psychologist see in his new-born baby? Since it is his he will not be likely to look upon it with the dry detachment which a scientist collecting data for investigation may pride himself upon maintaining. Yet since he is a scientist he will look more closely than would a less sophisticated father. He will also be more aware of the tendency to read something of his own intellectual and emotional states or processes into the infant's mind. Psychologist-fathers are no doubt a very small minority in the vast army of parents, and by no means all of them are any more perfect, either as fathers or as psychologists, than are other men in respect of parental attitude and vocational wisdom. We take them, however, as concrete illustrations of a fact very easily and frequently unobserved, but vital to the understanding of any human being, especially if that human being is so little able to explain itself as a baby. To understand another, one must possess that subtle *rapprochment* which can only exist between persons whose relationship is emotional as well as intellectual, in the deepest sense personal as well as physical or social, who, in a word, belong. It is equally necessary that one should deal with the situation in the light of wider observation and reflection, should perceive accurately what is happening, should distinguish event from interpretation, and should apply some tested standards of judgment to both events and interpretations.

We return then, to the baby and his affectionate but keenly observant father. At birth, and for a long time after, the baby is a singularly weak, dependent, yet self-assertive little organism with amazing potentialities. Its chief business obviously is to go on living, now that it has been given a start, and to grow, utilising everything in its environment favourable to that end. We have but to consider for a moment how small a thing in its interior economy or its surroundings may suffice to injure its health, or even imperil its existence, and we shall at once appreciate the precariousness of its early progress, however great the care lavished upon it by those who love it and are responsible for it. If too we contrast its smallness and weakness with the size and strength of all the lions in the path along which it must needs make its way, we may well marvel at its initiative and tenacity.

When it emerges into this hurly-burly of a world most of its powers are latent. It has no memories—unless we believe in *anamnesis* as Plato did, or accept Jung's doctrine of the unconscious as made up in large part of "racial" memories. Nor can it project itself in imagination into the future, for the material from which human imaginings are wrought is always in some measure drawn from the sensory and other experiences gained only through varied contact with people and things. As yet the baby cannot reason, in the normal sense of the word, or think in terms of anything but its immediate needs and satisfactions. It cannot even change its place, but must stay, where it finds itself until it is moved by kindly hands—or by the force of gravity. But it can make its demands known with an insistence which speedily renders it a far from negligible member of society. It can resist—or at least thwart—the will of those on whom it depends, after a fashion that may even reduce them to a sense of helplessness. It can respond to love and care. It can exhibit pain or fear.

Centred as it must be upon the maintenance of its own life, and conscious of all about it primarily as affecting its own well-being, it very soon shows a significant awareness of its relationship with other human beings and of its power to affect them, if only by directing their attention to itself.

Here, then, is in each case something original, unique, dynamic, however dependent and however malleable. The very quality of life in the tiniest green speck of a plant bespeaks the thrust of innate energies, seeking nourishing relationships with those elements in sun and soil, wind and water, which stimulate and enhance its growth after its kind ; seeking, too, conquest of whatever may obstruct, distort, or quench its growth from a mere cell to a flowering or fruit-bearing member of its species. No process of artificial generation will produce that mysterious energy of life. When the living organism has once appeared, however, the continuance of its life and the achievement of its growth are unquestionably conditional upon its relationships.

Living organisms like plants either have no consciousness or if, as Sir Jagadis Bose believed that he had proved, they have a form of consciousness, this is but a very rudimentary awareness of their environment as attractive or repellent. The child is very different. His relationships with persons quickly come to be more important than his relationship with purely physical objects or circumstances. From the latter he learns the differences between hot and cold, wet and dry, smooth and rough, sweet and bitter, things which can be pushed or pulled and things which resist his efforts to move or manipulate them. So his perceptions increase, his world acquires greater variety and meaning from the intellectual standpoint, and he experiences emotions of pleasure and the reverse. With those who care for him and play with him there is a give-

and-take which later he comes to recognise as a harmony or clash of activities and purposes. From the beginning, however, through his bodily contact with parents and other members of the family, nurses and even strangers, he not only receives welcome or repugnant sensations, and feels appropriate emotions, but is subtly stirred by those deeper influences which we have already summed up as *rapport*.

Dr. Watson's experiments seem to have shown that the three chief responses which an infant is capable of making are fear, when he feels himself falling for lack of support or when he hears a sudden loud noise, anger, when his movements are restrained, and love. Dr. Watson's conception of love in this connection, while not as specifically sexual as Freud's, appears to be restricted to signs of sensuous satisfaction following upon the stroking or titillation of certain "erogenous zones" in the body. The limitation is probably due to Dr. Watson's desire, in the interests of his theory, to trace all behaviour to some physiological stimulus. There is no real ground for this narrowing of either the nature of the child's response or the action which provokes it, as anyone may prove who will take the trouble to watch babies for a little while. Nor can the first two of the three responses observed by Dr. Watson be accurately described as purely physiological. However much of the mechanical there may be in them, in the same sense as the action of a decorticated frog is mechanical when the frog still endeavours to remove with its hands a spot of acid dropped on its body, the total situation in which the frightened or angry baby finds itself is one that has *meaning* for it.

There is no need to labour the argument that for the first three years of its life a child is predominantly emotional. We can accept this as a fact now almost universally recognised. What has not yet been adequately

brought out is this element of meaning in the characteristically emotional experiences of infancy. Emotion is not simply a frothing up of aimless and unrelated "feeling," to use the familiar but ambiguous word for which psychologists have substituted the term "affect." Even at the most primitive level of human life we "feel" about an object or situation which is present to consciousness, and we have a tendency, however vague or slight, to "do something about it": we try to prolong its presence if it is congenial, or to remove either it or ourselves if it is otherwise.

Dr. McDougall, in a series of broadcast talks some years ago, traced back all emotional attitudes to the two which he declared to be primary and fundamental—Love and Hate. More recently Dr. Suttie has taken the same view, and elaborated the conclusions to be drawn from it. Watson's three responses may be interpreted largely in these terms. Emotions are closely related to instinct. Before the concept of instinct was analysed into propensities and abilities there was a strong tendency among psychologists to classify all instincts as offshoots from one or other of three main instincts—Self, Sex and the Herd. These remain, even though they are now described as propensities. Demonstrably we can reduce the three to two. There is a direction of the life energy towards the self and a complementary direction of it towards others, for unless sex becomes abnormal it is far more than an irresistible impulse or a mere means of self-gratification, while the mutual fulfilment of two partners in sex gives rise not only to the family but ultimately to the tribe, the clan, the nation—in fact, to every form of human society in which the bond is that of blood-relationship. Here, too, meaning is involved, for even the older conception of instinct did not represent it as the mere blind "urge," or "drive," of elemental forces springing from the inmost

constitution of animal or man. Instinct was defined as the tendency to respond in a characteristic, appropriate and unlearned manner to specific stimuli or situations—flight from danger, aggression against obstacles or antagonists, the mating approach to the opposite sex. If in the newer representation man is seen to differ from animals in being able to link his propensities to various abilities, evidently he must be able to choose between the ends to which these abilities are means, and therefore even what was formerly called instinctive action is now still more clearly shown to have an element of meaning inseparable from its purposiveness.

All these energies of which we have been speaking are recognised by psychologists of every school, except perhaps the Behaviourist, as innate. In the new-born baby, as we said, most of them may be latent, but they emerge in greater or less degree as he enters into inevitable relationships with things and people. When he emerges into the world he is a creature of instinctual propensities—directed towards self-maintenance and other-relatedness—and with these propensities are bound up his emotional states and tendencies. Fear, anger and love, or love and hate, the propensity to satisfy himself and the propensity to satisfy others, the power to perceive objects, to find meaning in them, and to experience emotions with regard to them—all these states of mind, attitudes, impulses or whatever we choose to call them, are involved in the simplest ways of living and growing. They are called forth by his contacts with persons and things. But while the baby becomes aware of them all, his relationships with persons matter more to him than his contacts with things, or even animals, precisely because they *mean* more to him in the pressing business of preserving and increasing the insistent claim of his own life to security and satisfaction. On the other hand, his emotion is met by an answering

emotion, so that his impulse towards relatedness with the lives of others finds outlet and exercise. Though, as we have said, thinking (at least to the extent of perceiving, remembering and recognising), feeling and striving can never be separated in any moment or phase of human experience, for the baby, until he is about three years old and is able both to walk and to talk, meaning and purpose must find expression through emotional attitudes and behaviour. Only so can he show us, as it were, the inside of his mind. Essentially so does he appreciate what is inside our minds, for have we not often noticed that a tiny child seems to understand when someone speaks in language unquestionably beyond him? What he has caught, of course, is the emotional significance of tone, facial expression, movement or gesture.

Obviously the tiny child's chief relationships are with his parents, or with those who fulfil the functions of a parent towards him. For him they are the source of all that makes life safe and pleasant. They are the daily determiners of his fate. Not till the child passes into the second stage of his growth, approximately between three and seven, has he, as far as we can ascertain, the necessary physiological and mental capacity to make and use concepts—general terms for classes or objects. Until then his world is a world of percepts—apprehensions of individual and particular objects—and contains no abstract ideas. He knows nothing of power, love, protection, control, or even of right and wrong, as generalisations. But he knows all these, and a host of other realities which the adult denotes by similarly abstract words, in the concrete, chiefly as they are exhibited in the actions, and above all as they are revealed in the emotional attitudes, of his parents or parent substitute.¹

¹ Cf. Dr. Emanuel Miller's explanation of this process in *The Generations*, *passim*.

Are we to suppose, however, that at this stage, when life is for him a series of emotional situations, the meaning which he discovers in these situations is nothing more than a vague, diffused apprehension? Writing of adults, Professor Halford Luccock refers to "a fact which has a bearing on both theology and psychology—that it is hard to keep unframed meaning." For a tiny child it is impossible. "There is continuing urgent need," says the Professor, "to fill in the word 'God' with ethical content to save it from becoming a holy blur,"¹ and of course he points to the Christian experience of Jesus Christ as completely filling with meaning men's thought of God. A negative illustration of his point is the quotation that he makes from *A Wanderer's Way*, in which Professor C. E. Raven recalls the preparation of boys at school for Confirmation: "I do not think that Jesus ever came into our view or that God was more than a name." Historically, before Jesus lived and taught, ideas of God were either vague and general or, though very definite, inadequate if not distorted. If now we find the master-light of all our seeing in the portrayal of God by Jesus as the Creator and Lord who is also Father, we think of Him as personal in the sense of exercising thought, feeling and will, but as infinite in power and wisdom, in holiness and love, transcending our thought and calling forth our worship, yet immanent by His Spirit both in men and in the cosmic energies.

To think of God solely in terms less than these would be anthropomorphism indeed—the making of God in the image of man, though not, as primitive men made Him, in the image of Nature. Nevertheless, it is true that the knowledge of God in action amidst the conditions of human life which has come to us in Jesus Christ is a key to the apprehension of His nature as ultimate Reality and

¹ *Christianity and the Individual*, pp. 67, 90.

of His eternal purpose. If we did not possess and use that key our thought of God as a transcendent Being, however necessary philosophically, would be so vague as to be practically meaningless, if not altogether illusory, while we should lack all guidance in our morally and physically necessary attempts to make our actions accord, not only with a "reality-principle" such as Freud hypothesizes, but with Reality itself.

Further, and this is far more fundamental to the actuality of religious experience, we could not enter into that relationship with God which Professor Martin Buber has defined as the relation of "I and Thou."¹ In our life with Nature, he says, "creatures live and move over against us, but cannot come to us, and when we address them as *Thou*, our words cling to the threshold of speech." In our life with men, "the relation is open and in the form of speech." But in our life with spiritual beings, "the relation is clouded, yet it discloses itself; it does not use speech, yet begets it. We perceive no *Thou*, but none the less we feel we are addressed and we answer—forming, thinking, acting. We speak the primary word with our being, though we cannot utter *Thou* with our lips." For this relationship with all that is most real and personal, yet infinite, is not to be comprehended within the processes of intellect or the possibilities of speech alone. "The primary word *I—Thou* can only be spoken with the whole being." We realise the truth of this as soon as we reflect upon the daily commerce that we hold with the men and women nearest and dearest to us.

All this may seem to have carried us far away from the

¹ *I and Thou*, Eng. trans. by Ronald Gregor Smith, pp. 3, 6. Dr. Berdyaev's insistence, in *Solitude and Society*, that "I" and "Thou" must become "We" is an important comment on what Dr. Buber writes.

baby and his predominantly emotional intercourse with those about him and especially with his parents. Really, we are nearer to an explanation of what is going on in the baby's world than we were before we brought the theologian and the philosopher to the aid of the psychologist-father. If religion (as distinguished from particular forms of belief, worship and conduct) is anything more than an acquired habit of mind it must be an innate capacity, just as certainly as the capacity to speak, the propensity to fight, or the ability to sow and build. It is a power of response which ultimately takes the form of a dominant sentiment, utilising, harmonising and directing everything in the make-up of a man. It is, as we saw, centred in an apprehension of God as real and personal.

In what sense, then, can it possibly be said of this scrap of humanity, compounded at present mainly of physical needs and emotional states, that he already has the makings of a consciously religious person in him, though intelligence, imagination, reasoning powers and moral perceptions are for him as yet little more than latent potentialities, to be developed only very slowly during a considerable period of years? The answer lies in that parent-child relationship in which from the outset the "I and Thou" is fundamental, though from the side of the baby it is but gradually perceived, and the meaning of it is fused with sensations and emotions, since for some time to come the child must be incapable of "framing" meaning in any medium as definite as words. "At what age," asks Professor Henri Clavier, "does the child begin to make for itself a concept of God? That is a problem which does not lend itself to precise and absolute solution. We may say, however, that in the generality of cases the first manifestations of the religious idea present themselves at the age of questioning, that is to say towards the age

of three.”¹ But if this be agreed we at once begin to ask what has been occurring before then, during these three years of which Professor Cyril Burt has said that at their climax the child’s emotions are more intense than they will be at any other time in his life.²

Following upon M. Clavier’s original enquiries Professor Pierre Bovet worked out the implications for religious development of the child’s complete dependence upon its parents throughout those earliest years. He states them in phraseology which might suggest a more mature intellectual activity on the child’s part (unless the word “idea” is given a very wide connotation) than is likely to take place even among unusually intelligent three-year-olds. Without doing any violence to his argument, however, we can read it in those terms of propensity, emotion and feeling which, as we have seen, are applicable practically from birth. “When,” he says, “we endeavour to formulate the child’s ideas of his father and mother, we find them to include the divine attributes of classical theology: omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection.”³ He entitles the chapter from which this quotation is taken “The First Adoration,” and is careful to point out that “the implicit affirmations of the child precede the age of logical reasoning and owe nothing to it,” and that by the “childish theology” of which he is speaking he means “the attributes with which the child endows his parents.”⁴ In other words, the infant finds in mother and father (long before he can identify them under such names) the source of warmth and food, of protective care and of firm if kindly control.

¹ *L’Idée de Dieu chez l’Enfant*, p. 14.

² Consultative Committee of the Board of Education: Report on *Infant and Nursery Schools*, p. 247.

³ *Le Sentiment Religieux et la Psychologie de l’Enfant*, p. 30; Eng. trans. by George H. Green, *The Child’s Religion* (O.P.), p. 26.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 35; Eng. trans. p. 29.

As his emotional response begins to be accompanied by appreciable thought, however elementary, he looks upon his parents as those who know everything and can do everything, who are always right, always good, and always near at hand even if not always in sight. It may be, as Dr. Bovet says, that the child tends to regard all big people as possessing these attributes, but if so it is by "an extension of the feelings inspired in the child by his immediate *entourage*."

In a deeper and wider sense than either Freud or Watson Dr. Bovet believes that love is a primary energy (call it instinct or propensity as we choose). Just as many psychologists have distinguished within the general instinctual energy not only the sex-impulse expressed in love of the sexes for each other, but also the parental instinct expressed in maternal or paternal love, so Dr. Bovet holds that there is a propensity to filial love rooted in the constitution of every human being. To this we shall return. Here we need only remark that there is nothing in such a conviction incompatible with recognition of the limitations in a baby's powers of experience and expression.

Dr. Suttie has increased our insight into the truth about these characteristics of infancy by pointing out that the baby's first bond is most naturally with its mother, who feeds and tends it so constantly, and that the child's consequent emotional attitude of love towards her is directed strongly to its father also if the relationship between mother and father is what it should be. The origin of hate is then discoverable in the child's tendency to resent and resist anything that appears likely to rob him of his sense of security in his mother's love and care. No denial of innate and independent affection for and trust in the father is implied by Dr. Suttie's interpretation of the child-mother relationship. On the face of it,

however, Dr. Suttie's account fits very closely to the facts of the normal domestic situation, and is far more realistic than Freud's theory of infantile sexuality and of the Oedipus-complex. It leaves the parents in the natural position of partners in fostering the child's growth, as they have of necessity been in bringing about its existence, instead of setting them over against each other as unconscious rivals practically from the instant of the child's birth. The way in which at successive periods between birth and maturity girl and boy turn now to mother and now to father as their ideal and the object of their special affection has been very fully set forth by Dr. Crichton Miller¹ and others, following Freud. But while Freud finds additional material here for the elaboration of his theories concerning sex, Dr. Crichton Miller, without ignoring the sex-factor, regards the sequence as indicating the way in which children and adolescents need what both parents can give, the distinctive contribution of each having special value at stages of their children's development which differ as between boys and girls.

This long process by which each of the parents thus complements and helps to interpret the other in relationships of formative importance, probably little recognised either by the parents or by the children, has its beginnings in the dependence of the baby upon the mother, as Dr. Suttie has observed. Indeed, during the three years of infancy it is significant to a degree which cannot easily be over-stated. Freud has laid himself open to the charge of exaggerating both the place of sex as such in the father-mother-child situation and the effects which, as he declares, almost invariably result in later years. Adler has emphasised over-much the mischief that may be wrought even in babyhood by the nature of "the family

¹ Cf. *The New Psychology and the Teacher*.

constellation," though he has a more cheerful and more simple remedy to propound than has Freud. The true reason for valuing as highly as we should these years of infancy, which still in practice are so commonly regarded as negligible or even disadvantageous, is more positive and comprehensive than would follow from the fear of Oedipus or inferiority complexes, mother-fixations and subsequent refusals to face the hard but wholesome realities of life. For it is upon the development of religion throughout the rest of life that the acquirement of meanings and the direction of emotional attitudes, in the days before a child can understand or use the simplest words of religion, have so literally incalculable an influence.

If psychological researches indicate that the normal child under three has not the capacity or the equipment for evolving or even grasping the idea of God, and if nevertheless its emotional attitudes to its mother and father are in essence those which mature men and women spontaneously adopt to the God whom they clearly conceive and with whom they are consciously in communion, the inference is plain. The infant can hardly be supposed to conceive of God. His parents in effect fill that place.

It is at this point, however, that Freud commits his great fallacy, arguing that because to the tiny child his parents are as God, therefore the God of grown-up men and women is merely a fantasy preserved from childhood. We have already seen that the question of the objective reality of God cannot be settled on psychological grounds. We are consequently precluded from maintaining, even if we wished to do so, that the infant's finding of Godlike characteristics in his parents is evidence for the existence of God. The point with which we are concerned is quite different. It is that by his experience of such qualities

in his parents as real, and as answering his vital needs, the tiny child is prepared for a true understanding of the existence and nature of God when later his mental development enables him to grasp these intellectually, as well as to respond to them emotionally—though even his earliest states are not for him devoid of an element of meaning. Furthermore, it becomes evident that in these most elemental and natural early relationships the parents are not merely making or marring the child's character, as Dr. Emanuel Miller so clearly demonstrates. They are actually interpreting or misinterpreting God to the child in the only medium possible, though often the parents have not the faintest notion that religion enters into the matter at all, whether they account themselves religious or not.

Here, then, are the roots of religion. We have given our attention to facts which may be observed in any contemporary family, and our approach has been that of the psychologist seeking to understand living persons with whom he is in direct and immediate contact. It may be objected that this may be good as far as it goes, but that we ought not to be content to work at such short range. Anthropology and history, it will be said, must not be ignored. Behind religion as we experience or encounter it to-day in an age of civilisation there is the long story which sets our modern conceptions in a perspective of mediævalism and paganism, of the cults and philosophies which elbowed one another in the ancient world, and the superstitious fears which filled the hearts of primitive peoples. Indeed, we are reminded that even if we glance for a moment at a large-scale map of our present world we can see in the existing varieties of religion a conspectus of history. While, for instance, the most representative leaders of diversified Christian Churches from all over the world meet at Oxford,

Edinburgh or Madras that they may together worship God as Father and consider how to make more manifest the underlying unity of their faith by deed and word, Dr. Schweitzer confronts tribesmen in Lambarene who are dominated by superstitious beliefs and practices and have no word for God at all. If Milton could discern that "new presbyter is but old priest writ large," may not we be driven in sheer honesty to admit that at the heart of religions now accounted the highest there are elements in common with the crude imaginings and projections which marked the religion of savages reckoned the lowest? What then becomes of our interpretation of the beginnings of religion in babyhood within our own homes?

There is no need to dwell upon the fallaciousness of estimating the value of human life in any of its aspects by origin rather than by end. Even if this had not been exposed a hundred times in different connections it ought to be unnecessary in the light of the general acceptance of the principle of evolution, for to describe as evolution the mere elaboration of a primitive form, without genuine development or progress, would be a misuse of language: an arithmetical formula would summarise such a process better than a biological principle. Nor again need we do more than recall the fact that, while children born in a civilised environment and full-grown primitive men living in unadulterated savagery may exhibit some similar characteristics and tendencies, it is, to say the least, a woeful lack of logic to equate the two. Freud's excursions into anthropology and into the psychology of religion, to say nothing of his theological deductions (in which, to do him justice, he professes but little interest), have been vitiated by this major failure to distinguish between the primitive man and the child of present-day civilisation.

It would be scarcely worth while to touch upon these

extravagant theorisings at all in connection with the theme of this chapter were it not that the outcome of the most thorough psychological and anthropological enquiry into the religion of primitive peoples is very relevant to what has already been said concerning our own children, as European and American psychologists have revealed them to us. In the primitive who, it seems, is universally religious after his own fashion, there appear essentially the same attitude of dependence, and to some extent the same expectation of good, though also, and to a far greater extent, dread of evil and recognition of inescapable powers. Animist, fetishist, totemist, or whatever he may be, he connects the possibilities of favourable or disastrous visitation upon him and his with unseen powers thronging all about him, or perhaps inhabiting some sacred place or object.

To make sweeping and dogmatic assertions would not only betray the absence of scientific caution but would be patently ludicrous, inasmuch as it is obvious that our knowledge is, and must for ever be, confined to so few among primitive peoples, and that those accessible may not be widely representative. There is, however, an increasing amount of evidence that far away in the background, beyond the multitude of spirits and demons, there dwells, according to the dim belief of many of these folk, a great Spirit, called Father by some, but so remote that direct intercourse with him is impossible.¹ He is not feared or hated as the lesser and more incalculable powers are. If he cannot be said to be loved he is,

¹ Cf., for example, E. W. Smith in *The Secret of the African*, pp. 80, 84, 129, and *The Golden Stool*, p. 191. Prof. S. A. Cook writes: "When we turn to the impressive evidence for the belief in supreme gods even among savages, we may freely recognise that something of the nature of a monotheistic belief was regarded as a primitive phenomenon: that is to say, it does not come at the end of a progressive evolutionary series." *The "Truth" of the Bible*, p. 226.

nevertheless,¹ thought of as kindly in his distant, vague existence. A close and lifelong observer of polytheist tribes¹ has recorded his experience that the preaching of the one God, of the Christian faith appealed to the people supremely as a completely new message of deliverance from the multitude of lurking spirits that overshadowed their lives with perpetual fear, but there is good reason for believing that for them it was a filling in of the "blur" which had always been there, yet had yielded no help such as the Hebrew found in "the Lord who made heaven and earth."

Though fault can be found with some phases of Professor Otto's argument in *The Idea of the Holy*, he has performed the great service of penetrating deeply into the nature of religious emotion, and linking elementary forms of religion with the more highly developed through the sense of the "numinous" which he finds at the core of both. It is a mingling of awe and love, with an implied feeling of dependence and yet of power, either to respond or to defy. It is a consciousness of a supreme Reality, wholly "Other" than ourselves indeed, as Karl Barth asserts in so rigorous and one-sided a manner, mysterious, tremendous, holy and almighty in such degree that, if this were all, no attitude could be possible save that of a shrinking hardly to be distinguished from abject fear. But it is also an awareness of this Other as at the same time attractive, so that we spontaneously desire to find ourselves fully at home, as it were, in that Presence, and we begin to hate all that would separate us from that source of security and satisfiedness.² Though the

¹ J. Warneck, in *The Living Forces of the Gospel*.

² Cf. "When I awake in Thy likeness I shall be satisfied," and again, "As a child on the breast of its mother"—phrases which suggest that the Hebrew had some inkling of the connection between childhood relationships with the parent and fully developed personal awareness of and trust in God.

emotions play so large a part in it, this sense of relatedness is of course not pure emotion. It is an attitude, indeed an outgoing, of the whole person, including the psychological unconscious as well as the conscious. In it, if anywhere, is to be found the "raw material of religion," and the baby's earliest sense of an "all-great" that is "the all-loving too" is surely of one texture with it. As in the course of millennia the race has filled out, by process of reason and revelation, this primeval, vague awareness of God, so, as we shall see, in later childhood, youth and manhood, imagination and reason give substance to the emotional intimations which the infant's experience afford. How this comes about, the psychological study of those subsequent stages helps us to understand.

At this point our concern is with those entirely natural, human, universal and inescapable relationships of the child with its mother and father during babyhood which are, in fact, the actual elements of religion. Upon these experiences during infancy all the teaching given when the child is old enough to receive it, as well as all other forces from within or from without the personality which contribute to the building up of a religious life, must of necessity work.

Dr. Graham Howe¹ has spoken of parents as the mediators of reality to their children. The particular problem in connection with which he uses this phrase is the problem of discipline. His phrase sums up the deeper truth with which we have been dealing. Moreover, to the psychological factors which we have endeavoured to set in a clear light there corresponds the religious insight and experience set forth in the New Testament, that it is God of whom every family in heaven and on earth is named. This means that fatherhood and sonship, with

¹ *Morality and Reality*, pp. 73, 83.

all that their interdependence implies, are elemental, but that the significance which they possess for us in the nursery derives from the constitutive principle of the universe.¹ We are not deifying human parenthood, and projecting on to Reality fantasies created out of the transient emotions of children not yet able to reason about the facts of their experience. We should speak, says Dr. Bovet, of "a 'paternisation' of God rather than a 'divinisation' of parents," and see in filial adoration the prototype of religious feelings and the origin of theological dogmas."² Certainly the tiny child, at an age when he cannot even consciously adore his parents, is being prepared to understand the meaning of worshipping the Father, who with Jesus Christ has freely given us all things.

The remark which Mill once made to Carlyle, that "halfness is the great enemy of spiritual work," holds good of other spheres of activity intimately connected with that which Mill had in mind. In the introductory chapter we touched upon the supposition that the investigations of the most eminent psychologists in our generation have proved fatal to the maintenance of religious belief. The chief reason why that conclusion appeared, on the surface at any rate, so convincing was that those psychologists did not carry their enquiries far enough. It might be thought that the references we have made to Freud imply complete disparagement of his doctrines and thorough-going rejection of his psychiatry. On the contrary, it would be sheer prejudice and blind

¹ How crassly the whole argument here advanced may be misunderstood and misrepresented is made evident by Prof. S. A. Cook's curiously illogical remark: "To 'explain' the belief in a Deity from the infant's earliest experiences is to 'explain' parental love from the child's love of dolls and toys." *The "Truth" of the Bible*, p. 227.

² *Op. cit.* p. 46; Eng. trans. p. 43.

obscurantism to deny the unique and permanent value of the discoveries that he has made. In some respects this will in the long run be manifest from a standpoint quite opposite to that which he has himself assumed. His theories have suffered from fixation and arrested development. In his preoccupation with one powerful form of energy in human nature he has either neglected others of equal potency or has tried to interpret them as disguises under which the all-pervading sex motive is at work.

To help him out in the commendation of a hypothesis to which he has clung with fundamentalist tenacity he had recourse to an illustration drawn from ancient mythology—the story of Œdipus and his guilty, if Fate-determined, love for his mother and murderous hatred of his father. But the illustration was turned first into an explanation and finally into a formula for diagnosis. Trouble in later life is traced back to an infantile complex of love (in Freud's sense of *libido*, or desire) for the parent of the opposite sex and hatred for the parent of the same sex, the latter being subtly felt by the child to be a rival claimant for the affections of the former. It would be unfair, and indeed worse, to suggest that there is nothing more scientific and profound than this in the Œdipus-complex dogma.¹ What can legitimately be asserted is not only that Freud has built a system upon a half-truth which misinterprets the parent-child relationship and substitutes the abnormal and comparatively rare for the normal and practically universal, but also that he has so dwelt upon a myth as to obscure for himself and those whom he regards as orthodox disciples the very reality

¹ In *The Generations*, Dr. Emanuel Miller sets forth admirably the genuine significance for the child of those relationships with its parents into which sex differences enter so largely and which Freud distorts in his insistence upon sexuality.

which the actual parent-child relationship, as most people experience it, bodies forth.¹

Paradoxically enough it was Freud's emphasis, even in a distorted fashion, upon this relationship and its primarily emotional quality that stimulated psychologists like Professor Bovet and Dr. Suttie to make the further researches which have contributed so much to a sound and positive psychology of religion and its roots in the father-mother-child relationship.* Indirectly, therefore, Freud has already helped to establish more firmly than ever the validity of the Christianity which he has laboured to prove an illusion.

Jung has put the situation tersely in a sentence which also indicates where he himself now stands: "In Ernst Barlach's tragic novel of family life, *Der Tote Tag*, the mother-dæmon says at the end, 'The strange thing is that man will not learn that God is his father.' That is what Freud would never learn, and what all those who share his outlook forbid themselves to learn. At least they never find the key to this knowledge."² With this failure—we will not say because of it—has gone a misrepresentation of human fatherhood corresponding to the misinterpretation of infantile emotion. Despite all that he has said in protest against the criticism of his theory of infantile sexuality, for he has been at pains to insist that by *libido* he means love in the wide and varied forms which the German word *Liebe* connotes,³ whenever he comes to

¹ See further, pp. 93, 103 f. *infra*.

² *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*, pp. 139-142.

³ "We call by that name the energy of those instincts which have to do with all that may be comprised under the word 'love'." The nucleus of what we mean by love naturally consists (and this is what is commonly called love, and what the poets sing of) in sexual love with sexual union as its aim. But we do not separate from this—what in any case has a share in the name 'love'—on the one hand, self-love, and on the other, love for parents and children, friendship and love for humanity in general, and also devotion to

the analysis of motives in any particular child-situation, or traces the complexes of an adult to experiences during infancy, the word he uses is *libido*, and this in his representation of it is essentially sex, not love. It is desire, with the colouring of what is commonly understood by sex in its narrower aspect, that he finds at the heart of all emotional manifestations, even in the infant. Father or mother is simply the object of that desire. The reciprocal seeking and self-giving which are the true marks of love in its completeness are lacking.¹ Because of their absence it inevitably results that father and mother become for the tiny child the occasions of tension and conflict instead of the source and guarantee of security and harmony. Consequently the acceptance of Freud's theory as he himself applies it vitiates, if it does not destroy,

concrete objects and to abstract ideas." *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, pp. 37 f. Much later, in his *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, p. 133, Freud points out that there is a constant transformation of ego-libido into object-libido, and conversely, he then remarks that if this is so the distinction between the two is unreal: "One can either drop the term 'libido' altogether, or use it as meaning the same as psychic energy in general"—which is practically what Jung does, *e.g.* in his *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 83.

¹ The distinction here made is stated from the standpoint of Christian theology by Professor Nygren thus: "The use of the term *Agape* to describe the love of the Christian for men means that in this case also *Agape* denotes God's own love. . . . 'The love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord' (Rom. viii, 39) is the ground for all that can rightly be called *Agape*, and the characteristic of this love is just self-giving; it is therefore the direct opposite of the love which is desire, which seeks something for the self." *Agape and Eros*, Eng. trans. p. 96. While the Professor is dealing with religion at its highest development in adult life we can perceive the relationship between this and the "beginnings" with which we are here concerned. Against those who would say that patently the infant's impulse is that of desire for something for itself we point to the fact that if "self" and "other" are the two foci of instinctual life, and if instinctive propensities are by definition innate, the beginnings of the other-regarding impulse must be in the child from birth.

the conception of God as father. Furthermore it leaves us with an unhappy, repellent conception of ourselves as fathers and mothers which is only tenable by ordinary people in so far as they keep their psychological theories as widely separated from their actual personal experience as the barrister keeps his legal arguments about criminal cases in the Courts separate from the interests and atmosphere of his family circle. That this should be so is the more regrettable, because if only Freud adhered to his own description of *libido* as love in the large sense the logic of his argument would be exactly that which finds in the love of God as Father the fulfilment of all that the human parent-child relationship at its best shows to be deepest in us.

In elaborating his theory of the ego-ideal,¹ Freud is in some respects more positive. It would almost seem that he had been influenced by Jung's earlier conception of religion as a flight from reality and a regression to childish protectedness, but had endeavoured to find a more satisfactory explanation. "It is easy," he says, "to show that the ego-ideal answers in every way to what is expected of the higher nature of man. In so far as it is a substitute for the longing for a father, it contains the germ from which all religions have evolved."² He goes on, however, to show how the ego-ideal, shaped by parental and social relationships, becomes what is popularly called conscience and the social sense. Freud's reference in this connection to religion is ambiguous. If interpreted in the light of his insistence that religion is an illusion it can only mean that the part of the ego-ideal which is a substitute for the longing for a father, the germ from which all religions have evolved, is some-

¹ *The Ego and the Id*, p. 49.

² For further reference to this theory, see pp. 77 ff., 92 ff., 105-109, *infra*.

thing from which the ego-ideal ought to be freed. If, however, it is taken without prejudice as a statement of fact it may be regarded as a positive contribution to the thesis which we have developed in this chapter, namely, that the filial impulse is the natural root of religion, and that the Christian experience of God as Father answers to this psychological need, though the objective reality of God and of His Fatherhood must be established on other than psychological grounds. Similarly, Freud's view that a child's emotional life may be distorted by fear of the father as part of the Oedipus situation is not only an exaggeration of what may indeed happen in abnormal cases, but is a mistaken interpretation of what does happen in normal development, namely, that the strength and authority of the father brings into the child's experience that element of awe which Otto finds in the numinous.

Professor Bovet and Dr. Suttie do not ignore or deny the facts upon which Freud's intricate and extreme theorisings are based. Nor indeed would the plain man hesitate to recognise that infants, children and adolescents exhibit preferences and antagonisms with regard to their fathers and mothers. One of the most evident and practical conclusions to be drawn from the whole argument of this chapter is that the happiness, the mental health, the growing character of the not-yet-three-years-old, to say nothing of his subsequent religious development, are powerfully influenced by the harmony or otherwise that exists at every point between his father and mother, no less than by their direct relationships with himself. This, however, rests upon nothing so limited and negative as Freud's interpretation of sex. Writing of love as the positive energy fundamental to life, Dr. Suttie says,¹

¹ *The Origins of Love and Hate*, pp. 232, 36, 31. This position is admirably worked out in relation to Christian faith and experience by Mrs. Grace Stewart in *The Achievement of Personality*.

"Freud does not consider any alternative interpretations which might imply a non-sexual but social interest (*i.e.* love) of one individual for another. . . . I regard love as social rather than sexual in its biological function, as derived from the self-preservative instincts, not the genital appetite, and as seeking any state of responsiveness with others as its goal." It is in this context that he states the belief which is central to his position: "Love of mother is primal in so far as it is the *first formed and directed* emotional relationship,"¹ hate being no primal independent instinct, but "a development or intensification of separation anxiety which in turn is roused against love." Equally positive and constructive, as we have seen, is Professor Bovet's view of the religious sentiment as originating in filial love: "In the most characteristic manifestation of this love, veneration or respect, we discern a double origin—a tender love and an admiring fear; the same sources, as we have just seen, are those of religion."²

There is, of course, an obverse truth with which also we must reckon. A child whose experience of fatherhood and motherhood during its infancy has been unfortunate may, in later life, develop an antipathy to religion. This may come about either because parents towards whom the child as an infant felt distrust and fear were subsequently discovered by the child to be religiously orthodox, and perhaps insistent that the child should accept their religious teaching and follow their religious experiences, or because the very idea of fatherhood has been made repellent to the child by his infantile experience. Herein lies the true explanation of some situations which Freud

¹ With this may be compared the stress laid by Professor Allers on the child's most obvious and fundamental demand for security and love *The Psychology of Character*, pp. 83, 115, 156-158.

² *Le Sentiment Religieux*, Eng. trans. p. 21. This conjunction of love and fear may be compared with Otto's "numinous feeling."

has sought to interpret in accordance with his Œdipus theory. As the Bishop of Ely has said :¹ "It is indeed a tragic fact—but one which must not be overlooked—that there are in the world many children to whom the true nature and character of God can hardly be revealed in terms of fatherhood, because of their own bitter experience." Writing on the *Treatment of Moral and Emotional Difficulties*² Dr. C. H. Valentine observes : "It is often found that in the patient's childhood his father stood as the representative of authority, punishment, superiority and power. The very name 'father' stands to some patients as the symbol of a 'power-psychology.' For that reason, the idea of God is either repudiated or accepted with terror. The fatherhood of God does not mean to them the way of forgiveness, love and fellowship, but the way of discipline, severity and guilt." This leads him to suggest that "For those patients (and they are numerous) whose experience of a father has been submission to power, religion must be presented as an experience of fellowship. It may be advisable to teach the patient to substitute the word 'fellowship' for 'fatherhood' and the word 'love' for 'father.'" After remarking that "While some patients have been alienated by the father, some have been made over-dependent," and pointing out that this also arises from dominance and love of power on the father's part (a situation which we shall discuss at a later point in this book),³ Dr. Valentine writes : "It is religion in terms of fellowship with God and man that needs to be taught rather than religion in terms of the fatherhood of God."⁴ Such a statement

¹ *This Is Our Faith*, p. 44.

² Pp. 140, 142 f.

³ See p. 187, *infra*.

⁴ Dr. Valentine's real point is better put by Professor R. Allers in *The Psychology of Character*, p. 142, where he urges that the child should "be able to live in real communion with his parents, so that the distance between parents and child is not exaggerated into

obviously overshoots the mark. The teaching of Jesus about the Fatherhood of God, as we find this in the Gospels, is open to no attack on even the most modern psychological grounds. With specific teaching, however, we are not concerned until we come to early childhood, though even then it is essentially, if not exclusively, true that "The religious education of the child under seven is not a matter of instruction but of influence."¹ It would be preferable to say that at this stage, particularly, influence is more potent than instruction. From the beginning of the child's life that influence is exerted upon it for good or for ill by parents and other adults who form its personal environment, and what matters is that these "mediators of reality" should conceive of God as a Father in whom Power and Love are one, and power, as the Archbishop of York has said, is subordinated to love.² Even before the period of infancy is over it holds true that "A child's earliest knowledge of prayer should be the discovery of a person praying: its earliest knowledge of worship the beholding of a person worshipping. Religion will become real to the child because the child has seen its reality in adults whom he trusts and loves."³

Religion, then, begins in the parent-child relationship and in the development of attitudes, attachments and repulsions which are primarily emotional, but which, because emotions are so closely related to "instincts,"

something terrifying, and the child is assured of the respect that is his due, and does not feel himself to be merely 'an object for upbringing' or the subordinate and slave of adults."

¹ *The Religious Education of Children Under the Age of Seven Years Considered from the Standpoint of Modern Psychology* (Institute of Christian Education), p. 13. But here also there is a looseness of thought and expression that is misleading, as when it is said that "the basis of religion is fellowship."

² *The Recall to Religion*, p. xvi.

³ *The Religious Education of Children Under the Age of Seven Years*, p. 10.

indicate that the deepest driving forces of the personality are powerfully at work. These are not on the one hand spindrift on the surface of the waves, easily caught up by any breeze and carried away from the tenuous hold they had upon the deep waters, nor, on the other, treacherous undercurrents of which no man can say whence they come and whither they go. They are elemental and verifiable realities in our daily living. The meaning and purpose which inform them may for a child in its babyhood be simplified into the two babbling words which it only slowly learns to speak. Yet it was of children in arms such as these that Jesus said, "Their angels do always behold the face of—my Father." And He Himself was accustomed to use in prayer that child's word in His native tongue, "*Abba*—Father."

III

THE WORLD OF FANTASY

A LITTLE child's imagination has an unfailing charm for older folk. It is perennially fresh and apparently inexhaustible. "Tell me a story" is his constant plea. If stories are not forthcoming from the grown-ups to whom he turns he will invent them for himself. In his surroundings anything and everything may "suffer a sea-change, into something rich and strange." Fairies and gnomes hide everywhere about him. It takes a William Canton to write about "W.V." and her Invisible Playmate, but any child can understand what it is to have such a companion. He invests his toys with life and, as everybody knows, he often loves the oldest and most unrecognisable because they afford his imagination more scope for delightful exercise than does the new, expensive and valuable plaything which, by its very completeness, restricts the play of his fancy. He himself is everything by turns, and his games of make-believe so rarely pall for the simple reason that he can pass as rapidly as he likes through an endless variety of characters and events. He likes to draw and paint, even though learning to write may be a laborious process for which he lacks enthusiasm. The making of pictures satisfies both his creative impulse and his capacity for imagining. He may have to explain to others what his scribble or his daub represents, but for him it portrays at once what is and what he would like the existing object to be. For, remote from the fact as the product of his fancy may be, it is

never unconnected with what he, at any rate, regards as real. Just as the infant's emotional experience has value for him because it has meaning, so one of the reasons why the young child occupies himself with fantasy is that here also life takes on for him a larger significance. The researches of Dr. Hilda Oakham¹ into children's drawings have led her to the conclusion that children cannot draw the simplest object if it has no meaning for them. They are unable, for example, to draw a square until they understand its four-sidedness, but few at the age of four find any difficulty in doing so, since by then they can grasp this simple but essential fact.

It is now well understood that, apart from this element of meaning, the force and vividness of children's imaginings is increased by the exercise of eidetic imagery—the peculiar power of mental representation of an object with a clearness almost equal to that of actual perception, whether by sight or by hearing. It is a capacity which very few children retain as they grow up into adolescence and adulthood, but the existence of it in these early years may frequently help to account for those "children's lies," which are not meant to deceive, and which serve no such purpose as the evasion of punishment or the satisfaction of a desire to appear important. A child recently told his schoolmistress that he had seen an elf in a corner of his bedroom that morning. She was wise enough not to deny it, but to manifest friendly interest by asking such questions as what the elf was dressed in, and how often the child had seen it. The child was ready enough with positive answers, but after that conversation never referred again to the elf's visit. Mrs. Read Mumford² refers to a similar incident in which a six-year-old boy

¹ Address to the Psychology Section of the British Association, Nottingham Meetings, 1937.

² *Understanding Our Children*, p. 72.

came home from a day in the woods to tell his mother : " I have *seen* the fairies ; I *do* believe in them now ; I *saw* them at the foot of a mossy tree in the woods," and he described the fairies which he was so persuaded that he had seen. In both cases the essence of the situation was that the children enjoyed exercising a natural and wholesome capacity. The meaning of what they imagined was for them quite other than correspondence with merely tangible, verifiable, humdrum " fact." Eidetic imagery, however, is simply instrumental to the process of imagination : to regard it as causing the process is to put the cart before the horse.

Eager and fertile imaginativeness is by no means the only factor to be taken into account if an adequate psychological description of all this is to be given, but that does not substantially affect the essential truth which we have been illustrating. If infancy is the period when the emotions predominate, early childhood is the age of imaginativeness—or, if the more scientific term is preferred, of fantasy. At three or thereabouts a child enters the enchanted realm, and he is a dweller therein for the space of another three years. The age-limits must, of course, be taken as approximate and not as precise or universal. Obviously there are children who develop more slowly, as others do more quickly, than the average. A well-marked sequence is common to them all.

We are all familiar with the way in which each of the successive age-groups known as infancy, childhood (earlier and later), and adolescence (primary, middle and late), displays distinctive characteristics. This happens because in each there emerge, to a degree more marked than at any earlier or later stage in the growth of the personality, particular capacities, impulses and tendencies which, for the time being, are dominant. Since they are all innate they cannot be *absent* from the

preceding phases of general development, any more than they disappear from the subsequent ones. They may, however, be very largely *latent* before the time comes for them to burgeon forth with such vigour and vitality. When the relatively short period of their exuberant outburst has passed they take their permanent place in the composition of the personality: the subject, as it is popularly said, "settles down." But he is now a person of richer quality and more varied capacity, because these energies have come into full play, even though for the time being each seemed to develop almost to the point of exaggeration. This is so with regard to the emotions during infancy and the imagination in early childhood.

We shall be the less likely to fall into the fallacy of thinking about these natural and universal components of human personality as independent forces, rushing up from beneath or making invasion from without, if we remember that what we can and must distinguish (for purposes of scientific study and practical dealing) we nevertheless cannot separate.¹ It is less accurate to say, as we so often do, that John and Mary *have* instincts or propensities, emotions, imagination, intellect, reason, will and character than to say, as perhaps we should if we could express it more neatly, that these propensities, these emotions, this imagination, and so forth, *are* John and Mary in action in various ways. Moreover, it is always the whole John or the whole Mary that is acting, though always one aspect is for the time being paramount, whether it be feeling, thinking, or willing. The others are all there, alive, and contributing in some way and degree, however small, to the situation, unless indeed there is present any temporary or permanent abnormality amounting to illness or defectiveness. That is why.

¹ Cf. R. Allers on the nature of impulse, *The Psychology of Character*, pp. 66 ff.

we have been careful to insist that a baby's emotions are never unassociated for him with *some* meaning, any more than they can exist without his experiencing *some* tendency to give them effect by an exercise of will. The same is true of this second stage in the growth of the mind, but reason is also at work, as we are reminded by Professor Clavier's delightful story¹ of the small boy who was told by his aunt that God kept a big book in which He put down all the wicked things that children do: as the catalogue of crimes recounted by his aunt lengthened, "at last his little soul revolted, and he said with profound seriousness, 'But, Auntie, hasn't God got any india-rubber on the end of His pencil?'"

Many are the reasons which have been given for the occurrence of this "fantasy-period" in early childhood. Some observers, following Adler, ascribe it to the child's demand for power. He is able now to move freely and independently. He can communicate with others by means of words, and is no longer limited to emotional expression. He has the daily delight of learning spontaneously, and chiefly by manipulation, what a number of things he himself can do. But still he is acutely conscious that he is a very small person surrounded by people who are very big, and who can do many things which he cannot. He may be aware of what Adler calls "organ inferiority"—some slight physical deficiency or weakness which may be far from an abnormality, and is perhaps noticeable only when the child compares his own performance with that of other children. However happy his relations with parents and other adult members of his circle, he knows that their authority is absolute. They may say "Do" to him far more often than they say "Don't": nevertheless, they set bounds which he may not pass over. If he is an only child, he may hunger for

¹ *L'Idée de Dieu Chez l'Enfant*, p. 85.

the companionship of his equals ; if there are more children than he in the family his position as eldest, youngest or somewhere in between inevitably (according to the Adlerians) leaves something to be desired, in comparison with those of his brothers and sisters. So he fashions an imagined world in which he is king, a land of heart's desire, in which he can command delights, indulge his fancy, go free of fears and escape from hard realities. He may even imagine an illness or a physical weakness (digestive or excretory, for example), of which the symptoms are undeniably actual, and which can thus be utilised as a means of compelling attention from those whose strength is greater than his own. In other words, his use of imagination is to a great degree compensatory, and in the strength of his native propensity to insist upon himself he will probably seek to impress upon others the fancied superiority, in some respect or other, which is his reaction to the inferiority he feels.

Undoubtedly there is much truth in Adler's interpretation, but it does not account for all the facts, and it emphasises one aspect of the child's growth at the expense of others. Even with regard to the child's emotional states the theory of compensation is not by itself adequate as an explanation of fantasy. Imagination, as Dr. Ruth Griffiths says,¹ is the reflection of the emotional life. It is related to the solution of those emotional problems and conflicts which must for a time become more acute as the child's physical and intellectual capacities increase. The intensity of emotion which characterises him when he is about three is after all only relative ; up to that point emotion has been his chief means of knowing what is in his world, and expressing himself in relation to it. Almost literally in that early stage "feeling," to quote a phrase

¹ *Imagination in Early Childhood*, pp. 119, 28.

of Dr. John Oman's,¹ has for him been "the gateway of reality." Now, as he becomes able both to apprehend his environment in other ways, and to adapt himself to it, or it to himself, by other means, his emotions increase in strength, though they are no longer so unqualified or so completely dominant in his personality. "Development," in Dr. Griffith's words, "consists in a process of continually measuring one's strength against external forces. There is a need to strive, to overcome, to submit . . . Where overt action is impossible or inadequate or unsuccessful, fantasies tend to arise to satisfy emotion and reinstate equilibrium," but "the function of imagination in childhood involves much more than a mere expression of emotion, and may indeed be necessary to the intellectual as well as to the emotional development. . . . Fantasy is the means by which the child overcomes his environment, learns gradually to face reality, brings about development. Fantasy seems to be the very essence of primitive thinking. It is the child's method *par excellence*."²

This constructive element in fantasy is what Adler, Jung and Freud appear to have missed in their respective theories of compensation, regression and sexuality. Freud in particular, in paying such exclusive attention to "infantile sexuality," as he calls it, describes childhood as a "latency period."³ There are few, if any, manifestations then of the oral, anal and genital eroticism which he professes to discover in the infant's behaviour. From

¹ *The Natural and the Supernatural*, p. 80. It may be well to complete the quotation—"feeling as mere subjective emotion may only be the gateway of unreality."

² *Imagination in Early Childhood*.

³ Cf. Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, p. 274; *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety*, pp. 64 ff.; Anna Freud, *Psycho-Analysis for Teachers*, p. 79; *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence*, p. 157 f. The significance of the "latency period" will be dealt with more fully in our next chapter.

about the age of five until puberty is, if we accept the Freudian account of ourselves, about the only time in our lives when sex is not paramount, and even then it is really sex-energy that is active, though not easily recognisable. In fantasy Freud sees the child turning back from an environment with which for the moment it cannot contend to disguised forms of these infantile pleasures in which it can no longer actually indulge.

It is characteristic of Freud, however, that in his writings he practically ignores both the physiological facts of the nervous system and the intellectual (as contrasted with emotional) elements in mental structure and activity. Neither can reasonably be regarded as unimportant. The neurologists tell us that while the child is born with all the brain cells that he will ever possess, and the weight of his brain is already about a quarter of what it will be at maturity, he develops during these very early years those fatty sheaths, or *medulla*, surrounding the neurones in his brain which apparently have some connection with the power of relating percepts to each other and making concepts possible. By the age of three just over two-thirds of the weight of the adult brain is attained, and at the age of seven only one-ninth remains to be developed so that completeness may be reached by the age of eighteen or nineteen.¹ Obviously when this psycho-physical change in the child's equipment and powers has taken place he finds his world far fuller than before of interest, adventure, meaning and challenge. As Mrs. Read Mumford points out, "By the time that the child is two and a half to three years old, he has the power, not merely to form separate images or mental

¹ Cf. Karl Bühler, *The Mental Development of the Child*, pp. 39-42. "In the first three quarters of a year the brain doubles its initial weight, and trebles it before the end of the third year"—O. Pfister, quoted by Bühler.

pictures of objects, but to follow a combination of these images in a connected whole, a definite piece of experience. Thus, a simple story can be followed, remembered instructions can be understood and carried out, a game can be played, the child can respond to suggestions of 'make-believe.' He does not yet originate in his games, *i.e.* creative imagination has not yet begun; but he can enter into and follow the free creative thought of other people; and all is intensely real. So far, then, the little child has only responded to creative thought outside himself. Now, however, in simple ways, he begins to exercise his *own* capacity for creation." Mrs. Mumford goes on to show how the child at first exercises his creative imagination "by re-grouping, as it were, the actual objects in his environment," but how, before long, there is a highly significant transition: "At an earlier stage the bricks placed one behind the other merely *resembled* a train—now the chairs one behind the other actually *become* for him a cart. He is still relying upon his environment for his material, but now he can transform it to other uses, by the exercise of his imagination, according to his will."¹

The importance of observing the normal child in his completeness was fully realised by Adler, and the score of clinics established under his direction in Vienna have yielded a great volume of illuminating evidence about ordinary children, each, as Adler said, "in his setting"—his whole environment of home, school and other relationships.² The work done by Dr. Griffiths, Mrs. Read Mumford, Dr. Susan Isaacs and others, in their close and continued study of children at both the

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 68: cf. Dr. Susan Isaacs, *The Intellectual Growth of Young Children*, pp. 104-107.

² Cf. Adler, *The Education of Children*; Adler and Associates, *Guiding the Child*.

emotional and the imaginative stages, has enabled us to understand the real course of a child's growth more fully than we could possibly do by considering the child, as Freud himself has done, mainly if not entirely as a source of explanation, through emotional maladjustment in infancy, of the neuroses or psychoses from which adult patients suffer. It becomes evident that fantasy in childhood is something which has positive value, though we should be foolish and perverse indeed, if not blind, were we to ignore or deny the mischief that may ensue if fantasy in childhood or later is allowed to become a morbid self-indulgence or an escape mechanism, as in the psychological sense of "day-dreaming."

Before we consider the implications of the psychological facts for our special theme, however, we must take note of one or two further contributions to the study of fantasy.

A little child's "span" of interest and attention is brief. What everybody knows in this connection has been reduced to precise terms by Professor Spearman¹ and other investigators. It can hardly be questioned that, as a child's capacities unfold, his purposes become more conscious. "He may," says Professor Bompas Smith, "be fond of drawing or of modelling actual things. When he builds with his bricks he tries to make a tower that will stand up. Moreover, he has more or less clearly in his mind what it is he wants to do. He can, that is, think of a possible change in the external world as one to be made actual. In this way he comes to form definite purposes and to plan things in advance."² This representation of the young child's mentality is reinforced by what Professor Charlotte Bühler says³

¹ *Abilities of Man ; The Nature of Intelligence.*

² *Growing Minds*, pp. 26 f.

³ *From Birth to Maturity*, p. 78, *et passim*.

about the child's learning more, during the period we are now considering, by manipulation than by other activities. It is related also to Mme Montessori's¹ declaration that a child at this age moves order and has a genuine seriousness in what it sets out to do, though Mme Montessori exaggerates the extent to which play for a little child becomes work. But, as Professor Bompas Smith continues, "The world in which a young boy lives when he plans his actions to produce definite results is a very different one from that of his earlier childhood. We may call it a world of serious work in contrast to a world of play. The passage from one world to another is gradual, but it can hardly be a smooth one. The child finds that there are many things he must not or cannot do, and many things he has to do although he does not want to. He has to adapt himself to the ways of older people whose point of view is different from his own. His advance, therefore, entails some measure of constraint and a loss of impulsive freedom. Many children begin to feel this constraint as early as their second year, and go through a phase of obstinate self-assertion. In any case, it is almost inevitable that, as a child finds life becoming a more serious business, he should feel the need for some relief. He therefore returns at times to the freer world of play in which he lives, not as a member of the grown-up serious world but in the more spacious atmosphere of his earlier days. In this way he lives alternately in two very different worlds. But the two worlds may overlap. He can do serious things in a playful spirit and so transform drudgery into adventure."

This relief, found in the exercise of imagination between short but intense spells of attentive effort, is in no sense an equivalent of compensation or regression. If, as Dr. Griffiths² has perceived, the child's experience

¹ *The Secret of Childhood*, pp. 150, 229. ² *Op. cit.* pp. 28, 173, 301.

is not a patchwork of unrelated impressions and endeavours, but a developing unity of which we see only the salient points, there is an underlying connection between "work" and "play," the "serious" and the "fanciful" for the child himself, and this accounts for the way in which the two "overlap," or, as we might rather say, interpenetrate. His whole purpose is to discover, explore and relate himself to a world of infinite possibilities which is unified for him in his own multiform experiences of it, and interpreted by him in personal, "animistic" terms—for he still attributes life like his own to objects in his environment with which he has an emotional relationship. His fantasies are not lapses into the past but leaps into the future. Like his play they are an expression of his spontaneity and creativeness, but in the realm of ideas.

Now, of course, we may be met at this point by the rejoinder that the child is simply indulging in projection. He is treating the creatures of his imagination as though they were real, mistaking subjective fancy for objective fact.¹ And, of course, it is possible that he may do so, just as grown-up people often do. Projection in this sense may easily be fatal to the quest for knowledge of reality. But that is not the only way in which projection can be used, for projection is an activity of the mind which, to take only one illustration, serves no less a cause than that of physical and mathematical science. When a scientist or a mathematician has a problem to solve he usually assembles the knowledge already available to him which is relevant to the point at issue. Then, after

¹ Some psychologists trace projection back to a child's fear of impulses the exercise of which, as experience has taught him, will result in parental displeasure, interpreted by him as loss of love. He must defend himself against this and therefore he projects the impulse (e.g. aggression) on to someone else—perhaps his father. Cf. Emanuel Miller, *The Generations*, p. 77.

he has brooded over the matter for a time he frames a hypothesis—in simpler terms, a possible solution flashes into his mind. Along this line he experiments, but while he is thus putting his imagined solution to the test he must project it—must deal with it as though it were actual truth, an aspect of reality.

We shall see, when we consider the stage of development in childhood which follows this fantasy period, how insistent the child becomes upon knowing what he can rely upon, what is true and what is not. At the stage we are now discussing his experience is not yet rich enough to enable him to reason clearly and strongly. He is beginning to think in the conceptual or general terms without which deductive reasoning, the application of general principles to particular cases, cannot be carried on. He is reasonable, and capable of reasoning by an elementary kind of logic which sometimes leaves his elders without reply, but his native powers in this direction are as yet limited in their scope by his lack of material: he is only beginning to accumulate the necessary knowledge of facts and to acquire command of general ideas. Fantasy, however, is not necessarily contrary to reason, and projection is a falsification of fact only when it is exaggerated, or used unconsciously to transfer imaginatively to others impulses and ideas which the child fears to harbour within himself. What is happening in the ordinary case is that the child is beginning to think more cogently and purposively than before. Fantasy and projection are instruments which he can and does use in constructive thinking. As in the first period of his life he inevitably used "feeling language," so in the second he of necessity uses "picture language," and in reaching out towards the knowledge of reality he projects instead of arguing. Unless his natural development is retarded, so that he becomes a day-dreamer, refusing like Peter

Pan to grow up, and taking refuge from the real world in a world of make-believe, he will want, soon enough proof that things are as he supposes or is told they are.¹

It is appropriate to touch here upon projection because while it can neither be so effectively used nor be so dangerous in early childhood as when the personality is more mature, it has its beginnings, and it is of no small significance, at this time when fantasy is so active.

The same may be said of suggestion. The combination of quick and deep emotional sensibility with vivid and purposeful imaginativeness renders children of this age highly suggestible and contra-suggestible. This is so commonly recognised that we ought to determine the more carefully what we mean by suggestion and how we believe it to work. Professor McDougall's definition held the field for a considerable time. Suggestion, he says, "is a process of communication resulting in the acceptance with conviction of a communicated proposition in the absence of logically adequate grounds for its acceptance."² This emphasises too exclusively the

¹ On Projection cf. Prof. Grenstead, *Psychology and God*, p. 64. "This mechanism of projection of which he (Freud) speaks is not fantasy, but a perfectly real process within the reality of the ego itself. It is essential to the whole theory of projection that the transferred and dissociated affects are attracted to some perfectly real object which is significant for the ego in some way. We do not cast our shadow-gods out upon a void. The ego never creates entities. There is always an objective basis upon which the fantasy rests." Cf. also *The Essentials of Life and Thought*, p. 42, where Mr. T. Wigley observes: "Since projection is fundamental in the sciences, there is no need to be unduly depressed by its presence in religion. In both cases projection is the method of discovery, and we assess its validity by the results which it brings when these are verified by experiment, are confirmed by what we already know, and open the way to further knowledge. I would emphasise that last sentence, for it involves an emphatic denial of the common assumption that theology can be or should be isolated from other knowledges."

² *Social Psychology*, 15th ed., p. 97.

intellectual element in the situation Dr. R. H. Thouless therefore amended the definition, and wrote : " a process of communication, resulting in the acceptance and realisation of a communicated idea in the absence of adequate grounds for its acceptance," his purpose being to include " the important cases of suggestion in which what is communicated is not a proposition but a feeling state or a course of action." ¹ Dr. McDougall, in a controversy with Freud,² re-affirmed his definition and expanded his explanation of the working of suggestion, which he attributed largely to the operation of an " instinct " of submissiveness : " I had found myself driven to postulate as a feature of the native endowment of the human species an impulse to defer, to submit, to follow, to obey, a tendency or propensity of submission. There, I said, is the source of the creative energy evoked and operative in all successful suggestion, and the art of suggesting, I said, is the art of setting that propensity into action, of evoking its impulse, and of directing it towards particular goals." ³

Already, however, Dr. William Brown had criticised Dr. McDougall's theory as both limited and negative.⁴ Suggestion, in Dr. Brown's view, is " a successful appeal made to the unconscious mind." It is not dependent upon the submissive propensity, since " the operation of *any* instinct, powerful, profound and independent of other instincts, will increase suggestibility and produce suggestive effects." The emphasis here lies upon the positive tendency to self-assertion. " If," says Dr. Brown, " the self-assertive instinct of an individual be aroused

¹ *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, p. 18 f.

² *Psycho-Analysis and Social Psychology*, pp. 20 ff. 125-149.

³ Freud's definition was, " a conviction which is not based upon perception and reasoning but upon an erotic tie " ; *Group Psychology and the Ego*, p. 100.

⁴ *Psychology and Psychotherapy*, pp. 143-145.

(in a state of relative dissociation) he will be made more suggestible in certain directions." He clearly has in mind the influence of contemporary dictators over nations which have suffered defeat or depression when he points out that there is "no self-abasement in people who themselves are anxious to achieve a certain end. They follow their leader because they respect him, believe in him, and hope through him to achieve; not because they fear him. He enables them to believe in themselves." An important point is made by Professor Grensted¹ when he maintains that the element of authority which helps to make a suggestion potent is due less to its cogency or logical force as a reasoned argument than to its place in a system of personal relationships.

In our last chapter we summed up the instinctual propensities of the human being as self-maintaining and other-regarding. Looking at any normal child we can see how these complementary impulses manifest themselves in all his relations with the people, old and young, who surround him. If we describe his attitudes and tendencies in technical language, we find that we must speak of both the submissive propensity and the self-assertive in order to make our account of suggestion and suggestibility complete. We need also to bring in imagination and fantasy, projection and reality. All are required in any attempt to explain how and why one human being responds in this way to the ideas, emotions and actions of another without losing his own individuality and becoming a mere slave or imitator of that other.

In common speech we may put the matter thus. If we convey anything to the mind of a child by suggestion, and not by cold objective statement or action in an atmosphere of complete detachment and indifference, it is because of that *rapprochement* between him and ourselves

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 93.

which reference was made above.¹ The suggestion appeals to the child's whole personality—perhaps more to the unconscious part of it than to the conscious—but the activity which it stimulates is the activity of imagination. The suggestion takes life, as it were, within the child, gaining also a colour and a warmth even greater than it would otherwise have, because it comes from another person whose relationship with the child is meaningful and emotionally toned. Imagination and emotion play a very great part at this stage of the process. Yet, as always, meaning is essential too. The suggestion becomes part of the child's own inner world, and is made one with his own system of thought, feeling and will. It has come with the impress of reality from the person who made it: in the personality of the child it gains added reality as he experiences the change in his own thought and feeling which it brings. By force of imagination, working in the form of fantasy or projection, the child unites the fact, feeling or purpose which has thus been suggested to him with all that is most real to him. It becomes for him part of the world which he regards as having a real existence independently of himself. Or, perhaps, he embodies it in his picture of either himself or his world as these will be in the future. This does not mean that he argues the matter out or stays to inquire critically into it: he simply *sees* the idea or the emotional state as real, in his picture of himself, his relationships to other people, or his general environment, with a vividness which for him puts this reality beyond dispute. But when anything appears indisputably real to the normal child or adult his inevitable propensity is either to adjust himself to it or to fly from it. He “instinctively” seeks, in this case, to realise the suggested idea, state or action, or else he “instinctively” rejects it: he is suggestible

¹ P. 30.

or contra-suggestible to it. He is the more responsive if the suggestion helps him to fill a gap in his knowledge or his thinking, and thus to solve a problem which involves for him both intellectual interest and emotional tension—or, as the Gestalt psychologists would say, to complete a pattern. His responsiveness is likely to be greatest of all when the suggestion not only meets an intellectual or emotional need but also stimulates and facilitates action.

Suggestion is thus not just mental sleight of hand, a more or less illicit exploitation of emotion and imaginations. It calls into play very powerful native energies and capacities. Whether the result is good or bad depends upon what the content of the suggestion is, and what are the character and purpose of the person who makes it. As a process it is natural but neutral. A suggestion of which the content is ridiculous or even false may take effect. On the other hand, the validity or otherwise of the ideas suggested is not affected by the way in which they have found acceptance in the receptive mind: a true idea does not become false because it is presented by means of suggestion. Suggestibility and suggestion may have much to do with a child's growth in religion, but that has nothing to do with the question whether the religion corresponds with reality or not.¹

The importance of this factor in the development of the child's character and attitudes is still more clearly seen if we consider the processes of identification and introjection, as the psycho-analysts call them, during infancy and childhood. The baby, whether boy or girl, finds in its mother not only satisfaction of its needs, but also restraint. Later it discovers in the father both an affection which is, at the same time, strong protection and an authority which seems to come from a greater realm of reality than

¹ This brings us again to the point about objective reality and philosophy made in chap. i. pp. 16 f., *supra*.

the home alone. Good and evil, from the child's standpoint, are made concrete by both parents, though in different ways. Father and mother both arouse within it, now the happy sense of harmonious response and security, now the resistance and aggressiveness which leads to fear lest it should lose their love, and consequently to the unhappy sense of insecurity. The child may seek in one parent what it feels that the other does not and will not give. It may thus even see in one a rival with itself for the unqualified love of the other. If the relationship between the parents is right, as Dr. Suttie has observed, the child will be helped to realise that there is no ground for such rivalry, and that indeed the parents, being different, play complementary parts in the protection and the enrichment of its own life.

What the child will inevitably do is to identify itself, especially at this second stage in its growth, with certain characteristics of father or mother, or both, whether it thus seeks deeper certainty of the mother's fondness against the father's authority, or of the father's aggressiveness against the mother's control. It will identify itself, for its own deep and often unconscious purposes, with what seems to it good and with what seems to it bad in both father and mother, as the circumstances require.¹ By introjection father and mother become in these respects part of itself. It takes these characteristics of their personalities into its own. It imagines itself to be what its parents are, as its play so often shows, but this is something deeper than imitation of what it is accustomed to see them doing as a part of the daily routine. Standards and ideals of conduct are built up in this way. The

¹ If it feels that its security is being threatened by one parent it may accept and identify itself with something in the other which ordinarily it would dislike or oppose, but which in this particular situation may appear likely to help it in warding off the threat.

super-ego, as Freud calls it, develops. There is conflict between crude impulse and super-ego, or natural emotion and convention. There may be repression, unless the child finds that identification with what is best in each of his parents brings him into happier relationship with the other as well, and thus makes it natural for him to identify himself with what is best in that other also. Dr. Emanuel Miller has summed up the whole matter excellently in a couple of sentences: "Our knowledge of deep psychology has demonstrated to us the mental struggles through which a child passes in its endeavour to retain love, to take advantage of dependency, and yet to keep on the right side of authority vested in the power and will of the parents. The moral or regulative self of the child develops parallel with an equally powerful self which craves for instinctual satisfaction in the form of love, aggression and power, not to speak of those early sensual interests in its own body which a child is loath to abandon." ¹

In all this, however, the child is a creature of emotion and imagination, of projection and suggestion, far more than of reason and argument. He is beginning to be able to make those elementary comparisons, at any rate in the realm of the senses, which will eventuate in the classification of like and unlike, and in the perception of patterns, the completion of patterns in which there is a gap to be filled, and the building up of larger patterns or wholes from a group of smaller ones. Mme. Montessori's educational methods and apparatus, Professor Spearman's principles of the education of relations and correlates, the emphasis upon "insight" by the Gestalt psychologists, Dr. John Dewey's insistence upon learning through the living out of experiences, and other relatively recent advances in theory and practice have helped us to under-

¹ *The Generations*, pp. 129 f.

stand how far, and by what means, children develop the exercise of their reasoning powers much earlier than Professor Piaget, for example, has maintained.¹ Nevertheless pictures and play are the chief instruments of a child's thinking during the second three years of his life, while emotional impulses and tensions, connected with instinctual energies, are the driving forces of it. But just because his pictures are becoming more definitely patterns, and because the development of his brain is making it possible for him to begin to conceive pictorial ideas as well as to perceive the facts of sense, he is making progress in the appreciation of those realities which are not simply material, and in adjusting himself to them. If, during his first three years, "all the foundation-stones of the mental life are laid down" a great deal of building is done in the next three, and it becomes increasingly true that "the child's character is moulded, not by the impact of neutral forces upon the mind, but by the effect of the moral attitude of the parents upon the children."²

By natural process, then, both religion and morality develop in children at this stage as a living part of daily experience. In and through their relationships with mother and father, and with other adults, they arrive at the ideas of good and evil, of power and love exercised by someone greater than themselves. These ideas will ultimately go far to determine their conception of the nature of God, and therefore their attitude to Him, as, in the depths of their own lives, they apprehend Him. It does not follow that God is only a projection of what they have found in their parents, or nothing but a product of suggestion exercised (however unwittingly) by the

¹ Cf. Piaget, *Language and Thought of the Child: Judgment and Reasoning in the Child*. Piaget's view is that a child reasons comparatively little before the approximate age of eight.

² Miller, *op. cit.* pp. 96, 138.

parents themselves. The existence of God is independent of both projection and suggestion, just as the capacity for religion and the propensity to give it effect are not introduced into the child's personality by identification and introjection. These psychological processes may account for the colour, shape and movement, as it were, of a child's religion, but they do not account for its substance. Digestion is not life. Indeed even the food which by metabolism becomes human energy is only potential life. Yet the quality of our living will be deeply affected by the kind of nourishment we absorb and the efficiency or otherwise of our digestive apparatus. The truth about God may be obscured or distorted in the experience of a child if his parents are in themselves and in their relationships with him weak, unwise, inconsistent, sentimentally indulgent, harsh, overbearing, selfish, careless or indifferent, whatever beliefs about God they may profess or try to teach the child. On the other hand, despite all their limitations and failings, if they are in any sense true parents they will inevitably mediate to him (and not simply illustrate) the fact that God is, and the meaning of the power and love of God the Father everlasting. If we may take yet another analogy, candles and oil lamps, gas and electric light are all forms of the same energy, manufactured and manipulated, as it would seem, by men, and in varying degrees like the sunlight for which they are partial substitutes—sometimes positively bad substitutes, as we realise when we have matched colours at the back of a shop apparently brilliantly lit by electricity, only to find, when we take them out into the sunlight, that they are discordant. But these differing illuminants are not merely *like* the sun, though infinitely less intense and often so inadequate as to involve us in mistakes. Actually they are expressions of *the same* energy as the sun, and no other.

When we are considering children between three and six, however, we are confronted by an element in their experience which is altogether absent from that of the infant during the first few months of its life, and which comes only very gradually into play while the child is still in the emotional stage. By the time the fantasy period has arrived the child can talk and can understand what is said to it. Native curiosity can now find vent in questions, as well as in exploration by means of hands and feet, eyes and nose. Grown-ups are people who can tell one things as well as do things which one wants or doesn't want done. The learning process in its intellectual aspect has begun when a child is between three and six, and this, be it remembered, in terms of imagination and suggestion, projection and introjection, far more than through the more readily recognised media of factual statement and logical argument. The casual remark may lodge more firmly in a child's mind than the deliberate and careful utterance intended to "teach" him something. A story will often set him thinking, and thinking to considerable purpose, when a formal pronouncement will leave him either completely unaffected or thoroughly bewildered. What we say is one thing: what his mind does with what we say is quite another. Curiosity is allied to wonder. Fantasy and mystery belong together. "Little children," as Drs. Norsworthy and Whitley, of Teachers' College, Columbia, remind us, "are extremely credulous, accepting undoubtingly much of what is told them. They have a strong sense of the mysterious, too. The mind is felt but not seen, the light is seen but not felt, voices are neither felt nor seen, only heard: so by analogy, it is not a far step to a postulating of a mysterious Being neither felt, heard, nor seen. Stories of Nature, myths and wonder tales should intensify the emotions of awe and mystery, while God may be represented as something rather vague

and distant rather than as an indulgent parent. Almost invariably children form an anthropomorphic concept of deity at this stage, based on analogies of father and mother; beyond that, they may posit either a watchful presence judicially or beneficially inclined according to the teaching received, or a magic worker, or a confidante to whom they may chatter of the day's doings."¹

We need not agree in detail with this description: if fatherhood is always indulgent it misrepresents the reality of God's fatherhood. Analogy alone is not a sufficient explanation of the link between the child's experience of human parenthood and divine. When a child was told the story of the turning of water into wine, he said, "Oh, yes, of course! My father can do conjuring tricks"—a sufficient illustration of the mischief that may be wrought by giving a child any ground for thinking of God, or of Jesus Christ, as a "magic worker." Nevertheless we must agree with the essence of what these two Professors of Education here maintain. Awe and mystery, myth and legend are essential elements in the religious upbringing and development of children at this particular time in their lives. It is a grave misunderstanding to look upon a child's love of the mysterious as something attractive, but in due course to be outgrown, and it is a superficial error to suppose that one should tell stories to a child simply for the sake of entertaining it. We have learned from Dr. Hamilton Archibald "the danger of pointing the moral," a danger which lies less in the direction of stuffiness than in the probability that the application which we are so anxious to make is quite different from the much more valuable and practical interpretation which the child's own needs will cause him to give to the story. Nor does even this take us to the heart of the whole matter. It was, after all, the Victorian

¹ *The Psychology of Childhood*, p. 367.

Tennyson who put his finger on the point a century ago :

For WisCom dealt with mortal powers,
Where truth in closest words shall fail,
When truth embodied in a tale
Shall enter in at lowly doors.¹

The childhood of the race was fertile in myths—attempts by the use of fantasy and poetry to account for the actualities of experience. When children of to-day pass through the fantasy period they are not “climbing up the ancestral tree,” as Stanley Hall and other advocates of the “recapitulation” and “cultural epoch” theories have argued, though they may be using the same psychological capacities as the primitive folk who formulated the stories which anthropologists love to collect from African tribes or South Sea Islanders. Nor is it a necessary logical conclusion that myth is the mark of the primitive, a pre-logical, pre-scientific, and therefore purely imaginative and illusory artefact, with no place anywhere in the modern world save the nursery, and dangerous as a means of amusement even there. Plato was neither a child nor a primitive. He certainly cannot be classed with Hans Andersen or Lewis Carroll—though, be it remarked, both the author of the famous *Fairy Tales* and the whimsical creator of *Alice in Wonderland* had something more in view than the unfettered play of imagination. Plato found myth the only possible way of expressing what was most real, least questionable and yet beyond the power of his lucid thought and precise speech to set forth in plain prose argument and exposition. The early Hebrews were neither scientists, philosophers, nor historians. What they found in Nature and in their own corporate human experience was something beyond

¹ *In Memoriam*, xxxvi.

Nature and someone higher than the human race. They asserted their moral convictions and their spiritual intuitions in myths of which, no doubt, those which make up the first few chapters of Genesis were the noblest and the most significant.

When religion is most alive, intellectually and morally as well as emotionally, it invariably exhibits a vivid sense of "the beyond that is within." Moses on Sinai, Isaiah in the Temple at Jerusalem, St. Peter at Caesarea Philippi, St. Paul on the road to Damascus are outstanding instances of that swift insight which comes at times to ordinary men and women in the course of their religious experience. It is akin indeed to the "insight" of which Gestalt Psychology speaks, the power of completing the pattern, of solving the problem by that "leap of the mind" to which so many scientists have confessed that they owed their most concrete discoveries and which has followed long meditation upon imagined possibilities.¹ The form in which such insight finds expression, as in the first few chapters of Genesis or in Plato's picture of the cave, is not necessarily myth. Legend, romance, poetry and even parable may body it forth. Christendom had nearly died of formal theology, and of elaborate ceremonial which had no vital correspondence with genuine worship or sound morality, when Francis of Assisi gave it a new spring-time, in art and poetry, belief and conduct. The legends and stories of *The Little Flowers of St. Francis* in part, of course, represent the naïve tradition by which the devotion of his followers speedily surrounded him, but in his own spiritual experience sharp reality was blended with ineffable mystery, and only by use of his imaginative powers could the actual truth be conveyed. Romance and dramatic imagination made it possible for Dante, Milton, Bunyan to bring home to their contemporaries

¹ Cf. pp. 70f., *supra*.

the most austere as well as the most inspiring and gladdening facts concerning God and mankind, as well as concerning their own inner experience. And in all this there is at once what answers to the spontaneity of a child's play, the impulse of his curiosity, the truthfulness of his wonder, and the simplicity of his worship. Awe and attraction are the central characteristics of that attitude to the numinous in which Professor Otto finds the essence of worship. "Do not cease seeking till thou findest," runs an uncanonical saying of Jesus: "finding thou shalt wonder, and wondering thou shalt enter the Kingdom." Imagination and fantasy, the sense of mystery and the yielding to that in one's world which has greatness and worth, these are the paths by which the little child finds reality for himself, a reality which for him can never be divorced from the personal.

This was at least part of what Jesus meant when He said concerning children that of such is the Kingdom of God. There is in them a native responsiveness to an unseen realm which yet breaks in upon the seen and temporal. They cannot philosophise and theologise about the relationship between the finite and the infinite, "time, space and deity." Instead they live in two worlds, which are not wholly apart. It is natural for them to think of God as Father and of their Father-God, in the words of the ancient Jewish prayer, as King of the World. What matters is that their experience of human fatherhood should not corrupt this thought of the Fatherhood from which all families in heaven and on earth are named, and that when the milk of myth, legend and story are their proper food they should not be fed upon the strong meat of formal doctrine and ethical precept, however right these in themselves may be.

Mr. J. W. D. Smith has protested with reason and insight against the premature teaching of religion to

little children in an abstract intellectual fashion. This type of teaching, he says, "introduces the child to the thought of God before there is anything in his experience to which the term genuinely corresponds." True, if God is not to the teacher what He was above all things to Jesus—"My Father." But if that concept is used, the criticism must take another form, for obviously a child has experience of fatherhood long before he reaches the age that Mr. Smith has in view. "It is true," continues Mr. Smith, "that a child of three years of age may ask such a question as 'Where did the trees come from?'" To such questions, it may be said, the true answer and the obvious one to give to the child is the religious one. He could not understand the scientific answer and he does not understand personal causation. But what is the result of such an answer? It diverts the child's attention and directs his interest into shallow waters when the instinct of his soul is urging him towards the depths. His intellect is set to puzzling over a word when his mind and spirit are waiting to grow as he learns more of the processes of Nature. There may be little he can understand, but he is dimly aware of an open door and a kingdom to be possessed, and his spirit quickens in response. He stands at the beginning of that quest for the ultimate ground of the mystery of life which men call God. 'Until a little child has had some experience which awakens in him a bit of this wondering after the mystery of life, it seems to me that the word "God" is best left out of the picture.' The child is asking for bread. If we are too hasty in pressing the thought of God upon him we may, in effect, be offering him a stone."¹ Here penetrating insight is curiously hampered by logical fallacy. To insist upon the use of a word which for the child is an abstraction, devoid of any meaning that can

¹ *Psychology and Religion in Early Childhood*, pp. 23 ff.

be derived from his own experience, is indeed patently both foolish and wrong. But to argue that the child has no experience to which the thought of God *as Father* can be related would be equally so. And to say that by speaking to the child of God as Father we limit his apprehension of "that ground of the mystery of life which men call God" is fallacious, because it leaves out of account the working of the child's mind in creative fantasy (or, if you will, in primitive thinking as Dr. Griffiths calls it) upon the concrete material supplied not simply by the name "Father" but by the daily experience of what this does, in fact, mean. It is only when that experience is largely contrary to what Jesus taught us to understand by "Father" that the child may be made to stumble. Even then, as actual instances have proved, the child of an unworthy father clings to those few elements of good that persist in the most brutalised, callous, or indifferent parent, and in his fantasy world he will create a picture of fatherhood which is inspired by those elements of good, even if reinforced by what he sees and envies in the lives of happier children. It will be a picture of a father who commands reverence and evokes love—the kind of Father whom Jesus made known to men, and who is no fantasy.

IV

"IS IT TRUE?"

RELIGION in childhood and adolescence used to be described as hinging upon the "pubertal crisis," at an age somewhere between eleven and fourteen. Conversion, associated with this transition from childhood to youth, was regarded as the gateway to definite and purposive religious life. Up to that point, it was supposed, there was smooth, continuous growth in religious knowledge, and elementary training in religious behaviour was its counterpart. After the "crisis" there was progress in the development of genuine religious experience and in the achievement of well-knit moral character—not quite so smooth and continuous as the earlier movement, but still a steady weaving upon a settled warp.

We owe to educationists and psychiatrists a better understanding of the psychological train of events. Nobody now thinks of puberty as the one great crisis that comes to the growing personality. There are several turning-points both before and after it. It is upon recognition of these that our educational system is being reorganised and our methods of teaching are developing. Nursery school, infant school, primary school and secondary school are not just the inventions of tidy-minded administrators. The provision of separate buildings and a specially trained staff of teachers for each is no luxury, but a scientific meeting of natural needs. So, too, the school psychologist or the psychiatrist called upon to

deal with backward or problem children treats them not only in accordance with their Intelligence Quotients but in the light of their chronological age also. He knows that a normal child of eight will be living in a completely different world from that of a six-year-old. We have already seen that between birth and the age of six or a little more there are two well-marked stages. The change at seven is greater than at three or five, and the four years between this and the onset of puberty have an importance which has hardly yet been appreciated—partly because the psycho-analytical emphasis upon infantile emotion, and to a less degree upon childish fantasy, has run to such an extreme that this “latency period” has received comparatively little attention, and even the upheavals at adolescence have been interpreted as the outcome of emotional stresses at least akin to those of infancy, if not identical with them.¹

Clearly the influence of these successive phases of physical and mental development upon the growth of religious consciousness must be considerable. Tribute is due to the leaders of the graded Sunday-school movement, because in their choice of material and methods suitable for Juniors (*i.e.* children between eight and twelve, approximately), as for the preceding age-groups, they were at least a decade, if not two, in advance of the Hadow Reports, which have made “Seven plus to eleven plus” so familiar a phrase. It must be admitted, however, that the basis of this practical improvement was largely empirical. Deeper study of the forces at work in the child was necessary.

Emotional situations and imaginative fertility inevitably issue in the unexpected and incalculable. However experienced and sympathetic we may be, there

¹ *e.g.* Dr. Anna Freud, in *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence*, p. 151, still maintains this view.

are many occasions when the baby and the little child elude us. When a baby stares, round-eyed and placid, at us, we do not say, " His soul was like a star and dwelt apart," but we know, just as we know when he gurgles happily as though he is enjoying a private joke, or flies into a tantrum for no obvious reason, that he is in a world into which we cannot follow him very far. So, when the small child makes up a fairy-story of her own, or reacts quite illogically to something we have said or done, it is not enough to admit to ourselves that we are puzzled : we are wise only in the degree in which we recognise that their thoughts are not as our thoughts. There is a touch of faery about it all. To be matter-of-fact in our approach may be to lose contact, and even to raise barriers or to stimulate resistance.

In later childhood, however, which is to say between seven and eleven, boys and girls *are* matter-of-fact. If they are healthy in body and mind they do not lack emotion or imagination. They are still responsive to suggestion. But they are acquiring a greater stability and independence than they had before. There is less inclination to cling to the protection of home and older people, more to make their own way among their equals and in the world at large. In the nursery school and the kindergarten, as we observed, each child did indeed mingle with others of its own age, as there was little opportunity for it to do at home, but the children did not play much in groups, and they tended to pursue their individual interests by themselves. Now they become more social.

If, in babyhood, the discovery of meanings involved some kind of implicit reasoning this could hardly be conscious, and while between three and seven they were surprisingly acute in " putting two and two together," their exercise of their reasoning powers was both limited

by the smallness of their store of knowledge and apt to be deflected by their imaginativeness. Now they make steady advance in their use of their intellectual faculties : general mental ability, intelligence in the sense of " the problem-solving capacity," is more manifest, though special abilities such as those required for the study of mathematics or languages do not seem to emerge very definitely till towards the close of this period. Physically the rate of growth is less rapid. Children become sturdier and stronger, filling out and settling down after a fashion that enables them to sustain the inevitable though not necessarily violent tensions of puberty when it arrives. It has been noticed that there are relatively far fewer problem children of ages between seven and eleven than there are among younger or older ones. This suggests not only a diminution of nervous and emotional excitability but probably, also, a transfer of interest from the subjective to the objective, from the interior realm of feelings and imagined situations to the exterior one of concrete facts and actual events.

Life in later childhood brings with it the dominant and ever-increasing necessity of adjustment to physical and social environment. The day-dreamer seeks escape from hard reality by means of a make-believe existence in some land of his fancy. But the vigorous boy or girl is bent upon finding out exactly what are the realities with which he or she must reckon. Consequently they want to know how things are made, how things work, what is the use of them, and so forth. They like to acquire the mastery of tools, mental as well as manual, and to experiment in the application of their skill. William Penn commented upon this in his *Fruits of Solitude*, as long ago as 1693 : " Children rather be making of tools, and instruments of play ; shaping, drawing, framing and building, etc., than getting some . . . rules by heart." It is essential, from

their point of view, that they should know where they stand in their relationship with other people, so that they may act with certainty and thus with security, as well as with the desired effect upon those around them. In gangs and team games they are finding their place in a social order : “ drinking delight of battle with their peers,” they learn to recognise the importance of authority and obedience, albeit an authority more or less of their own choosing and an obedience rendered without any sense of constraint.

The hunger for romance is as keen as ever. The hero-story takes the place of the fairy-tale. Incredibly exaggerated some of these yarns of adventure by aeroplane or submarine, at school or in the wilds, may indeed be, but film or story must be “ founded on fact,” as writers for boys and girls in the days of Henty, Ballantyne and Talbot Baines Reed used to say about their own specially thrilling productions. Typical of this age is the question, “ Is it true ? ” The spinner of yarns must be frank about his intention if he proposes to indulge in sheer fabrication. He is on sure ground with children in this realist period of their development only if his tale has a core of truth, however much, after the manner of a legend, it may be elaborated and embroidered. The pleasures of fantasy still have their place, but instead of flight from the reality of life to imagined delights, boys and girls now want to explore the realities further.

In contrasting the pleasure-principle with the reality-principle Freud works out the conception of the super-ego or ego-ideal. To understand this it is necessary to recall the way in which he distinguishes the aspects of the total self or personality as he thinks of it, and to keep in mind his portrayal of their relationship. The *ego* is what might be described as the self of which we are ordinarily aware. It has been developed out of the *id*, that mass

of the raw material of human nature in the shape of instinctive and emotional impulses of which we are unconscious, but which is always pressing up into consciousness. The *super-ego*, or ego-ideal, is the standard set for us partly by social tradition and partly by influences of a more subtle and interior kind to which we have been subject from infancy. The super-ego acts in the unconscious as well as in the conscious part of the personality. It deters the individual from giving unrestrained expression to crude instinctive impulse, thus exercising a suppressive power in the conscious and a repressive in the unconscious. In Freud's later writings the super-ego takes the place of his original notion of the "censor," which he pictured as sitting at the door of communication between the unconscious and the conscious, and preventing unwelcome instinctual and emotional elements in the unconscious from entering consciousness as they would otherwise do.¹ Energies thus repressed tend to form complexes within the unconscious mind, and to weaken the personality by using up the energy required to maintain the repression. The conflict caused below the level of consciousness frequently ends in a breaking into consciousness of these repressed impulses, either in a disguised form such as dreams or in the form of a neurosis, which is a mental illness such as an obsession, an anxiety-state, an over-mastering fear, or something of that kind, for which the patient can find no reason in his conscious life.

The super-ego, or ego-ideal, is thus not altogether different from ordinary notions of conscience and social tradition or convention, mediated to the individual primarily through relationships with his parents during infancy and early childhood, and through the life of both

¹ Freud represented the Censor as acting below the level of Consciousness.

family and school. The "latency period," which is practically co-extensive with the years between seven and eleven that we are now discussing, is of special significance in this connection. Freud's own latest formulation of his view is quite concise. "The beginning of the latency period," he says, "is characterised by the passing away of the Oedipus Complex, the creation or consolidation of the super-ego, and the erection of ethical and aesthetic barriers in the ego. In obsessional neuroses these processes are carried further than in normal. In order to effect the destruction of the Oedipus Complex a regressive degradation of the libido takes place as well, the super-ego becomes exceptionally severe and unkind, and the ego, in obedience to the super-ego, produces strong reaction-formations in the shape of conscientiousness, pity and cleanliness."¹ There is implicit in this description the thought of perpetual struggle between what lay people would call conscience and impulse, and when Freud speaks of "regressive degradation of the libido," he means a strengthening of the effort to thrust the instinctual energies, which, we must remember, he regards as essentially sexual, further into the unconscious depths of the personality.

His daughter, Dr. Anna Freud, states the psycho-

¹ *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety*, p. 64. He proceeds to argue that in the case of these obsessional neuroses, "We once more find an illustration of the truth that every exaggeration contains the seed of its own destruction for, under the guise of obsessional acts, the masturbation that has been suppressed approaches ever more closely to gratification." In an earlier book, *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, p. 166, he affirms that, while in the case of boys at the beginning of the latency period the Oedipus Complex is "abandoned," through fear of losing manhood, in the case of girls the reverse happens, and the girl, in her envy of male potency, "is driven from her attachment to her mother, and enters the Oedipus situation as though it were a haven of refuge." We are concerned with his main point about the super-ego, however, rather than with the apparent inconsistency between the two statements.

analytic theory of the latency period rather more fully. She emphasises the conception of long-continued struggle, attended by anxiety, between the developing ego, or conscious self, and the id, or crude instinctual energy of a primarily sexual character, springing from the unconscious. She also brings out in greater detail the transition from an almost blind attachment to one parent and antagonism to the other ("object-love" and its opposite), which we have already discussed in criticising Freud's exaggerated Oedipus-complex dogma, to that perception of desirable qualities in both parents which ends in the child's making them his own ideal and reproducing them to some extent within himself ("identification" and "introjection"). Furthermore, she brings into her picture the important element of the child's relationship not only to his parents but to his world as a whole, which up till now, as we saw, has seemed to him so overwhelming in its bigness that he must needs either submit to it or find expression for his own "will to power," as Adler described it, in the realm of fantasy. She says: "The latency period sets in, with a physiologically conditioned decline in the strength of the instincts, and a truce is called in the defensive warfare waged by the ego. . . . Its whole attitude to external objects gradually changes as it surmounts the Oedipus situation. Complete dependence on the parents ceases and identification begins to take the place of object-love. More and more the principles held up to the child by his parents and teachers—their wishes, requirements and ideals—are introjected. In his inner life the outside world no longer makes itself felt solely in the form of objective anxiety. He has set up within his ego a permanent institution, in which are embodied the demands of those around him which we call the super-ego. Simultaneously with this development a change takes place in the infantile anxiety.

Fear of the outside world looms less large and gradually gives place to fear of the new representatives of the old power—to super-ego anxiety, anxiety of conscience and the sense of guilt. This means that the ego of the latency period has acquired a new ally in the struggle to master the instinctual process. Anxiety of conscience prompts the defence against instinct in the latency period, just as it was prompted by objective anxiety in the early infantile period. As before, it is difficult to determine how much of the control over instinct acquired during the latency period is to be attributed to the ego itself and how much to the powerful influence of the super-ego.”¹

We must give further attention to three aspects of the child's development between the ages of six and eleven thus emphasised by Dr. Anna Freud. They are the growth in the social sense, the place of the guilt sense, and the importance of the transference from complete dependence upon the parents. They are mutually related in a way which is very significant for our present study.

It is obvious that not even the veriest infant can live without awareness of reciprocal relationships between himself and all the other human beings whose lives impinge upon his own. One of the most deep-seated,

¹ *The Ego and the Mechanism of Defence*, p. 157. Cf. Dr. Anna Freud's *Psycho-Analysis for Teachers*, pp. 62 ff. With this may be compared Dr. Melanie Klein's account in her *Psycho-Analysis of Children*, p. 252. She holds that “the development of the super-ego ceases, along with that of the libido, at the outset of the latency period,” and continues: “I would now like to emphasise as a point of central importance that what we have to deal with in the various stages that follow the decline of the Oedipus Complex are not changes in the super-ego itself, but a growth of the ego, which involves a consolidation of the super-ego. The general process of stabilisation which occurs in the child during the latency period is effected, I think, not by any actual alteration of its super-ego, but by the fact that its ego and super-ego are pursuing the common aim of achieving an adaptation to its environment and adopting ego ideals belonging to that environment.”

disastrous and tragic forms of psychosis—or, in popular terminology, of madness—with which we are acquainted is that in which⁴ the patient sinks back into himself and refuses to betray any recognition of what doctors, nurses, fellow-patients and friends say or do. The emotional activity characteristic between birth and the age of three is, as² we have seen, a bond between the child and those about him. It is not an unrelated functioning of his own energies, and moreover, as we saw, it has meaning. Yet inevitably, during that first stage of growth, the infant interprets all his experiences and everything in his surroundings with primary reference to himself and his own welfare. His fear lest anything should rob him of his mother's love, and of the security which he feels because of it, is egocentric. Nevertheless he responds with a genuine affection; he knows the difference between what is in his own mind and what is in his mother's mind (though he may be unable as yet to think about thinking); and he can oppose his own will to his mother's will.

Later, and especially at the stage between three and six, the child's social sphere has enlarged from mother and father, brother and sisters, members of the household to which he belongs and visitors to it. He has friends among children from other households; probably he has begun to go to school. He meets a variety of grown-up people, and many more pass before him in the streets. Being by this time actively imaginative he gives life to the human figures in pictures, and peoples his imaginary world with still others. But he is still conscious of smallness and dependence, as he was during the first three years of life. His fantasies are to a considerable degree a means of asserting himself. The self-reference is still, and necessarily, primary. At the same time the real grown-ups in his more intimate circle, and especially

mother and father, are not only the source of well-being but also the embodiment of rule and law. As Dr. Susan Isaacs puts it : “ What is ‘ naughty ’ means for the little child simply and literally ‘ what makes grown-ups angry. ’ ” ¹ Further, as Dr. Isaacs’ observation of young children has shown, in games of “ let’s pretend ” fathers and mothers, teachers and railway-guards, indeed “ any person of power and authority,” will often be represented as “ most tyrannical in their demands and severe in their punishments and penalties . . . usually far more so than the real persons in real life, or than anything the children themselves have actually experienced.” Dr. Isaacs explains this, together with the severity of children to others of their own age who have offended in any way against accepted codes of behaviour, on the ground that these seven- or eight-year-olds are really “ supporting *themselves* against the ‘ babyishness,’ the tears, the clumsiness, the lack of control upon which they turn so severe an eye in others. As with us grown-ups too, they castigate in others the very faults they are struggling against in themselves. They can only dare to be mild and tolerant of the weaknesses of others when their own impulses of anger and fear are more firmly leashed, and their own skills more securely won.” ²

With ten- and twelve-year-olds the case is different. They have now passed from individualism and competitiveness, even in play, to the spirit of the team and the gang. Rules are not for them ordinances arbitrarily made by a personal authority but are rules of the game, to be interpreted with some generosity and good sense. Loyalties are more social than individual. This is vividly exemplified by Dr. Isaacs when she points out that a

¹ *The Children We Teach*, p. 79.

² *Op. cit.* pp. 84-87. Cf. Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, p. 142.

boy or a girl will not "split" upon his or her companions even though refusal be at the price of lying to a headmaster or headmistress who enjoys the real confidence and respect of the children. The social life which has developed among the children themselves is so strong that if the group is for any reason "agin the government," group-loyalty wins. "The boys are aligned as a group against the master as a person, against the larger world of 'the school.' He may appeal to them on the ground of some remote abstract ideal, but they cannot detach that from him. The master might feel impelled to break down their loyalty to their friends—but would this be really desirable?" Dr. Isaacs holds that if grown-ups respect these loyalties, "the return is often a hundred fold in trust and confidence in us, and in real growth towards those larger allegiances we are aiming at."¹

During this period which we have called the stage of realism, and which the psycho-analysts describe as the latency period, there is a growing detachment from emotional dependence upon parents and other adults which is to some extent due to this increase of social relatedness to children of the same age, fostered by the conditions of school, where organisation tends to group like with like and to reduce the degree of inequality between individuals within the form or set or team. There is a certain gratification of the desire for power, also, as children learn to make things, to play games, and to utilise their developing intellectual capacities. Professor Piaget argues that the social propensities (never absent, even in infancy, as we have seen, but now showing such marked activity) are released by the child's greater ability to understand his environment, both material and personal, but Dr. Isaacs rightly maintains

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 107.

" the *mutual* influence of thought and behaviour throughout." ¹ She makes a very important point, however, when she says that intellectually the child between seven and eleven feels a great need to understand the world around him, " a world of things and of people," to understand it as a whole, and to reach that understanding along the avenue of his everyday experiences, interests and activities. ²

To say, therefore, that children of this age are realist and matter-of-fact, that they have to some extent passed from the security of the home and parent-love to the more objective and less mysterious security of the group or gang in school, playing-field or street, and to stop there, is to offer a very superficial description of what is happening. The emotional and imaginative elements in their make-up, which were exercised so vigorously during infancy and early childhood, have not been replaced by the social and intellectual. The activity of these energies may not be so obvious, now that other powers seem for the time being to have attained predominance, but they have not ceased to exist. In the very nature of things, as children move from the shelter of home and nursery school to the wider world in which they encounter more children who are their equals, more adults with whom they must have personal dealings, more activities calling for initiative, adventure and courage, they become aware of growing responsibility in divers directions. They are held more accountable for their own attitudes and actions. Occasions for choosing between alternatives and risks of doing wrong as well as chances of doing right are multiplied. With the diversified enrichment of their experiences comes a more imperious necessity to discover

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 81.

² *Op. cit.* pp. 112 ff. Cf. also Dr. Isaacs in *Intellectual Growth in Young Children* and in *Social Development in Young Children*.

something or someone to unify these, or life, would become a constantly more baffling and bewildering chaos. They must somehow begin to discover for themselves what they could take for granted when they were babies or tiny children, dependent wholly in a small and safe world upon mother and father, who gave them love and whose will was law, so that their chief fear was that by offending against the law they should lose the love, and their elementary guilt sense was connected with elemental ways of displeasing mother and father by being "dirty" or "naughty." A transference is plainly inevitable.

It is equally plain that neither the group of other children nor the teacher will supply a wholly adequate object upon which these hitherto parent-and-home directed energies of the emotions, the instinctual propensities, the imagination and the will can be centred. No object which is the pure creation of fantasy will serve, for this would mean sheer day-dreaming and retreat from reality. The end of such indulgence is failure to cope with life altogether. In its extreme form as a psychosis it is expressed in that type of illusion in which a man imagines that he is Emperor of China, or something not so harmless. Clearly, therefore, this transference, even in its earliest beginnings in childhood, must be to an object not less real than the actual parents. If it is to satisfy the deepest needs of the child, the youth, and ultimately the mature man, it must offer a continuance and not a contradiction of the child's initial experience. Otherwise there can be no unity within the growth from birth to maturity. Infancy and childhood would be what indeed the more extravagant among Freudians appear to make of it, a thoroughly unfortunate, if not mischievous, introduction to life which all the developments of later years can scarcely suffice to remedy—

even with the help of universal and prolonged psycho-analysis.

Dr. Cattell quotes Freud's saying : " I think it would be a very long time before a child who was not influenced (by adults) began to trouble himself about God and the things beyond this world," and replies : " The same could be said equally of mathematics or science or politics. And we have in the child from the beginning an animistic tendency, a yearning towards poetry and beauty and spiritual values beyond his immediate experience." ¹ Earlier, he has defined animism as " the tendency to explain all sorts of natural happenings as being due to the will of living (but disembodied) beings." ² But even if among primitive folk and small children, in the time of their ignorance, this tendency leads to mistakes about the real world which involve magic and superstition among undeveloped peoples, or an over-development of fantasy among children, the child in a civilised society is aware of the difference between make-believe and fact. " Animism, as a naïve tendency to ' project ' our own modes of experience on the outer world, is a universal tendency of the untutored mind." ³ Admittedly, but the child between seven and eleven is hardly likely in these days to have escaped some tutoring. Little sophisticated as he may be, he knows well enough not only that the recurrent " modes of his own experiences " have a reality at the heart of them, but that there must be an answering reality, or a reality to which they are his answer, beyond him. His widening social relatedness helps his understanding to that extent, as his power of reasoning helps him to interpret his social experiences, at least to the point of being certain that other people are as real as himself. Now that he is losing his egocentricity

¹ *Psychology and the Religious Quest*, p. 188.

² *Ibid.* p. 17.

³ *Ibid.* p. 17.

he perceives that adjustment must be on his side, as well as on theirs. He long ago learned that he must adjust himself to such inanimate objects as a statue in his path. No amount of make-believe, animism or projection, in virtue of which he supposes that the statue is as much alive as he is, will result in the statue's moving out of his way because he calls upon it to do so, any more than it would result in his model train's starting from the other side of the room if no one had set it going. The "animism" of his infancy or early childhood has begun to be exchanged for some understanding of cause and effect, not only in his material, but also in his mental and spiritual, world. He has discovered that he can make others happy or sorrowful by what he is, and not alone by what he does; conversely, he may be made miserable or glad by their states of mind, and not merely by their actions—as, for example, when he goes unpunished for a fault by any penalty inflicted upon him, yet wholly repentant because he has found out what parent or teacher or friend feels about it.

It is in this way that he advances to a sense of guilt as something more and deeper than simple consciousness of having done something wrong. Freud, of course, traces guilt back to the *Œdipus* situation, and imports into his explanation another of the notions which he has borrowed from Greek mythology. He tells us that the guilt sense which pervades our human nature has its origins in the desire of the son to marry his mother, and the horror of the son when he had unwittingly killed his father in order to obtain possession of his mother.¹ In the field of anthropology he finds a similar situation as between the father of the tribal horde and his sons, and

¹ *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, pp. 277, 279. *New Introductory Lectures*, p. 141.

draws similar conclusions.¹ In actual fact, a great deal may be explained by the way in which infants and tiny children are often caused to associate the idea of wrongness with the natural functions of sex and of excretion, the organs of which lie near enough together to create confusion in the mind of the child when he is rebuked or punished for curiosity about them, or for some failure in personal cleanliness. Undoubtedly, in later childhood and in early adolescence, a child who has not been given sex instruction in the right way, receiving plain and simple answers to spontaneous questions whenever and however they arise, may from ignorance and false shame develop a sense of guilt in relation to the quite normal phenomena of sex. But neither the normal nor the abnormal developments of sex suffice in themselves to account for the growth of the guilt-sense, any more than Durkheim and his fellow-sociologists succeeded in explaining religion as essentially a product of social relationships.

Less open to criticism is Freud's statement that

¹ *Totem and Taboo*, pp. 114-124, 235-243; cf. *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, pp. 93 f; and *An Autobiographical Study*, pp. 123 f. Professor E. O. James affirms roundly that "There is no anthropological evidence for 'a dislocation in the family life of the primitive horde' as a result of the sex urge, the sons slaying the father in order to secure the women for themselves, and then inventing a ritual device to expiate and commemorate their crime." In any case, he says, if such a primal state of society as Freud supposes ever did exist, "at least no traces have been left of its occurrence in any known state of culture, and it has yet to be shown that religion in practice is an attempt on the part of the individual to be reconciled with his infantile father-image." Professor James takes the view that sexual licence at seasonal festivals, like sexual symbolism in myth and ritual, are "directed primarily to specific ends, viz. the promotion and conservation of life, not the satisfaction of repressed erotic desires," and he observes that "religion, in fact, has always endeavoured to exercise a regulative control over the instinct of sex." *Comparative Religion: An Introductory and Historical Study*, pp. 33 f.

"The sense of guilt (as well as the sense of inferiority) can also be understood as an expression of tension between the ego and the ego ideal."¹ A very common view, not far removed from this, is expressed by Dr. Cattell when he says: "Before three or four years of age few children show any sense of guilt—except when they are actually discovered in naughtiness by a parent. But by seven, most have acquired by imitation, through fear of loss of parental affection, a sense of guilt and the correlated notion of sin."² If Dr. Cattell means that there is a connection here between imitation and fear he does not make the nature of it clear. The important point, however, is that he distinguishes, at any rate by implication, between a false sense of guilt due to mere convention and a real sense which is a matter of relationships, as he distinguishes also between a state of guilt, which is an attitude, and sin as an act or a series of acts. At the root of the whole disquietude in the child's mind there is a feeling that something in himself has come between him and another, whose love and trust he values, and upon right relationships with whom depends his hope of security, his happiness and the fulfilment of his heart's desire. He is no longer limited to that complete dependence upon his parents which made his emotional reactions to their pleasure or displeasure with him so intense. He has passed beyond the time of fantasy when he found freedom and power in a world of his own making. He has to meet the claims of his equals as well as of his elders and superiors. He desires to keep his place in his group by maintaining an unfailing loyalty to his fellows. His increasingly numerous and varied social relationships bring him more opportunity of playing off failure in one direction by success in another. Yet there

¹ *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, p. 106.

² *Psychology and the Religious Quest*, p. 36.

remains a sense of imperfection and wrongness greater than he knew in his relationship as a tiny child with his parents, and an inner demand for satisfactory adjustment stronger than he experienced in his fantasy days. And they are there because what he needs and wants above all things is a dependable reality which he understands, and with which his relationship is as personal as it is with his father and mother, his teacher, his friends. But it must be adequate to a world of experience ever enlarging. A super-ego, derived from his parents and from his daily contacts with others in his social environment, will help him but it will not sustain him, especially if its chief effect, as Freud avers, is to create fear in him.

"In their imagination," writes Dr. Susan Isaacs, "young children do really fear the direst penalties for their naughtinesses and even for their very wishes. Their notions of justice and of what their parents may do to them are built upon the pattern of their own surging wishes and angers and fears, and are as little measured. They cannot yet test their fantasies by their experience of reality, since this is so meagre and limited. . . . The moral values and the social judgments of the older child are, on the one hand, more temperate and more sensible than those of the younger : and, on the other hand, they are distinctly more effective and reliable in reality."¹

It would seem, then, that the pressure of reality upon boys and girls at this stage, exerted to a considerable extent through their developing social relationships, increases at the same time both their "need to understand" and that sense of wrongness and disquiet which we know as guilt : it sets them, on the other hand, upon the quest of an object for their affection, their trust and their endeavour who, to them, can be all that father and mother have ever meant, yet without the limitations of

¹ *The Children We Teach*, pp. 89 f.

goodness, power and love which even the best of fathers and mothers must reveal to boys and girls who have passed from emotional intensity through eager imaginativeness to a realism in which neither of these is lost. Unconsciously, it may be, but unquestionably, they are not only driven to make a transference but have begun to make it. Freud has not even taken into account the implications of his own theory when he says that if left to themselves they would not trouble themselves about God. It is true that no human being would by himself arrive at the knowledge of God which was given to men in Jesus Christ, but the history of the race shows how it has felt after the idea of God, if haply it might find Him, from the very first. We need not accept the theory of recapitulation and suppose that every child in the course of its development "climbs up its own ancestral tree," or the culture epoch theory which maintains that each of us passes through a series of stages corresponding to the successive types of culture achieved by the human race, in order to perceive that childhood at its most matter-of-fact stage demands a reality at the centre of its world such as only the Christian conception and experience of God as Father can yield.

However reflective a child may be, we cannot suppose that he is in any way specifically conscious of all that is going on in the depths of his own mind. The psycho-analytical account of it, however, in this case strongly reinforces the impression left upon us by simple observation of the child's general characteristics and behaviour-tendencies as these are recognised by everybody. We used the word "realist" even in respect of children's attitude at this stage to stories and cinema-shows. Dr. Emanuel Miller uses it in a slightly different connection. The latency period, he says, "is a period of realism, of intellectual realism, as compared with that perceptual

realism which is so real yet so neglected a quality of early child life." ¹ He sees in the play of these boys and girls "largely a preparation for adult life." If, then, in work and play alike, as in all ordinary relationships, children in this phase are chiefly concerned to discover what is unquestionably real and indubitably reliable, so that they may think and act without fear, the lines of their religious development must surely at least be similar.

Freud, of course, since he considers religion only a useful illusion, cannot give to his "Reality Principle" any religious significance. It is in fact a pure abstraction as he represents it, becoming concrete only in the actuality of our immediate physical and social environment. His "super-ego" or "ego-ideal" is again only less abstract than his earlier figure of the censor, which it replaces. He declares that "The fear of the super-ego should normally never cease, since it is indispensable in social relations in the form of moral anxiety, and it is only in the rarest instances that an individual succeeds in becoming independent of the community," but he is not so entirely utilitarian as this might seem to indicate. Protesting against the way in which "Psycho-analysis has been reproached time after time with ignoring the higher, moral, spiritual side of human nature," he writes : ² "So long as the study of the repressed part of the mind was our task, there was no need for us to feel any-agitated apprehensions about the existence of the higher side of mental life. But now that we have embarked upon the analysis of the ego we can give an answer to all those whose moral sense has been shocked, and who have complained that there must surely be a higher nature in man : 'very true,' we can say, 'and here we have that higher nature, in this ego-ideal or super-ego, the representative of our relation

¹ *The Generations*, pp. 130 f.

² *New Introductory Lectures*, p. 116.

to our parents. When we were little children we knew these higher natures, we admired them and feared them ; and later we took them into ourselves.' ” ¹

Now religion, for the child as for the adult, must mean a relation to God, though, as we have already argued, this may in the first instance be mediated by the parents. It might seem as though in the passage just quoted there is nothing to prevent the deduction that in the latency period of realism this development is carried further, and children discover for themselves more fully the existence of God as the greatest of all realities and their relationship with Him as something direct and practical. Unfortunately, having contributed so much that is of value to our understanding of a child's religious experience during the latency period, Freud, in his prejudice against the possibility of religion's being rooted in reality and being the deepest of all human responses to reality, at this point plunges into a confused subjectivity, abstractness and inconsistency, for he proceeds : “ Whereas the ego is essentially the representative of the external world, of reality, the super-ego stands in contrast to it as the representative of the internal world, of the id. Conflicts between the ego and the ideal will, as we are now prepared to find, ultimately reflect the contrast between what is real and what is mental, between the external world and the internal world.” ²

¹ *The Ego and the Id*, pp. 46 f.

² *Ibid.* p. 48. Rejecting the psycho-analytical criticism of religion as an illusion, Dr. Cattell interprets religion as a reality, wherein response is made to God, but God is interpreted by Dr. Cattell as the Universal Reality—“all that which is inherent in the laws of the Universe,” present perfectly but unconsciously in our experience, whereas God is present consciously but imperfectly in the “Theopsyche”—“the God mind that is distilled from the interaction of all individual minds” (*op. cit.* pp. 129-132). We can hardly wonder that he is impelled to say that it would be a mistake to drop the name “God” altogether in teaching children

It is precisely at this point that Bovet carries us forward while Freud turns back. The teacher sees what the medical psychologist misses. "Certainly," he writes, "there is in all children at this time a very characteristic and spontaneous outburst of metaphysical curiosity: speculations regarding the origin of things, the first man, the creation of the world and of God Himself—to which we might add the marked preoccupation at the same time with questions about the origin of the individual, birth, the differences between the two sexes and the process of generation. . . . This has been customarily represented as the *awakening* of intellectual curiosity: we believe, on the other hand, that it is necessary to see in it a *crisis*, at once intellectual and moral, comparable in many respects to the crisis of adolescence, and that we are here facing a crisis of religious experience."¹ The young child thinks of his father and mother as omnipotent, as good, as loving, providing, protecting. In this realist stage of later childhood he finds his parents out, so to speak—he realises their limitations, inconsistencies, failures. Then, as Bovet says, "the child, just after the sixth year, spontaneously asks himself questions about natural phenomena and the origin of things. He finds the answer in the intervention of persons, to whom he naturally attributes the power, wisdom and goodness with which he has endowed his parents. Thus, independently of any religious teaching, are realised those conditions which, on the occurrence of the crisis which shatters the childish faith in the parents, enable him to discover in the universe

religion, though "the study of God becomes a branch of science," and scientifically, "Theopsyche," in his view, "meets the need for clarity" (p. 186). A pantheistic combination of scientific humanism and what Lord Gifford understood as "natural religion" offers little that meets the need of the growing mind, to say nothing of the mature personality as a whole.

¹ *The Child's Religion*, pp. 38 ff.

someone whom he may endow with attributes at once paternal and divine."¹

Is this, then, merely projection? Does all that Piaget has recorded concerning the child's idea of causation² simply prove that at this period of apparent realism he is after all only an animist, attributing life, mind and spirit to what is external to himself simply because he feels these to be the spring of his own activities?³ The argument runs the other way. To recognise that there are some things which father and mother cannot do, that there are occasions when love and justice do not seem to be forthcoming from them, that they cannot always be counted upon to take the same attitude in like circumstances, is not to suffer complete disillusionment. There is so much that they can do; their love and justice, their consistency and dependability remain facts of experience, despite all limitations and deficiencies. It is the reality of these things from which the child takes his start. They are, as it were, basic to his universe and they are not abstract. He knows by intuition, as the most erudite philosopher must in the end admit, that love and power, truth, beauty and goodness have real existence only for and in personal beings. What he sets out to discover is where the final, inexhaustible, eternal, personal source or sources of these actualities can be found—though he could never conceive of his quest, or describe it, in that way. He is no logician or metaphysician. Until he is ten or thereabouts he apparently does not develop a historical sense sufficient to enable him to appreciate in the sequence of events anything more than broad distinctions between the here-and-now and the far-away-and long-ago. Yet if reasoned thinking is pattern thinking, if

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 81.

² *The Child's Conception of Causality.*

³ Cf. the tiny child's endowment of dolls, toy animals, or even trains, with the characteristics and powers of living things.

intelligence is ability to complete the pattern and perceive it as at least potentially a part of a still larger one, then God, not only as the Father, but as Maker and Master of the real world, the Designer and Master-weaver of the great pattern, becomes a necessary postulate in the child's thought.

It would be highly ridiculous to entertain even for a moment the notion that a child between seven and eleven is capable of anything approaching such philosophical analysis and constructiveness as all this implies. To confuse a child's naïve experience with an adult's sophisticated interpretation of it is so glaring a fallacy that even a warning may seem superfluous. The reason for being so explicit, however, is that here we come upon an issue of cardinal importance. In these days reaction against the imposition of knowledge or belief upon children, whether by stark authority or by subtle and only partly conscious suggestion, has resulted in a fear—almost pusillanimous and certainly sentimental—of telling them anything in definite terms. Curiously enough, however, there is at the same time as great a tendency as ever to discredit the child's own experience on the ground that it is so limited and immature. There is, furthermore, a complete disinclination to regard as significant for the understanding of life and the universe as a whole the child's religious reactions to his experience, though we may have been so ready to reinterpret human personality and conduct in the light of the infant's emotional reactions to *his* experience, which is more limited than the child's.

Freud treats belief in the existence of God as little more than the domination of thought by unconscious and probably repressed desire—a form of "unconscious wish fulfilment."¹ He says: "Psycho-analysis concludes that [God] really is the father clothed in the grandeur in which he once appeared to the small child. The religious

¹ *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, p. 208.

man's picture of the creation of the universe is the same as his picture of his own creation." But may it not, after all, be true that, as in the emotional and fantasy periods, so in the realistic, we are confronted by elements in human nature which are never separable from the rest, yet which emerge more clearly and dominantly than at any other time in the growth of normal personality? Is it unreasonable to suppose that these elements have their place in human nature, not simply for the sake of ensuring mental balance, but because they are the essential conditions of that correspondence with ultimate reality upon which life itself depends? If you set a Fourth Form in the biological laboratory to dissect a chestnut bud they discover not only what is essential to the existence and growth of a bud, but also what derives from a tree, and goes to the making of another tree. When we penetrate to this insistence in later childhood upon an explanation of things in terms of reality and personality, we may be in contact with a natural and vital factor in all religion, however mature or otherwise, just as emotion and imagination are natural and vital factors. In this demand for reality, however, lies the check upon the other two, and further, if it is spontaneous in all healthy, normal children, we are as justified in assuming the existence of that which can satisfy such a demand as in recognising the existence of air to meet the need of the lungs and the blood.¹

Dr. A. B. Macaulay, in discussing the nature of religious dogma and its relationship to science and philosophy, points out very aptly that if religious faith must be integrated with scientific knowledge, so also must scientific knowledge with religious faith. We must agree, if we hold that both are natural functions of reasonable man living in a rational universe. "We do

¹ *The Death of Jesus*, pp. 31 ff.

not really see the truth of anything,” says Dr. Macaulay, “ till we have seen it in its place in the whole. We have not comprehended our faith and its contents, we have not made it the object of scientific treatment, we have not exhibited it to ourselves as truth, until we have set it in relation to our whole experience of reality. And, on the other hand, we have not seen anything else in its truth, we have not comprehended in their real nature the varied phenomena of the world, till we have looked at them in their place in a world where the first and final Cause is the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.” ¹

For the Christian the guarantee of the reality, purpose and activity of God is found in the life and teaching of Jesus, concrete facts in space and time. What we are emphasising here is that the very nature of religion, as this is discoverable in the growing mind, is to make demands upon historical reality, and through it upon a Reality beyond space and time, yet personal. “ Thou hast made us for Thyself and our hearts are restless till they find rest in Thee,” cries Augustine. “ It is He that hath made us and not we ourselves,” says the Psalmist. The Hebrew certainty of God’s existence historically and logically precedes the Christian. It is what boy and girl in later childhood are searching for, just as the inwardness of the fuller Christian revelation of God in Jesus Christ is perhaps more naturally desired and apprehended in

¹ Prof. L. W. Grensted writes in *This Business of Living*, pp. 82 f. : “ This analysis of the life-process in us is never at any point unrelated to that which lies outside us. It is a response in us to a given something at each stage. Impulse and appetite and emotion and sentiment only have meaning in a world to which they are successively appropriate. Hunger would be as meaningless in a foodless world as sex would be in a world where we were not organised as men and women. If the sentiments are, as we have said, dispositions which develop in us through our relationship to others, this is only the completion of a process which has the same general character throughout. We do not and cannot live in the void.”

adolescence. The testimony of the mature man to the reality of God is, as we have seen, strikingly confirmed, whether intentionally or not, by psychiatrists who, like Jung, find that their patients are made whole by faith in that reality. Since the sicknesses from which these patients were suffering were caused by refusal to face reality, by confusing fantasy with reality, by the "splitting" of the personality, and so forth, it cannot be seriously argued that recovery was due to an illusory belief. Religion involves prayer and self-surrender as well as faith. As Professor Pratt long ago observed, the nerve of the whole thing is cut directly the religious man has a suspicion that his religion is wholly subjective, that there is no answering reality. Boys and girls in later childhood, by their very make-up, their matter-of-factness, their realism, bear testimony in another way to the reality not simply of religion but of its object, for they are unconscious witnesses to the naturalness and necessity with which the human mind and spirit, as it grows, uses reason to help it to establish the objective actuality of the God already known as Father. Revelation and discovery are counterparts. We are prepared for the manifestation of God's reality and Fatherhood in and through Jesus, both because we are by constitution possessed of the filial spirit—"God sent forth the spirit of sonship into our hearts"—and because by experience in the family the meaning of Fatherhood has begun to be interpreted to us.

Our discussion has perhaps taken an unexpected turn. We seem now, instead of dwelling upon the religious characteristics of boys and girls in the "seven-plus" period, to be using their religious attitude and experience as evidence for the reality of the Creator-Father-God whom their realism impels them to seek. It is worth while, however, not only to show in what respects religion

progresses *because of* the emotional and imaginative qualities so often supposed psychologically to prove its illusoriness, but also to bring out the neglected fact that, if fantasy, projection and suggestion play a part in the religious experience of the growing mind, so too does insistence upon reality and rationality, interpreted not as abstractions but in personal terms. Only as that demand is satisfied can the growth of religion proceed. That is why boys and girls at this stage turn from myth and legend to history. Of course at an earlier stage they learned much that was historical—stories about Jesus, for example. But then they drew from both what nourished them most truly. Now they must be sure that, in essentials at any rate, what we tell them is true. They cannot any longer afford to blur the distinction between poetry and prose, though they relish both, and grasp soon enough the fact that some truth cannot be told except in poetry. There is little danger of their becoming miserable little literalists, unless indeed their powers of imagination were not given ample exercise during the fantasy period, were discouraged, or were repressed. If that has happened we may well have on our hands a creature of lamentable moral earnestness, a genuine prig.

In dealing with the true "reality-principle," with the development of conscience or the "ego-ideal," and with religion as an affair between persons, we have been concerned with something characteristic of later childhood, when emotion and imagination are checked by question and reason, but this is not all. This element of realism and actuality is universal, as the comparative study of religions, and particularly of the higher religions, makes plain. There is always a tendency to personalise the natural forces operative in circumstance—weather and harvests, sickness and health, prosperity and adversity—as the myths of all times and peoples show. When

morality and character, religion as life and action (as apart from *tabu* and tribal custom), become an established part of the common ideal there invariably emerges a reference to the historical, or at least to the quasi-historical. Thus Hinduism, with the doctrine of *maya* (illusion) at its heart, produces the stories in the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*, projecting on to divinities in human guise, as in the *Bhagavad-Gita*, the qualities out of which all that is finest in the domestic and social life of Hindu India has in fact been built. More remarkable still is the way in which Buddhism, in its pristine form a philosophy which looked for the disappearance of desire, and therefore of personality, as the consummation devoutly to be wished, gave rise in its *Mahayana* form to the figure of Kwanyin, Goddess of Mercy, and to a long and varied tradition not only of gods, but also of saints and heroes. It is, however, distinctive of the Hebrew genius that the personal and the concrete take precedence of everything else. The deliverance from Egypt was the great fact from which the story of the chosen people started. After it came the giving of the Law in the name of a God now made known as real and personal, if also infinite. "Jewish reflection," says Professor Macmurray, "thinks history as the act of God."¹

Whatever we make of the Hebrew myths and legends, which reflect the pre-history and the most primitive religious beliefs of the time before Abraham, or of the stories of the early migrations, or again of the miracle-stories that gathered about the records of the Hebrew golden age from the time of Samuel till the time of Elisha, it is unquestionable that the Prophets, actual persons in ascertainable historical circumstances, set their stamp upon the religion which became Judaism, and did so even more by what they were than by what

¹ *The Clue to History*, p. 38.

they said. They were men of spiritual insight, and their characteristic exercise of it was in the interpretation of contemporary history in the light of past history—which they read as "What God hath wrought." Under their influence the Pentateuch and the books of "the former prophets" (Samuel and Kings) took shape as a religious record which also marked out the right path for a people "whose God is the LORD." This historical emphasis endured when the succession of the great Prophets ceased. The outstanding parts of the Apocrypha are the story of the Maccabees and the roll of heroes in Ecclesiasticus. Thus it was that, despite the subsequent falling away to passionate legalism and cynical worldly wisdom illustrated by the extreme types of Pharisee and Sadducee, these people, whose one great possession was their religion, had been prepared for a final revelation of God in action on the plane of history. The Synoptic Gospels and the Book of the Acts show how slow even the most responsive among the Jews were to recognise the supreme Event when it actually took place, or the uniqueness of the Person in whom God acted. Yet these writings stand out from among all the religious literatures of the world as records, first of the cardinal and self-revealing act of God in human experience, and then of the resultant rise of Christianity as a religion centred in the historic fact of Christ. Nor does the story stop there, for the tale of personal and corporate Christian adventure and achievement runs through all the centuries since. Here then is the appeal to emotion and imagination, but it springs from fact, not fantasy. As we have seen, the question "is it true?" so often on the lips of boys and girls in this realist period of their religious development, is precisely the one most calculated to bring them into relationship with reality, and to prevent both illusion and regression.

V

THE NEW SELF AND THE OTHER SEX

WHEN Jaques described the seven ages of man he jumped from the infant, "mewling and puking in the nurse's arms," to the schoolboy, "creeping like snail unwillingly to school," and thence to the lover, "sighing like furnace, with a woeful ballad made to his mistress' eyebrow." Shakespeare was concerned—especially in *As You Like It*—with something much nearer the hearts of his audience than complete and scientific classification. Even so it is evident that there is more than a step between the whining schoolboy and the sighing lover. One would like to have had Jaques' summary of the stages in this part of Everyman's progress. For puberty comes about half-way between birth and maturity, and from the point at which the boy or girl ceases to be a child there is still a decade or more to be compassed before he becomes a man and she a woman, in the physiological and psychological sense of full preparedness for the exercise of all their functions. Within this period of youth there are three stages, as before it there were the three which we described as infancy, early childhood and later childhood. There are no convenient and expressive names for these distinct phases of youthful development, so we must content ourselves with the cumbersome terms primary, middle and late adolescence. It will be noticed that this is a considerable departure from the old notion of adolescence as confined to the three or four years during which the reproductive organs spring into activity and the secondary

sexual characteristics appear. Between eleven and fifteen—the stage of primary adolescence—well-defined and far-reaching changes in all respects do indeed occur, and with these the present chapter is to deal. But to speak as though at fifteen adolescence is over is doubly mistaken, since we then tend to overlook some of the elements which distinguish middle and late adolescence, while at the same time we fail to perceive the wholeness of the process which requires all these years for its unfolding and for the integration of personality which it should bring about.

We have already had occasion to discuss Freud's emphasis upon and interpretation of the sex factor in infancy. That babies and little children are as naïvely interested in their own sex organs and those of their brothers and sisters as they are in other parts of their bodies, that in due course they ask questions about birth and reproduction, that they easily fall into the habit of masturbation, that they reveal special fondnesses and sometimes peculiar antagonisms for one parent or the other—all these are simple, universally recognised facts. False shame and prudish convention resulted, under Victorian conditions, in much repression and neuroticism—though in point of fact by no means all who lived in the Victorian age were Victorian in this sense, and a decent reticence was not necessarily the equivalent of fatuous ignorance or mischievous silence.

In our day the principles and methods of wise sex-education are widely understood, and by the time puberty is reached, children may well know all they should without attaching disproportionate importance to the knowledge. The period of latency, during which even the Freudians recognise a certain detachment in children, offers the opportunity of unifying the information and understanding which has been gathered, or

should have been, all the way along from babyhood, as sensible answers met spontaneous questions, and much was conveyed by attitude and atmosphere rather than by "moral instruction." Indeed, it sometimes seems as though for the young adolescent there is nothing more to know, at least physiologically, even about marital intercourse and birth control. No mystery remains and, too often, little real reverence. But, after all, the physiology and biology of sex are not the whole truth about it, and sex instruction on that side, however valuable and desirable, will never by itself enable the adolescent boy and girl to understand adequately what is happening to them and what they ought to do about it. Nor will the addition of the psychology of sex, if it goes no further than Freud's doctrine and symbolism.

Yet we are confronted by the fact of sex as central directly we consider the adolescent, body and mind. Whatever the Freudians may say, the adolescent himself cannot regard his new experience as essentially a recapitulation of infantile conflicts. Though boy-babies differ from girl-babies in ways far more subtle than matters of physical sex, and though in the latency period boys and girls work and play together without self-consciousness despite their realisation of sex-difference, it is patent that sex-feeling must be a very different thing after the sex organs have begun to function from what it was before, when physical sex in this regard was only latent and potential. The strange thing is that Freud not only pays no real regard to a consideration so obvious but, in perpetually reducing sex to the infantile form of it, he misses precisely those elements in it which make it genuinely central to primary adolescence and highly significant for religion. These are the elements of the other-regarding propensity and the creative capacity.

Nature herself teaches every human being who makes

the wrong sort of experiment with sex that the one thing you cannot do without involving frustration is to be self-centred and selfish in the sphere of sex—even physical sex. Science and history, art, literature and religion show that the deepest potentiality in sex is neither mere pleasure in the exercise of it, nor biological utility in procreation and the carrying on of the race, but the sharing by human beings with God, the Creator-Father, of the power to create. This power is exercised in a multitude of ways. The outcome of its activity may be a child or a nation, a machine or a poem, a scientific hypothesis leading by experiment to some world-changing discovery, or a character that incarnates the Kingdom of God. But this is something vastly different from that libidinal cathexis¹ which, even if it achieves sublimation of sex-impulse in the commonly accepted sense of sex, amounts in the end only, as Freud tells us, to a goal-inhibited activity. It should be recognised, however, that goal-inhibited activity can be no more than a second best, and direct expression of sex-impulse must in that case remain the primary desire, though it is subordinated to fear of moral and social disapproval. Consequently there is no true sublimation.

It is possible now, as perhaps it was not even fifty years ago, to relate our intellectual, moral and spiritual

¹ Freud's use of the word is thus explained: "Cathexis, from the Greek *κατέχω*, I occupy. The German word, *Besetzung*, has become of fundamental importance in the exposition of psycho-analytical theory. Any attempt at a short definition or description is likely to be misleading, but speaking very loosely we may say that 'cathexis' is used on the analogy of an electric charge, and that it means the concentration or accumulation of mental energy in some particular channel. Thus, when we speak of the existence in someone of a libidinal cathexis of an object, or, more shortly, of an object-cathexis, we mean that his libidinal energy is directed towards, or rather infused into, the idea (*Vorstellung*) of some object in the outer world." *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, p. 48. Translator's Note.

interpretation of sex to the physiological and biological facts. We cannot stay at this point to develop the arguments in favour of believing that the relationship between body and mind in general is that of interaction. A bland note made by Dr. John H. Ewen in his summary of the case for Psycho-physical Parallelism (which, of course, he accompanies with a summary of the case against it), says simply: "Metaphysics is against interaction."¹ No doubt Dr. Ewen's metaphysics may be—but there are other metaphysicians, and meantime the physicists have made it more difficult to deny the organic relationship of spirit and matter than to affirm it. Within the body itself, however, while the sex organs develop in a special manner and actually follow a distinctive plan of cell-division from the very start (*i.e.* from the moment when the ovum is fertilised by the sperm), they are now understood, in common with all the endocrine (or "ductless") glands (pituitary, thyroid, adrenal and so forth), to pour certain secretions direct into the blood-stream. They thus enrich it with energy-bearing bodies (hormones), which affect the physical and mental processes of the whole person in a variety of ways not specifically and recognisably sexual, in the narrower sense, at all. So while at puberty boy and girl become physically capable of procreation, this function is not separable from what we can only describe as personal quality: it is never merely physiological or biological.

The point is put technically but clearly by Kretschmer thus: "The sexual impulse is not a simple function of the generative glands, but clearly depends on the co-operation of the other glands and the central nervous system, where the central nervous system and the endocrine glands have intimate relations with one another of action and reaction, now on the nerves, now

¹ *Aids to Psychology*, p. 7.

on the vascular system, and regulate both positive and inhibitive impulses. The sexual impulse is not a product of the generative glands, but of a complicated system of causal factors made up of cerebral nervous tissue and glandular tissue, in which the interstitial glands play an important rôle. This means that the sexual impulse is no isolated psycho-physical entity but an important ingredient of the total temperament, which cannot be separated from it, and which is closely interwoven with it. We must not separate the total affectivity from the sexual impulse, nor account for it entirely in terms of sexual impulse, in the exaggerated terminology of certain psycho-analysts. We must make it clear that any observation of the working of the sexual impulses leads us far down into the temperamental peculiarities of a man."¹ He goes on to say that this bears closely upon psychological developments and processes.

Berdyayev writes in a similar vein but more from the standpoint of the philosopher: "The problem of sex is of fundamental importance to anthropology. Man is a sexual being, and a sexual polarity is characteristic of human nature. Sex is not a function of the human organism but a quality of it as a whole and of every cell which composes it."²

To this we may add that biologically neither sex is merely instrumental to the other, as, in the case of both sexes, hands and feet may be to the nervous system and the mind. The two are complementary, and are moreover complementary for a greater purpose than mutual satisfaction. Each must surrender to the other in order that a third person may come into existence, and from the three there emerges all society, with its evolution of sacrifice and achievement in every aspect of human

¹ *Physique and Character*, pp. 87 f.

² *The Destiny of Man*, pp. 79 ff.

living. The very biological conditions and necessities of sex save us from being the victims of our self-regarding propensity (inevitably predominant in the baby, as we saw, and even in the young child, as it remains to a less degree in later childhood), since, even biologically, self-fulfilment involves the exercise of the other-regarding propensity in promoting *the other's* self-fulfilment, whether in marriage or in the family.

Thus the beginning of adolescence is a veritable new birth. At puberty boy and girl are deeply stirred, not simply by the emergence of an added physical capacity, with all its emotional accompaniments, but by the enhancement of all their physical and mental powers, so intertwined is sex with all the other components of personality. The new self of which the adolescent is subtly aware is the psychological counterpart of an all-round biological change. Emotion and imagination, reasoning and practical ability have successively held sway, and then have not vanished before the onset of a new dominant energy but have taken their due place in a personality which has had a little breathing space wherein to organise and consolidate its gains. Now all are strongly reinforced at one and the same time. If, therefore, a period of instability, vacillation and even conflict now supervenes it is not because the adolescent finds himself thrown back into struggles connected with "infantile sexuality," nor is it because he is suddenly confronted by an unruly and overwhelming sex-energy within himself which by turns captivates him and fills him with dread of disaster. It is rather the natural and inevitable outcome of the fact that all these impulses, energies and powers are demanding appropriate expression, but have not yet been integrated and directed towards a clear and single goal by that cultivation of sentiments, shaping of character, and forging of purpose which are the

particular business of youth throughout the three stages of adolescence.

Writers on adolescence too often present us with a vivid sketch of adolescent characteristics and then explain the whole situation during these four or five years of incalculable change as due in the main, if not altogether, to puberty as such. It was necessary in the present discussion to begin with the physiological and biological facts of puberty in order to bring out more clearly the true nature of sex and its influence on the development of personality. Now let us recall briefly the normal traits of the boy and girl between eleven and fifteen. In doing so we must keep one or two important points in mind. It is easy, for example, to forget that these young people are no less a puzzle to themselves than they are to older folk. It is not the case that if only the seniors would exercise enough sympathy and patience they would understand adolescents completely. There is too much paradox in adolescent feeling and outlook for that to be possible. Further, it should hardly be necessary to remark that adolescents are not all alike. There is perhaps no other stage in human life at which individuals can differ from each other more disconcertingly, while at the same time they are in many ways so similar that the temptation to generalise is hard to resist. For some the "eleven to fifteen" period is truly one of storm and stress. Others pass through it quite easily, unconscious of any great upheaval or profound change, within or without. It is not surprising that certain conventional, highly-coloured, and overdramatised pictures of "adolescence" are scorned and denounced by schoolmasters and schoolmistresses—even more, perhaps, than by fathers and mothers—who recognise nothing of the kind in the boys and girls with whom they daily have to do. This, however, is neither a denial that deep-seated and

far-reaching changes are in progress within all boys and girls at this stage of their growth, nor is it the same thing as a self-satisfied unobservant refusal to try to understand what is actually going on.

Girls are generally a year or so ahead of boys in physical development, and often in intellectual, while also they tend to suffer more than boys from worry and overstrain. The Consultative Committee of the Board of Education in its Report on *Differentiation of the Curriculum for Boys and Girls respectively in Secondary Schools*¹ embodies a great deal of valuable evidence on this and related points from doctors, psychologists and teachers. Commenting upon it to the Committee, Professor Cyril Burt suggested that "the apparently conflicting results attained by different investigators on the subject might be reconciled by the following statements: that subjectively the emotions of men might be profounder and more prolonged, but in their outward expression the emotions of women might be more sudden and intense. It would, however, always be difficult to decide how far these differences were primary, and how far they were merely secondary to differences in physique and environment. . . . The profound differences in interest and outlook which obtained between the sexes in most civilised communities were probably due, not so much to inborn differences in intellectual capacities, as to the inevitable bias imparted to the small initial differences in instinct and emotion by the larger differences in physique and social environment and tradition. The nature of the emotions predominant in either sex, and the kind of objects arousing emotions, appeared to differ at a very early age, and these differences seemed to increase with increase of age. In general the differences in emotional capacities were found to be larger than divergences in higher

¹ Pp. 118 f. and 89.

intellectual capacities, but they were not so large as the sex differences in certain physical qualities and in certain processes of sensation and movement."

Bearing these qualifying considerations in mind we may picture to ourselves the average boy and girl in primary adolescence. After the relative stolidity of later childhood they are exuberantly emotional. There is no close parallel between the three stages comprising infancy and childhood and the three that mark the progress of adolescence, but several of the qualities which are prominent during the first six or seven years of life are also much in evidence when this time of "beginning again" arrives. It is natural enough that with quicker emotional sensibility there should be a richer imaginative-ness and a readier suggestibility. Some psychologists say that for a year or two there is a marked falling off in learning capacity and in the rate of general intellectual advance. In so far, however, as Fourth Formers do for a time prove less satisfactory in this respect than either younger, or older boys and girls the cause is less probably mental retardation than diffusion of interest and difficulty in concentration. These in turn are due to the very fact that the adolescent is so much more alive to the varied fascinations and challenges of the world as the enhancement of all his powers now enables him to apprehend it. On the other hand there is a restlessness which the far-reaching disturbance of his own state of body-mind is bound to produce, but for which, if he is conscious of it, he cannot account to himself. The slight differences in the rate of growth between limbs and trunk at this stage necessitates some readjustment of gait and poise. Both boys and girls feel clumsy, awkward, ill-at-ease and very self-conscious. Yet there is a keener sense of beauty in colour, form and movement than has been experienced before.

Arts and crafts are for many the most congenial form of creative activity at this stage. They are not, as a false interpretation of sublimation would suggest, a mere disguise for the expression of sexual energy in the predominantly physical sense of the term sexual. They bring into play that creativeness of which sex is a vehicle, and which is stimulated by the pubertal enrichment of the whole body-mind to which reference was made earlier in this chapter. Many schools are discovering this for themselves, and a striking paragraph in the *Handbook of Suggestions to Teachers*,¹ issued in 1937 by the Board of Education, says: "Physical energy can be released in games and other exercises, but children who are bewildered and disturbed by the emotional tangles of adolescence do not always find the way to peace on the playing-field. The rhythms and patterns of art, whether musical, literary, decorative or instructive, may bring them satisfaction and help to give a balance to their lives. Similarly the romance of youth is not mere fantasy or sentimentality. It engenders chivalry, the spirit of sacrifice, the passion for a cause and the love of a leader which the totalitarian states have been quick to exploit."

At twelve or thirteen boy and girl are just becoming aware of themselves as persons, entitled to a place in the sun. They may possibly exhibit a cocksureness which does not endear them to other people. But, though they would on no account admit it, beneath the bravado there is an inhibiting uncertainty of themselves. Thus it comes about that just when their ideals are higher than ever before, their sense of failure is correspondingly poignant. Adventure is the breath of life to them: nevertheless they know the torture of timidity. The sexes are apt to draw apart for games and social activities, until the major physical changes have taken place and

¹ P. 140.

become matter-of-course. The tender emotions are consequently directed towards members of the same sex, and there is a resultant tendency for younger boys and girls to develop enthusiastic admiration and even affection for older ones, and for adults, of their own sex. There need be no unhealthiness in this if the seniors act with kindly good sense, and there may be much to gain in every way, though if fear of morbidly romantic attachments or of mischievous practices is exaggerated it may result in setting up barriers between young adolescents and those very people of greater maturity who could do most to deliver them from the perils of over-heated emotionalism.

The adolescent, again like the little child, is anxious to be secure and to be accepted, though now his eye is upon society and not upon the family. If he cannot count upon his own home as a harbour of refuge, and upon the members of his family as friends who will not fail him, his plight is desperate. Nevertheless, it is in the larger world that he must now find his feet and discover his affinities. However shy he may be he is at heart a thoroughly gregarious animal. Temperaments differ, and the introvert will often be happy in some solitary pursuit, while all adolescents need ample opportunity for quietness and apartness. What is fatal is to try to prescribe in detail when he shall be social and when alone. No one can regularise or command his moods for him. He must needs learn to cope with them himself, and what others can do to help him is mainly to show him, by what they themselves are, that inner discipline and unity of character and purpose are normal possibilities.

The problem for boys and girls in primary adolescence is that of double adjustment. In their new capacity as budding men and women who have definitely left childhood behind them, but are not yet sure of their independence and standing in a grown-up world, they must adapt

themselves to their altered circumstances, and in particular to the social groups of which now they are a part, however inconspicuous. But if they are to take their due place in this larger and more exciting world into which they are steadily making their way they must somehow achieve adjustment, balance, direction within themselves. A contemporary novelist describes a character in one of his writings as "more like a civil war than a personality." That is exactly what the primary adolescent so often thinks about himself. Moreover, he craves something more than peace. Of all things he hates the "faultily faultless, icily regular, splendidly null." He wants to be captain of his soul in order that he may throw himself into some quest or conquest. Unification of his resources is not enough. There must be a purpose. Nor may the purpose be narrow and ungenerous, concerned with nothing but his own welfare and position. In primary adolescence boys and girls are waiting to give themselves away that they may find themselves.

What all this means is that adolescence in each of its stages, but especially in its earliest, is the golden time for the fostering of sentiments and the discovery of a master-sentiment. It is the supreme paradox, not only of adolescence but of all human nature and experience, that inner harmony, purposeful integration of the self, is achieved only by devotion to something beyond the self. By definition a sentiment is the grouping of emotions about some object or centre (fact or idea, ideal or institution, enterprise or person) in such wise that the stirring of one brings all the others into action, and furthermore, by reason of the relationship between emotions and instinctual propensities and the interaction of body and mind, organises all the psycho-physical energies of the personality for the ends represented by the object central to the sentiment. The master-sentiment is of course one that

is supreme *because* it gathers all the others into a purposive unity dependent upon both their affinity to itself and its ability to give them full effect as parts of a splendid, dynamic whole. As the Gestalt doctrine affirms (primarily of perception and similar elemental phenomena of experience) the whole is more than the sum of its parts, and the parts owe their significance to their place in the whole. The unity involves tensions and is by nature dynamic, a creative pattern and not just an admirable piece of static architecture. By the achievement of adequate sentiments, themselves held together and directed by a master-sentiment, the person is unified "without remainder." For if by the eleven-plus age a child has already, through repression, developed a number of complexes the growth of powerful sentiments tends to drain off the dammed-up energies and utilise them in wholesome and acceptable ways. As we have just observed, a sentiment draws upon the unconscious (through the propensities) as well as upon the conscious. Consequently the sentiment is the natural remedy for the complex, working automatically so that the subject is even more aware of reinforced aims, capacities and enthusiasms than he is of the release from inhibitions, obsessions and conflicts. Whereas the formation of a complex is, *ex hypothesi*, wholly unconscious, a sentiment can be consciously and deliberately cultivated.

If, then, religion is truly described as a sentiment we see how relevant it is to the needs of boys and girls in primary adolescence. Is it, however, the most natural and serviceable of sentiments? Why should the claim be made that if religion is a sentiment at all it cannot be one amongst others, but must, if it is genuine, be the master-sentiment? Is adolescence the stage at which youth should grow out of religion, or is it at this point

that boys and girls should in a special way grow up into religion?

Dr. Margaret Phillips' research into the development of sentiments has elicited a great deal of evidence concerning "a hierarchy of purposes, attitudes and emotions in which relatively narrow and immediate aims and values are subordinated to others which are wider and more permanently valid." Thus, she says, "the presumption has arisen that there may exist for each man some comprehensive, dominating purpose or value. What, then, is the object to which such purpose or value corresponds? Obviously, a purpose which comprehends all others can only come into existence when the object of awareness, of love, and of endeavour is the whole of reality. Where it is anything less than this, certain parts of the personality remain unabsorbed, certain emotions unaroused, certain drives or incentives unenlisted. The excluded portions or aspects both of reality and of individual personality tend to make their own independent demands, conflict ensues, and the hierarchy remains incomplete. We shall assume here that the 'religious sentiment' is the sentiment required to complete the hierarchy, whose object is, potentially, the whole of reality, and which is capable of organising the complete gamut of human emotions."¹

Remarking that "To apprehend, love and respond to the whole of reality is obviously, for finite minds, a task which can never be fully achieved. To apprehend, love, and respond to a part, aspect, or symbol is easier"; Dr. Phillips distinguishes four types of emotion which are included in the religious sentiment and which find their

¹ *The Education of the Emotions Through Sentiment Development*, pp. 261 ff. Dr. William Brown, in saying that "God is a concretion of all the values," gives a more comprehensive and more philosophical formulation to the same psychological truth, *Science and Personality*, pp. 80 f.

climax in it. They are love of persons, social emotion, æsthetic emotion, and intellectual interest. But these are all, as she reminds us, "potentially and in principle, sentiments for reality."

Here then the adolescent comes upon a point of reconciliation between his idealism and his realism. He is conscious of impulses which drive him hard—a push of instinctual energies in which he rejoices, yet which may be too much for him and land him in chaos. A sentiment, however, exerts a pull: it is an attractive force. It works in the open. He realises that though the influence upon him of objects which may become for him the centres of sentiments in one sense exerts itself independently of him, in another he is free to choose or reject it. He can apply his powers of discrimination between values and ally himself with the nobler. There is scope for the exercise of intellect and will (since will always amounts to a choice between perceived and evaluated alternatives) as well as opportunity for the outflow of emotion. His whole personality is called into play, body as well as mind. The sex potency which, as we saw, is both creative and other-regarding, and which stimulates the whole person to bring something new and beautiful into existence as well as to seek out the *alter ego* (the responsive friend, in primary adolescence, rather than the lover), is not inhibited or frustrated but utilised and directed in the service of a sentiment: for a sentiment is not static; it inspires movement, effort, the attempt to achieve what may and should be in due time, but is not yet. There is thus in the whole process a naturalness, a completeness and a purposiveness which can only be perceived when the facts of psycho-physical structure in adolescent and adult human nature are adequately analysed. We have already seen where Freud's failure lies in this connection. But a similar mistake may be made on the other side,

as by Dr. Iovetz-Tereshchenko when he maintains "that Love is not a sexual phenomenon, and that there are *two different* factors working in man—the Sexual and Love" in order that he may "demonstrate that there are in human lives visitations of a sublime experience and that there are years in adolescence when that experience pre-eminently occurs."¹ This is because in effect he limits the interpretation of sex very much as, in practice, Freud does, and misses the truth that in a dominant sentiment all the energies of the personality are caught up and given that sublime significance and purpose which can alone be truly called the glory of God, and which to him are supreme.

By its very nature the religious sentiment leaves nothing in life untouched. This is true of Christianity pre-eminently. In worship and in its conception of the ideal world it opens out upon the infinite, yet expresses itself in the immediate concreteness of qualities to be developed and duties to be performed. Christianity is centred in a historic person. In Jesus of Nazareth the young adolescent finds reality—character, purpose, action. But he does not stop at the stories of Jesus told in the Gospels or the sayings of Jesus recorded there. Like the writer of the First Epistle of St. Peter, the adolescent can say that he is of them who through Jesus believe in God. If so, he finds the key to history and to his own experience not simply in the God of the Hebrews, but in the Father of Jesus and our Father. He reads the book of the Acts and the story of Christianity in the world throughout the ages since the Christian Church was founded. There he finds the Spirit of Jesus, which again is the Spirit of God, manifest in saints, heroes and splendid servants of mankind, but also in undistinguished men and women who in our own day are loyal to Jesus as Lord. He can join

¹ *Friendship—Love in Adolescence*, p. 267.

himself to that company of the loyal, and when he does he will discover that the Kingdom of God is not simply a gradual transformation of the kingdoms of this world but a mighty creative power which from beyond this world is ever breaking in¹ through men and women who, in their day and degree, are creative and other-regarding as Jesus uniquely was in the days of His flesh.

The formation of a sentiment and conscious committal to all that the acceptance and cultivation of it may involve are not logically separable, but they may be related to each other in more than one way. This fact makes it possible to affirm, without distortion of the truth, that religion in boys and girls at this primary stage of adolescence normally finds a climax in conversion experience—just as, on the other hand, it may be said with scarcely any qualification at all that every boy and girl will pass through some conversion experience, though not necessarily a religious one, usually between the ages of thirteen and sixteen. To make still more explicit what is covered by these statements we may formulate two propositions—that conversion may be “sudden” or gradual, and that everyone sooner or later is converted: but we note also that religious conversion is not the only kind of conversion. When William James talked of the transference of an idea from the margin to the focus of the mind as explaining what happens, psychologically, in conversion, he was describing unawares (inasmuch as Shand and McDougall had not then developed the theory of sentiments) the process by which the young adolescent comes to realise what sentiments are active in his case, and which of them is dominant.

Conversion is generally admitted by psychologists to be “an adolescent phenomenon,” though not exclusively

¹ Cf. Rudolf Otto in *The Kingdom of God and the Son of Man*.

so. Starbuck's study of it forty years ago¹ was the first endeavour to ascertain statistically the average age of its occurrence, as William James' Gifford Lectures,² a year or two later, supplied the first careful collection and discussion of case-histories. Curiously enough James' documents referred chiefly to adult experiences, and it should be remembered that one of the reasons why, since the evangelical revivals of the eighteenth century, insistence upon cataclysmic conversion as the only real proof of entrance upon a true Christian experience led to the effort to bring this about during early adolescence if not during early childhood, and resulted in much artificiality as well as in subsequent "falling away," was that adult conditions were read back into an adolescent setting. The great instances afforded by St. Paul, Augustine, Francis of Assisi, Bunyan, Luther, Wesley, and so forth, happened to be of the dramatic type. Insufficient attention was paid to the quieter kind of conversion illustrated by such lives as those of Nathaniel, Timothy, Polycarp, Melancthon, Mother Julian of Norwich, or Zinzendorf.

Even those for whom everything seemed to turn upon a moment of shattering yet dazzling revelation did not experience that terrific ebullition of emotion and change of direction without long, probably unconscious, preparation. St. Paul himself is as good a proof as any. From the time when he looked upon the face of the martyred Stephen³ till the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ shone into his heart on the road to Damascus he had not only been confronted by triumphant certainty in the lives of those whom he

¹ *The Psychology of Religion*. ² *The Varieties of Religious Experience*.

³ Despite Prof. A. D. Nock's somewhat casual suggestion that Saul was not present at the stoning of Stephen, *St. Paul*, pp. 33, 62-63.

had helped to persecute, but had heard more and more about the life and teaching of Jesus. Thought was involved as well as feeling. Was he right—or was Jesus right after all? And the issue for him was not academic, but practical and ethical: “the thing I would not, that I do, and the thing I would, that do I not. . . . O unhappy man that I am! Who shall deliver me from this body of death? I thank God, through Jesus Christ our Lord!” Whether this particular passage was meant to describe his state before conversion and the effect of conversion itself, or whether it refers to that continuing series of struggles, choices, insights which are part of the Christian’s pressing on towards perfection, matters little: if the latter, then it applies all the more strongly to the former. Professor E. F. Scott brings out the essential point about conversion when he writes: “Paul had indeed learned about Jesus and had been attracted to him more than he knew; but at the same time a disclosure was made to him which did not result from the operations of his own mind. Knowing the facts, he suddenly became aware of their significance. In a flash of blinding insight he perceived that the will which had manifested itself in Jesus was the will of God. Thus, in addition to what he knew already, something was revealed to him. He had the vision of Christ, not merely as he had appeared to men, but as he was in his own nature—the power of God and the wisdom of God.”¹ That flash of insight is very much akin to what the Gestalt psychologists mean by insight—a sudden completion of the pattern, and perception of its significance. It follows upon what has been called a period of incubation.²

On the other hand, the slow process of gradual

¹ *The New Testament Idea of Revelation*, p. 138.

² Cf. Graham Wallace, *The Art of Thought*, and Henri Poincaré, *Science and Method*.

conversion is not mere drift into a wide and quiet harbourage. Closer examination will show that there have been many less vivid and startling insights, many simpler and less far-reaching turning-points and decisions, but all have formed part of the pathway by which the subject has been brought to a point where he realises that he is where he fain would be—or at least that he is on the right side of the wicket-gate, with his face set in the direction of an abiding City.

Jung some years ago offered as a psychological explanation of the conversion of St. Paul the suggestion that it was a reversal of complexes: "The incident of his hearing the voice of Christ on his way to Damascus marks the moment when the unconscious complex of Christianity became conscious." The supposition is, of course, that Saul of Tarsus, finding that he was impressed and attracted by the Christians, despite his antagonism to them, repressed the whole constellation of sympathetic emotions that gathered round the name of Jesus until, at a moment when he was thrown off his balance and deeply stirred, they broke through and established themselves in consciousness. It would be preferable to say that a Christ *sentiment* had slowly been forming in Saul's mind until there came a moment of enhanced emotion and swift insight which made focal what had been marginal, or made into a master-sentiment what had been, as Saul thought, a minor one—and one of which, as an orthodox Pharisee, he was ashamed.

It is unnecessary to go further into the nature of adult conversions, dramatic or gradual, notable or commonplace. Temperament (predominantly introvert or predominantly extravert) may have much to do with the suddenness or the gradualness of any particular case, and conditions, as we have already said, may intensify many features of it. James' famous Lectures have often been

criticised on the score that the types of personality cited are not widely representative, but are indeed a little inclined to gentle morbidity. Nevertheless, so long as there is no confusion between what is likely or possible in mature men and women, hard beset by the conflicting claims of the great world, and what is probable, because natural, in primary adolescence, where internal turmoil is more present to the consciousness than is external stress, there is something to be said for thinking that these clear-cut stories of outstanding men and women shed light on what happens in adolescent conversion. If further, instead of putting old heads on young shoulders and misreading the exceptional event in manhood and womanhood as the norm for youth, we penetrate deeply enough into that renewal of heart, mind and will which was the essence of the conversion of St. Paul or John Wesley, we may agree all the more fully that conversion is, characteristically and essentially, an adolescent phenomenon even when it occurs long after adolescence.

The criticism of Starbuck was not that his types were too narrowly selected, but that he drew conclusions from records too largely consisting of information about young people. It seemed, therefore, that there was a vitiation of the percentages, which showed curves of conversion-age rising rapidly in the case of girls from 10 to 13, with a sharp drop to 15, a still sharper rise to a peak at 16, a moderate descent to 19, a steeper one to 20, and a steady decline thereafter, while in the case of boys the sharp rise begins at 13, reaches a peak at 16, drops fairly quickly to 19, sharply to 20, and then falls away. We need not trouble overmuch about his figures, though actually they are far less misleading than was supposed. In a sentence or two he sums up the living facts which harmonise with all that we know of the general psychological developments in adolescence. "We may safely

lay it down as a law, then," he says, "that among females there are two tidal waves of religious awakening at about 13 and 16, followed by a less significant period at 18; while among the males the great wave is at about 16, preceded by a wavelet at 12, and followed by a surging up at 18 or 19."¹ Under the older regime deriving from the harder type of Puritanism, this would have been accounted for by the suggestion that at the ages indicated young people most naturally came under conviction of sin and sought deliverance. Incidentally it may be observed that little children were brought under that same "conviction" and underwent conversion, in large numbers, during the Jonathan Edwards revivals in America, as well as in England, and if a curve could have been worked out it might have shown closer correlation with the theological indoctrination of both children and adolescents than with ordinary developmental factors. We must not, however, overlook the tendency to develop a "guilt-sense" in early childhood to which Dr. Anna Freud refers:² the imposition of highly coloured and inevitably terrifying "sin and salvation" doctrines upon this might well have the desired, but deplorable, effect.

Starbuck himself was concerned with more than the bare facts concerning the age at which conversion most frequently occurred. There must, he thought, be some connection between the physico-mental changes at puberty and this tendency to a great transformation of the religious life. "Biologically considered," he says,³ "the central thing underlying all these phenomena seems to be the

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 34. For a valuable recent study of age-frequencies in both the "gradual" and the sudden groups, see W. Lawson Jones, *A Psychological Study of Religious Conversion*, pp. 49-81, 227-229.

² See quotation on p. 96 above.

³ *Op. cit.* pp. 147 f. Cf. Sanford Fleming, *Children and Puritanism*, and A. J. W. Myers, *Horace Bushnell and Religious Education*, as also Bushnell's own works, especially *Christian Nurture*.

birth of the reproductive life. That is the time when the person begins vitally and physiologically to reach out and find his life in another. It is the announcement, on the physical side, that one is gaining capacity to enter into the social whole through the avenue of the family. . . . It is natural that in adolescence there should be a rapid development, which either furnishes some of the elements that directly enter into religion, or brings the individual suddenly into such ripeness of mental capacity that religious impulses may have an adequate organ for their reception and expression." Returning to this point towards the end of his book he writes : " In a certain sense the religious life is an irradiation of the reproductive instinct," and safeguards this statement against misunderstanding by pointing out that " We have to distinguish constantly between *causes* and *conditions* of growth. The sexual life, although it has left its impress on fully developed religion, seems to have originally given the psychic impulse which called out the latent possibilities of development, rather than to have furnished the raw material out of which religion was constructed." ¹

Leuba's conclusions we have already mentioned, but it is relevant here to touch upon both the likeness and the difference between his argument and Starbuck's. " Since the end of religion," he says, ² " is to maintain and perfect life, the biological point of view affords the larger and more fruitful outlook. From this point of vantage religion appears as a part of the struggle for life." He further maintains that, " according to this biological view the necessary and natural spring of religious and non-religious life alike is the 'procreant urge' in all or some of its multiform appearances." This leads him, however, to explain religious ecstasy in terms of sex-

¹ Pp. 401 f.

² *A Psychological Study of Religion*, pp. 14-18.

impulse,¹ and from such a standpoint it can have no purpose beyond self-enjoyment.

One reason for considering so fully the connection between sex and the religious sentiment in primary adolescence goes far beyond repudiation of the idea that religion is only a sublimation of sex-impulse. If religion is neither a particular form of emotion, nor a separate instinct which may be weak or powerful in accordance with the make-up of the individual, but a master-sentiment dominating the personality, and utilising every energy of body-mind in the service of a creative and other-regarding purpose, it must have its roots in the very structure as well as in the functions of every human being. "When I was a child, I spake as a child, I felt as a child, I thought as a child : now that I am become a man, I have put away childish things." For a child the natural attitude to reality is that of dependence, the demand for security and love, the recognition that all the meaning of the universe lies in the words "Father," "Mother." We have seen how parental attitudes mediate God to the child and how, later, parental teaching about a Father-God who is the essence of reality to father and mother themselves helps the child, using his own imagination and reasoning, to give colour and content to what he first knew only through emotion. But at puberty and in adolescence the child experiences in himself the great transition not only to adulthood, but to potential parenthood. It is noticeable that, towards the end of primary adolescence, boys and girls often manifest a fondness for little children which then declines with the growth of interest in the opposite sex as the mating impulse becomes dominant, and only reappears when marriage and parenthood are approaching. This fondness is undoubtedly an outcrop of the parental impulse. And so in

¹ *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, pp. 330, 137-153.

varying ways the father-mother-family sentiment is the most natural of all as an all-comprehending, unifying, supremely significant force which integrates the enhanced propensities and abilities of the adolescent. It is open to the sceptic to say that belief in the reality of God as creative, fatherly love and power is but a projection of adolescent desire on to an impersonal universe. But once more we may reply that if, at a crisis such as primary adolescence brings, what unifies and gives meaning to the entire personality is something that does not correspond to the eternal nature and purpose of all existence, the universe must be irrational. There is not in that case even a President of the Immortals to sport with Tess.

Before we pass from primary to middle adolescence there is one point of very considerable importance to be considered. Freud is most certainly right in saying that however wholesome the relationship of a child to its parents may have been up till the age of adolescence there must then be a break. "From the time of puberty onward," he says, "the human individual must devote himself to the great task of *freeing himself from the parents* ; and only after this detachment is accomplished can he cease to be a child and so become a member of the social community." Then of course follows the formula : "For a son, the task consists in releasing his libidinal desires from his mother, in order to employ them in the quest of an external love-object in reality ; and in reconciling himself with his father if he has remained antagonistic to him, or in freeing himself from his domination if, in the reaction to the infantile revolt, he has lapsed into subservience to him."¹ For a daughter the prescription is the same, *mutatis mutandis*. We hear much, sometimes, about the mischief wrought by possessive mothers and domineering fathers, about the boys and girls who grow

¹ *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, p. 283.

up confirmed bachelors because they never find mates modelled on the lines of their idolised parents, and about the young people who revolt and go wrong because they have been denied by fond and fussy parents the chance of living their own lives, and taking their own risks in even the most trivial affairs of daily life. Such situations do occur. What happens far more often, however, is a subtle sense of having lost contact with each other which invades the happiness of parents and adolescent children, though there is no lack of genuine affection and mutual confidence. This comes about because it is not understood on either side that the price of continued love and loyalty is the giving and taking of real independence. The parents who have mediated God through daily relationships with their children during infancy, who have taught these same boys and girls about God during childhood, and who, while frankly admitting their own imperfections and shortcomings, have lived out their teaching as far as they were able, must when adolescence comes give their children a chance to find God for themselves and in their own way, being always ready to help when help is asked of them. The adolescent's consciousness of need is begotten of the very exuberance of his own emotional, intellectual and volitional energies ; of the conflict that arises from the rival claims of his own powers to dominance ; and of the desire for a friend to take the place (in some, but not all, relationships) of father and mother.

What the development of the religious sentiment means to the adolescent then is clear. It is well summed up by Mr. M. L. Jacks. He notes the prevalence of dictatorships in the world of to-day—dictatorships not only political but religious—and continues : " But it is doubtful if any of these dictatorships is really adequate for human needs, and I suggest that the time is ripe for

establishing in the minds of young people the authority of God. It may be urged that that authority has already been rejected, and that empty churches show this to be an irreligious generation. In so far as that is true, it is the authority of the wrong God that has been rejected, and rightly rejected. . . . It is the authority not of the God of any one part of the Bible, but of the Bible as a whole that we would establish : we see His form slowly emerging through the mists in the Old Testament, shining with full light in the face of Jesus Christ, and through the subsequent ages illuminating with that light one by one the dark places of the earth. Illumination He brings, and the unravelling of perplexities, sense where there was no sense before, and a clear road where there was no track : He is the absolute, where all things else are relative, the source of all beauty, the guarantor of all truth, the sanction of all that is good : He explains duty, and His is the voice of conscience. Seen in this way He may become the centre of life." ¹

¹ In *The Headmaster Speaks*, by Twelve Public School Headmasters, pp. 143 f.

VI

THE MATURING MIND

MIDDLE adolescence, like later childhood, is a period of consolidation. Physically, growth is less rapid and is more proportionate, while the new functions have become established. Mentally the surging of emotions has quietened down. Intellectual ability has reached its maximum and the special abilities are now definitely discernible. If, as is probable, conversion in one form or another has occurred, life has found its centre. In James'¹ familiar words, the self has passed from the state of being divided and consciously wrong, inferior and unhappy, to that of being unified and consciously right, superior and happy. Reason and the development of convinced purpose take in middle adolescence the place that emotion has occupied in primary.

To characterise any stage of growth by a single word or a brief phrase is misleading if this in any way obscures the fact that all the propensities and abilities normal in the complete human being are present at that stage and that most of them are active, though, as we have seen, some may be latent. After puberty, however, there is no more latency, and by fifteen or so both bodily and mental powers are practically stabilised, though not yet developed to quite the full extent of their potentialities.

It is not irrelevant to observe that this is the main

¹ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 180.

reason for urging that boys and girls should remain at school till after the end of their fifteenth year. What matters is that they should not be thrust out into the hurly-burly of the world till they are ready to stand on their own feet. If they are thrown too soon on their own resources they will probably react to their new circumstances emotionally rather than with judgment and purpose. Scarcely knowing what they want to make of life, they are in danger of a false start, choosing, perhaps, some calling for which they have no real vocation or fitness, and thus intensifying, during the first year or so of their attempt to earn a living and make a career, their inner sense of uncertainty and insecurity.

It is worse still, of course, for those who fail to find employment on leaving school at fourteen or fifteen and a half: character may easily be weakened and disintegration may follow, instead of that toughening of fibre and growth in self-respect without which they cannot become happy and serviceable members of any community. It may seem an exaggeration to say that a few months—twelve at most—may make so great a difference to the whole future of the boy or girl, and no doubt we shall be reminded of the multitudes who have made good despite the fact that they left school at fourteen. The reply is that this is no excuse for making conditions unnecessarily difficult, and that, while perhaps a relatively small proportion of those multitudes have become demonstrable weaklings or failures, the great majority who have succeeded, have done so at a price which ought never to have been asked of them. There is always the question whether their success would not have been all the greater if they had had a better chance at the beginning.

This is not the place for argument about the school-leaving age or the necessity of secondary education, in

some form,¹ for all, at any rate during primary adolescence and up till the age at which middle adolescence may fairly be said to have been reached. Reference to that issue is involved only because, in dealing with it from the professedly educational and the broadly economic points of view, both the protagonists and the opponents of reform have so surprisingly missed the point with which we are concerned, and which affects so closely the well-being of all young people, whether at the age of fifteen or sixteen they leave school and go to work or whether they stay on at school till they are eighteen and then enter business, take training for professions, or go up to universities. Debate has turned upon whether an additional year at school could be afforded, upon what practical use could be made of such a year, and so forth. Rarely has it been recognised, despite the Hadow Report, that the decisive factor ought to be the psychological. Consequently, boys and girls have been sent from the relatively sheltered community of school, in which they have yet been free to develop their own independence, into the challenging, exciting world of bread-winning and amusement-seeking before they were ready to withstand the physical, mental, and moral stresses and strains inevitable in so perplexing yet fascinating an environment. On the other hand, unless we pay proper attention to this question of when the natural conclusion of one stage and the beginning of another occurs, we shall know neither what to expect of ordinary healthy boys and girls who seem so suddenly to shoot up into responsible if lively young men and women, nor what they have a right to expect of us

¹ Dr. Luella Cole has shown very conclusively that the actual set-back, in some respects, to effective secondary education in America, which has followed the effort to make education up to the age of fifteen universal, is due to the failure to devise types of curriculum suited to adolescents of differing temper, capacity and outlook. Cf. her *Psychology of Adolescence*, pp. 201 ff., 225 ff.

by way of freedom and guidance, at home or at school, at work, in social life, or in the Church.

It would be foolish to ignore the differences between boys and girls who leave school at fifteen or sixteen and those who remain for another two or three years. These differences of course are not, so to speak, organic but functional. They result from environmental influences, working upon personalities which in essentials are of similar make-up. The clearest way of approaching the facts will therefore be to look at the characteristics of middle adolescence as such, and afterwards to ask how development is affected by the respective circumstances of continued school life and "starting work."

There are two needs which inevitably become manifest at this period. Young people themselves are not always clearly conscious of them. The introvert is more likely to be so than the extravert, and the student than the young industrial or business worker. Degrees of awareness, however, make little difference: the essential necessity is there, and often accounts for much that might otherwise seem nothing but an exhibition of self-sufficiency, superciliousness, or sheer lightness of mind and irresponsible flippancy. At this age boys and girls *must* make sense of things and *must* criticise.

We will consider this second impulse first. A measure of control, both of oneself and of circumstance, has been achieved during the four years or so since the onset of puberty. Quite probably towards the end of that time there came, suddenly or otherwise, an assurance as to the object of one's loyalty and the direction of one's purpose. After tumult, change and uncertainty there was the relief and joy of conviction. For even the least excitable-tempered adolescent there is a deep emotional satisfaction in anything that unifies and harmonises life—early successes in examinations, sports, the social life of school,

choice of a calling and the finding of a job, attachment to a cause such as may be found in the youth movements of the totalitarian states or in admission to membership of a Church which is felt to be really alive. During primary adolescence, too, there have been many essays at friendship. Now there comes the stronger and more equable relationship with one or two friends—perhaps one. This again is emotionally toned because it is the outcome, not of a planned approach one to another, but of affinities gradually discovered, of growth in mutual understanding, and of adjustment. If conversion has been experienced there will certainly have been at the heart of it an outgoing of personal loyalty and devotion directed towards a Lenin, a Sun Yat Sen, a Mussolini or a Hitler, just as towards Gautama Buddha, Mohammed or Jesus Christ, not only as symbolic of character or representative of an ideal community, but as creative of what he stands for.

All these experiences have been unquestionably real, and the higher of them have pointed to the existence of an enduring Reality whereon life and a career, religion and all the most vital human relationships, can confidently be built. But now arises the question—will it all last? There is a certain ebbing of emotional tides, not to say a reaction. Actual situations are indubitably less roseate than the glimpse of the ideal which was so appealing. Older people—even older young people—do not glow as much and, without being cynical or disillusioned, often appear to get on admirably well without the vivid certainties, warm attachments, and crusading spirit which were the fruit of adventure and discovery during primary adolescence. Indeed, so many of them are, outwardly at least, indifferent even to the existence of God or to the claims and potentialities of the State.

To be critical, then, at this stage anyhow, is not to be *blasé*, disillusioned, impertinently self-satisfied, peevishly

discontented or thoughtlessly revolutionary. It is to be really honest with the best things life has thus far had to offer. Because they are so evidently the best things, to be sure about them is vitally important. Youth must *know* what is real in itself and in its world. Cracks and fissures on the face of the rock must not only be recognised for what they are but traced and penetrated, so that their seriousness or their negligibility may be reliably assessed. Tradition is not enough : second-hand testimony will not suffice. It is a condition of psychological health and of progress towards maturity that youth, after the bursting forth of all the powers which in the end will make a full-grown man or woman, should test all things in order that it may hold on to the things which are excellent. It is when this natural and by no means merely destructive impulse is inhibited that repressions and conflicts result and damage ensues, probably much later on. The inhibition may result from any one of a variety of causes. If, for example, a boy or girl has not during primary adolescence become properly detached from the parents, he or she may harbour a lingering fear lest the gain of independence should inevitably bring with it the loss of parental love ; or again, if older people who stand in a position of authority insist upon orthodoxy of any kind, they may create a mischievous tension in the minds of boys and girls who respect them and wish to obey them, but whose wholly natural and healthy desire is to think for themselves and choose their own course of action.

Doubt, in religion, is the almost certain sequel to a genuine conversion. Adolescents who have experienced nothing more than a superficial orgy of emotion, or, at the other extreme, have made a purely formal and intellectual acceptance of creed and ceremony, with a modicum of ethical prescription, are not very likely to

exhibit doubt, or indeed to exhibit anything at all of significance in this sphere, as time goes on. Real doubt, as distinguished from pure scepticism, is an indication that religion is at least being taken seriously, not the reverse. It goes beyond the questioning of theological formulæ. These can be reshaped in accordance with modern ways of thinking and still the core of Catholic belief may remain untouched. The kind of question that demands answer in middle adolescence is often far less subtle than, for example, the nature of the Trinity, or the relationship between revelation and inspiration, but it is no easier to answer convincingly and practically. What is life really for? Can we trust our intuitions about it—and about God? What difference does prayer make? Why be good? How explain the virtues of irreligious people? Is religion anything more than a matter of taste and temperament?

This need of security is moral as well as intellectual and emotional. Making sense of things, the other demand in middle adolescence, is in one regard part of the effort to gain a firm foothold; but it is a quest of the mind rather than of the heart, a task for the imagination more than for the will. In early adolescence there is so much delight in the enjoyment of new experiences that they are taken as they come, with little effort to co-ordinate them or even to explain them at all fully. There are some years to spend at school as yet. Vocation need not be settled for a time. Little in the way of responsible judgment and action is expected from boys and girls hardly into their teens. Even school work is still in the region of fact-accumulation and elementary application of principle. Meaning is inseparable from any kind of activity, as we had reason to emphasise in dealing even with infancy. But meaning and purpose in the wider and deeper sense do not become problems in themselves,

demanding explicit answer, until intelligence is fully developed and the individual, now consciously in possession of the full range of his powers, finds himself face to face with a real world of lights and shadows, contradictions and inspirations, possibilities both good and evil, which he finds overwhelming in their complexity and concrete immediacy.

The emotional and imaginative stages in infancy and childhood are followed by one of keen interest in finding out what things are made of and how they work. So in adolescence, to the period of joyous experiment in all directions, suffused by a romanticism for which nothing is impossible, succeeds this time of insistence upon discovering how things hang together. To the inner unity and power now emerging from a splendid chaos of ideas and emotions there must surely correspond a world of order, reason and purpose—otherwise there is something irrational in the situation: so thinks the adolescent. Projection may play a great part in the development of such a conception. Creative imagination may furnish an ideal of what such a world might be. But there is also an ethical imperative: there *ought* to be at least an approximation to that world. Only the day-dreamer, who at this age is not to be regarded as an amiable child of fancy, but as an adolescent trying to take refuge from disagreeable actualities in childish evasions, can be content to ignore the unhappy facts so long as he is allowed to play with his highly-coloured pictures. The normal boy and girl between sixteen and eighteen think more naturally of how they may make the vision come true. The very attempt involves reflection on the nature of things, and a real effort to come at some element of relatedness between contrary facts of experience—even if the relatedness is that of eternal antagonism, as, for example, when the young Russian is taught that religion

is the enemy of the common good, or the young German that the Jews must be cast out if the nation is to survive.

The illustration just used will perhaps suffice to indicate that we are not crediting young people in middle adolescence with the philosophic mind. They may think very little, their thinking may be unsystematic, they may loathe abstractions ; yet it is true that they are in search of something that makes sense of the world into which they are plunging, or will plunge before another two or three years are over. The process of twofold adjustment goes on throughout youth and even to old age. There is the adjustment of the energies within the self and the adjustment of the self to the environment (and of the environment to the self, unless we are to write ourselves down determinists in every realm of our experience). But the former predominates in primary adolescence and the latter in secondary. The impulse to make sense of things accounts in large measure for the awakening of enthusiasm for science and art, for economics and industry, for politics both national and international, and above all it results in a natural desire to discuss ethical and theological issues in religion.

This obviously is the true logic of development. There is no theology, even to the extent of nature-myth and folk-tale, until in some sense the numinous has been felt. Morals are not the invention of a Robinson Crusoe, but in part an outcome of living together, though in larger part they may derive from recognition of the necessity of living in harmony with the Powers that control life and death, joy and sorrow. To find oneself in religion and morals by finding God is the deepest concern of younger adolescents. To make sure of oneself, but also to make sure of the religion (by comparison of religions, totalitarian as well as classical ; by analysis and criticism of a theological kind ; and by consideration of their

fruits in personal and social conduct) is the great necessity for middle adolescents.

Very little of all this may appear on the surface. Often enough it seems as though boys and girls of this age are incapable of taking life seriously. Apparently they look upon religion as a kill-joy, and regard discussion of theological and ethical questions as a bore. That many of them take such an attitude is true enough. But it is equally true, though they themselves are probably quite unaware of the fact, that this is mainly bluff—a defence-mechanism of no small value to youth only just in the act of acquiring independence, still removed by a very little way from the suggestibility of primary adolescence, and suspicious of authority in so far as authority may be as cramping as it is kindly. Nor is youth prepared to have its first shy venturings in the interpretation of life for itself despised, coldly criticised, or even good-humouredly smiled at by those whose only distinction, apart from their being a few years older, is that they appear to be thoroughly conservative and sophisticated. They will come for help in good time : for the present they protect themselves from premature interference by perpetrating this innocent fraud, more or less unconsciously, upon those of their friends who lack understanding. Let there be no mistake, however, about what is going on behind the façade, what the bravado conceals, or whether there is anything serious left in the coming generation. Writing of the tendency to break away from worship, Dr. John Kennedy analyses very accurately the situation common to young people in middle adolescence, though he speaks in terms of boyhood and apparently puts the crisis a year or two earlier than we have done here :

“ One of the reasons is man’s haste at all times to be done with discipline. Most non-churchgoers have at one time been members of a Sunday-school. They may not

have been members of pious homes, and the Sunday-school is not a substitute for that, though we act nowadays as though it were, but at least they have been to Sunday-school.

"The Sunday-school offers them the ideal of Christ. As a child, knowing nothing of life's temptations, the ideal is taken for granted. But, later on, the ideal becomes a challenge, and when it challenges the boy's own autonomy it is consciously or unconsciously repudiated. An ideal involves discipline, and the growing boy is not easily disciplined. If the ideal be vivid enough and the conditions favourable for his allegiance, it will hold him and make him. But if the ideal never be clearly perceived, or if conditions, inward or outward, make allegiance too difficult, the boy will break from the incipient discipline and all that is connected with it."¹

The ideal itself may have been inadequately conceived, as Dr. Kennedy goes on to suggest: "The man in the street, because he has had some formal religious instruction in school or in Sunday-school, instruction, by the way, which was graded to his juvenile understanding, is apt to jump to the conclusion that he has a competent understanding of the Gospel. It is identified with a few Bible lessons and some texts and hymns that have been learned by rote, and that is all there is to it! In all the confidence of his appalling ignorance, he actually believes that all the church has to offer him is a few platitudes and pretty-pretty stories. He has a sentimental regard for its teaching, as we all have a sentimental regard for the associations of our childhood, but no intellectual respect for it."

The analysis remains true even if religion, as such, may seem to be left out of the picture altogether. For many young people politics or the social order, vocation

¹ *The God Whom We Ignore*, pp. 27 f.

and career, may seem to matter more. In actual fact the hunger for a satisfactory religion is generally at the root of their disquietude, and the response they make to Fascism or Communism, their enthusiasm for art or social reform, or their devotion to some society or cult, is quasi-religious in its quality and characteristics. The ideal which at least *should* become a challenge is embraced more consciously and fervently in primary adolescence than in later childhood. We find, therefore, in Dr. Kennedy's description of the half-knowledge which is the most dangerous form of ignorance, still further reason for seeing to it that education, and especially religious education in the specific sense of that term, is carried far enough intellectually, as well as emotionally and morally, before adolescents leave school.¹ But if moral courage, discipline and intellectual respect for the ideal are what youth needs to carry it through middle adolescence towards maturity of character and purpose, then clearly these are only achieved as youth can make sense of things, and thus reinforce the glowing enthusiasm of the first stage in adolescence with the intellectual and moral convictions of the second. Courage is a more far-seeing virtue than mere daring. Discipline is something far more reasoned than the mere habit of obeying commands which is produced by sheer drill. Intellectual respect is called forth only by that which keeps the mind continually on the stretch. That is why criticism and doubt are part of the process of thinking things together and thinking them out which preoccupies boys and girls in their last two or three years at school or their first year or two at college.

Dr. Charlotte Bühler records two striking characteristics found in the diaries kept by a considerable number

¹ For the practical application of this to the school curriculum, see p. 205, *infra*.

of young people in Continental countries, where apparently the habit of keeping diaries is far more common than in Britain or America. "The 15-18-year-old wants to find one single friend who understands him. It is interesting to observe how remarks made by these youngsters about their friends reveal the need for a deeper and more personal bond. . . . At about 17 the individual becomes dissatisfied, is no longer completely taken up with school work, and if already in a profession, suddenly not satisfied with the type of his activity so far. He wants to accomplish something that is as unique and significant as possible. In all the diaries that cover this phase we find this wish to do important work and to stand the test of responsibility." ¹ Here, whatever is negative and subjective in the impulse to be critical and in the quest for meaning passes over to the positive and objective. As in the formation of sentiments during the first phase of adolescence, so again in the second, but with the astringent element of intellectual and moral judgment much more marked, life is unified by the grouping of desires and purposes round some specifically chosen and carefully evaluated object external to the self. Dr. Carnegie Simpson has gathered the truth up into a couple of sentences: "We must find the essentials of the life of man. I name two. One is something *to do*; the other, someone *to love*." ² What is this but a higher and fuller exercise of the creative and other-regarding propensities which we have already seen expressed in the parent-child relationship and in the ripening of all the powers of the individual at puberty? Life is organised and disciplined, finds meaning and direction, in active relationships between persons, and religion is the supreme form of such relationships, if we judge religion by its highest manifestation in Christian faith and practice.

¹ *From Birth to Maturity*, pp. 193, 196 ff. ² *Essentials*, p. 33.

How true this is of middle adolescence Mr. M. L. Jacks has indicated in his description of boys during their last year or so at a public school : " By this time his mind is becoming trained, and is often as sharp as a two-edged sword : he becomes highly and acutely critical : all his own and his parents' and schoolmasters' religious beliefs come in for a searching examination—creed and dogma are suspect—the very existence of God is questioned—and he probably calls himself, not without a certain pride in his intelligence, an atheist. In this honest, but mistaken, belief he may leave school ; but, however many of his religious beliefs he may jettison, temporarily at least, two things remain : one is the memory of his pledged word ; the other is the belief in a *Person* ; he has come full circle and is again a hero-worshipper, though wiser and more discriminating than when he entered our doors. The personality of Christ makes a most powerful and forceful appeal to the intelligent boyhood of seventeen or eighteen, partly because of the grand common-sense of what He said, partly because of His revolutionary temper—two things much valued at that age ; many boys cannot see why more people don't live out that personality in their own lives, and there is much criticism of the Churches for their obvious failure to practise what He preached. However that may be, many a public-school boy leaves school without a ghost of a notion *what* he believes, but able to say with the Apostle, in the silence of his own solitariness, ' I know *whom* I believe.' " ¹

Comparative studies such as Professor Olive Wheeler's in *Youth* have shown us that there is in many respects similarity of development between adolescents who leave school at fifteen or sixteen and those who stay on for another two or three years. Alongside the picture

¹ "The Solitude and the Religion of the Public-School Boy," *Hibbert Journal*, vol. xxxii. No. 3, April 1934.

drawn by Mr. Jacks may be placed that which emerges from such a book as *Asking Them Questions*. The leader of an Edinburgh Boys' Club and Scout Troop invited the boys to send in any questions concerning the Christian Faith which interested them ; these questions were submitted to eminent ministers, clergy and professors for reply. "A telegraph messenger asked 'What was Christ's position as God if He prayed to God?' ; an apprentice plumber about the 'Second Coming' ; a butcher's messenger boy about the Trinity ; a young gardener about the Soul ; one schoolboy about the Vision of God ; another about our Lord as a boy ; and so on. More than half the questions were about Heaven and Hell, evil, sin and suffering (involving the extent of the power of God), and the relation of Jesus Christ to God." ¹

The list of questions propounded reveals an activity of mind as vigorous and independent as that of Mr. Jacks' schoolboy. It should be said, however, that in both types there is a genuine eagerness to know, and not a mere readiness to discuss and dispute. The ultimate desire and purpose of boys and girls at this stage is to build and not to destroy. As the Gestalt psychologists would say, they want to complete the pattern, and the process requires knowledge as well as insight, fact as well as argument, the fruits of other people's experience as well as adventure in quest of fruitful experience on one's own account.

It remains true, however, that at fifteen or soon after boys and girls come to a very literal parting of the ways. Inevitably going to work means stepping out into a world very sharply contrasted with the world of school. It will almost certainly bring a precipitation of conflicts due to no previous repressions or pathological states of

¹ R. Selby Wright, *Asking Them Questions*, Preface, p. vii.

the unconscious but to the sheer tensions of the situation. To leave school behind, to earn money, to mix with men and women as fellow-workers, seems like crossing at a bound the apparently sharp dividing line between being a mere youngster and being grown up. So they feel in their leisure time, and so they try to make their parents and their brothers and sisters feel about them. Successful or otherwise at school, they will now show the world what they can do.

In their actual employment, however—and the more so if this is not fugitive but relatively permanent, and in a stable industry—they are the smallest of cogs in an incomprehensibly large wheel. Their tasks are apt to be very limited in scope and speedily to become monotonous. Freedom and self-expression soon appear to lie elsewhere, and meaning almost disappears. But still greater are the risks of finding out what men and women are really like, in their less admirable aspects, before boy and girl have got far enough in their own development and stabilisation to evaluate wisely and to judge both fairly and firmly. Character may be beaten out by circumstance, but it may also be misshapen if circumstance is more irresistible than desirable. Boy and girl are still exceedingly suggestible, and with their tendency to believe that whatever is, in the world of men and women who have gone to work, is right, the very energies within them which should ensure independent achievement and self-fulfilment may easily cause them to become like the crowd, not by humble submission but by strenuous effort. They may actually seek to rid themselves of moral sensitiveness and spiritual aspiration in order that they may fall in more easily with the more sophisticated and paganised companions among whom they wish to stand well. In any case their creativeness, finding so little scope in their work, may find vent in sheer violence

of undirected activity or misdirected emotion during their leisure, unless that leisure is educative and recreative.¹ At this time our boy and girl are beginning to feel drawn each to the opposite sex without as yet having acquired ease and self-control in a relationship that is truly courteous and chivalrous. The peril of spoiling the relationship, because imperious energies are generated while understanding and sensitiveness remain uncultivated, is obvious—but more so to us than to the boys and girls concerned. The craving for vital self-expression is forced into a single channel, and resource in the use of innate impulse for satisfying any truly social purpose is narrowed rather than expanded. The reality-principle, in Freud's phraseology though with a deeper meaning than he gives to it, is subordinated to the pleasure-principle. Creativeness is missed in the quest for mere satisfaction.

The boy and girl who stay at school gain much besides knowledge, skill and the maturing of discriminatory judgment. They are not plunged into a world for which they are not ready, and they have more choice regarding the kind of world into which they will ultimately go. But there is a penalty to pay for their advantages. The boy or girl at boarding-school, and more especially the girl, lives for the greater part of the year in an artificial environment, not wholly counteracted when they go home for the holidays, and a society mixed in age and sex is apt in easy-going kindness to induce them to react too sharply. If they are not at boarding-school but at day school there is at least the chance that home and school may co-operate in bringing out the complementary value of the two environments, which otherwise may prove conflicting in their influence. But often enough

¹ Cf. the valuable essay on "Education for Leisure," by T. F. Coade, *Education of To-Day*, pp. 141-152, and *Wayward Youth*, by A. Aichhorn.

the pressure of work is allowed to reduce social life both at home and at school to a minimum, so that amidst their much learning they have no time to live—or to relate their learning to life. Thus, in the first case, when the mutual attraction of the sexes is making itself felt it has too little opportunity of finding natural expression, while, in the second, when the creative energies of thought are coming most strongly into play they are often frustrated by all the evils of an academically acquisitive society.

- Nevertheless, boy and girl, whether at work or still at school, are feeling and showing many signs of a steadier and more conscious development. This, we should note, is the gradually maturing outcome of those same energies which seemed so incalculable during the primary stage of their adolescence. If harmony between feeling, thought and purpose has not yet been wholly attained there is at any rate more proportion and balance. More, perhaps, in the case of those at school than in that of those at work, they begin to value responsibility and to desire it. Sharing authority in some measure, they appreciate, as they could not do before, the true nature of it, and begin to perceive how and in whose interests it should be used. There is a growth in a genuine corporate sense and in the kind of loyalty that goes deep enough to remain steady while open-eyed. The hunger for adventure and for a cause is stronger because the boy and girl are beginning to distinguish these from mere thrill or excitement. A Socrates in the ancient world can outshine an Alexander, and in the modern a Ronald Ross or a Schweitzer may be at least as significant as an Amundsen or a Kingsford-Smith. Looking into the future our middle adolescents envisage themselves as occupying a place of dignity and security in the community because of the contribution that they can make to its welfare and progress. As children they wanted to be all sorts of things—now

bus-driver, now manager of a bank, now airman or doctor. In primary adolescence they dreamed of becoming film-stars or professional athletes. Now they have ambitions, but of another sort, for, as we have already observed,¹ they want a vocation that is socially significant as well as distinctive and congenial. Therein the Sixth Former and the young wage-earner are alike.

Something more than hero-worship and the gang-spirit becomes manifest towards the end of this middle period of adolescence. Mr. H. G. Wells laid stress upon it in a lecture at the Sorbonne in 1927. After declaring his dislike of much in both Marxist Communism and Fascism he continued : " What I am discussing now is not the mental content of these two movements, but their quality and spirit as organisations. . . . They are both mainly composed of youngish people. They are so far democratic that they are open to anyone who will obey their disciplines and satisfy their requirements. Some of my hearers may know something of the intimate lives of young Communists or young Fascists. The movement dominates their entire life. The individual gives himself—or herself—to the movement in a spirit essentially religious. It enters into the life and into the conscience as few religions do nowadays." ² Youth has responded, in Russia, Italy, Germany, to meanings, values, purposes, demands which, whatever validity we think these may possess or may lack, have been proclaimed by dynamic and challenging leaders with definiteness, realism and enthusiasm. It was perception of this element in youth that made Dr. G. J. Jordan write : " The Church is more than a divine Creation ; it is an urgent psychological necessity." ³

¹ P. 159, *supra*.

² *Democracy under Revision*, pp. 38 f.

³ *A Short Psychology of Religion*, p. 58.

Thus as the adolescent comes to the final stage of his development, before, in the early twenties, he reaches maturity as an intelligent, purposeful, social human being, all his propensities and abilities, his native qualities and capacities in body, mind and spirit, begin to find the unity and direction in relation to other human beings and to the living forces of the whole universe which his inmost nature demands. His spontaneous endeavour is to achieve wholeness of personality, harmonious and active membership in a community, clarity of mind and consistency of thought, definiteness of vocation, a joy in living which is possible only when he feels within him what St. Paul calls the power of the endless life.

Is this sheer idealisation? Shall we be told that ordinary young people neither aspire to anything of the kind nor are capable of it? We may well agree that there is nothing automatic about such a development. Even if religion be left out of account, character and purpose do not result from the bare interaction of instinct and temperament. Instinct, it used to be said, is the raw material of character. Yet nobody would claim that raw material evolves unaided and unguided into a finished product, especially when such factors as choice and will are involved. That is why, in conceiving of religion as a sentiment, and as indeed the dominant sentiment wherever it is taken seriously at all, we have insisted upon the element of meaning in all experience, from birth onwards, and upon the necessity of a growingly purposeful effort to respond to that nature and meaning of the self and of its universe which are perceived by insight as well as analysed out by logical argument.

Religion, therefore, is not just an unfolding of the potentialities hidden in all children and adolescents, at best entirely naturalistic and at worst purely subjective. We have sought to show that it utilises and unifies all

these potentialities. It is in that sense wholly natural, and cannot be regarded scientifically as something added from outside, or as a matter of individual taste. The question is not whether a child, an adolescent or a man shall or shall not be religious, but rather what kind of religion he shall cultivate and exercise. Religion in itself is a response, and if it brings all the energies of the personality into play on the one hand it is, on the other, dependent for its quality and validity upon the degree of reality possessed by its object. The stages of adolescence, considered in the light of their psychological characteristics, mark the stages by which the individual makes wholly his own, intellectually and morally as well as emotionally and practically, the religion which has been mediated to him during childhood by his parents and by his family and community relationships, as well as by his growing apprehension of the facts of his physical nature and environment.

We have been engaged thus far in discovering how natural is the religious response to that independent reality around which an adequate religious sentiment may be built up, but to do this is not to give a complete explanation of religion, especially in its highest form. It will be necessary to say something about revelation as evoking this response. Meantime it is desirable to draw together the psychological factors in that response. For it must include the independent and realistic thinking of later adolescence as well as the emotional vitality of earlier, the specific choice of a way to be followed and a goal to be achieved through acceptance of a vocation, no less than the insight and the active self-committal experienced in conversion.

Sir Percy Nunn speaks of personality in terms of the body-mind.¹ Mr. Charles Fox goes further when he

¹ *Education, Its Data and First Principles.*

writes of "the mind and its body."¹ Dr. J. S. Haldane² shows how the complete explanation of personality carries us through the ascending stages of chemistry, physiology, biology and psychology to a climax in philosophy. We have observed that the action of a sentiment draws, through the instincts, upon the physical as well as the mental energies of a man in every activity of which he is capable except the pure reflex. We may be unable to trace the process by which the transformation and retransformation of the central energy takes place, just as we cannot at present penetrate the mystery by which sensation becomes perception, or, in other words, by which a physical state is transformed into a mental one. But that this process occurs there can be no doubt. If we deny it we are forced either into the materialistic, mechanistic theories which enable Watson to say that there is no fundamental difference between physiology and psychology apart from the extent of process considered, or we are faced by some theory of epi-phenomenalism, by which mental activity accompanies physical but has no demonstrable cause-and-effect relationship with it. If we agree with McDougall that striving towards a goal is of the very essence not only of biological but of psychological process, we are committed to the conclusion that dynamic psychology involves something more than *vis a tergo*, a force which can be described simply as a "drive," or a "push." The sentiment which controls and dominates the whole physiological, biological, psychological process is centred in an object, the intrinsic nature of which must affect the characteristic action of the sentiment at least as much as environment affects the way in which hereditary propensities and abilities are exercised. Meaning and value come in to shape purpose,

¹ *The Mind and its Body*.

² *The Sciences and Philosophy: The Philosophical Basis of Biology, etc.*

but in the fulfilment of purpose there is a drawing forth of energy which resides in the physiological and biological no less than in the psychological structure of the complete human organism. It is a two-way traffic, and the psychological is no more the *product* of the biological than the reverse.

Yet it follows also that the physiological and the biological must affect the psychological. We recall Dr. McDougall's definition of character: "The native propensities are the chief part of the raw material which becomes organised to form character. The process of organisation is of two stages. The first stage is the formation of sentiments. The second is the building of the sentiments into an harmoniously co-operating system. *Such a system of sentiments is character.*"¹ The logical expansion of this indicates the structure and working of personality, body-mind, man-in-social-relationships. If religion is a sentiment at all, it must at once control within its sphere energies that find physical, biological and psychological expression and be the fulfilment of all those energies, a centre which is also a goal. If it is the dominant sentiment, then *a fortiori* it involves and is involved in literally every function of the complete organism. If it gives direction, meaning and value to the *vis a tergo*, the force that "drives" or "pushes," it is also in itself *vis a fronte*, a force that attracts, or "pulls." The value imparted to all process within the organism will then depend upon the object of the religion. If, as in Christianity, that object is personal the whole activity of the human being (and thus also of human society) will develop a quality and a purpose in harmony with the character and will of that personal object of religion as He comes to be known by the religious man. Propensities and abilities, emotions and intellectual

¹ *Energies of Men*, p. 188.

activities, insights and choices—in fact the complete person, body, mind and spirit will find unification and direction in response to the eternal self-manifesting divine, personal “Other.”

Nothing that has been achieved in the analysis of instinct into propensity and ability by Dr. McDougall, nothing that has developed in the classification of instincts or propensities into the two main groups of the self-regarding and the other-regarding, affects the argument adversely. Everything that has been contributed by Dr. Suttie strengthens it. The religious sentiment, dismissed by Freud as an illusion, becomes the effective answer to his psychology of sexuality and despair, for the creative instinct is seen naturally to take the place of the death instinct which he has postulated. What Dr. J. A. Hadfield¹ has called “The Law of Completeness” is a more satisfying explanation of the facts—at every level—than Freud’s ever-repressed but never-subdued sexuality, and yet this constructive interpretation finds a real and significant place for all the physical and biological facts of sex to which Freud has given a twisted and disproportionate significance, and which in adolescence undeniably exert so powerful an influence on the growth and the dynamic enrichment of the personality.

We find ourselves, as we follow this argument, working out from another angle the philosophy of wholeness—the completion of incomplete structures and the building of these into greater and more significant wholes—which is the only philosophy accordant with a Gestalt psychology. In this connection a comment of Jung’s becomes very apposite: “It is no reproach to the Freudian and Adlerian theories that they are based upon the drives; the only trouble is that they are one-sided. The kind of psychology they represent leaves out the psyche, and

¹ *Psychology and Morals*, pp. 61 ff.

is suited to people who believe that they have no spiritual needs or aspirations. . . . Although the theories of Freud and Adler come nearer to getting at the bottom of the neuroses than does any earlier approach to the question from the side of medicine, they still fail, because of their exclusive concern with the drives, to satisfy the deeper spiritual needs of the patient. They are still bound by the premises of nineteenth-century science, and they are too self-evident—they give too little value to fictional and imaginative processes. In a word, they do not give meaning enough to life. And it is only the meaningful that sets us free.”¹

This, then, is what we mean by speaking of religion as a sentiment, and it is easy to see how at adolescence it may, and often does, attain a new dominance, potency and significance, not because of an emotional crisis at a time when a boy or girl is peculiarly liable to an overwhelming access of feeling, but because *all* the forces in normal human personality are then enhanced and deeply stirred, and because a powerful and comprehensive sentiment is so intimately and inseparably connected with them all, giving them indeed a unity and direction not otherwise attained.

Religion for the mature mind is thus seen to be fulness of life indeed, in satisfying relationships, and with definite purpose. It is a dynamic harmony, a confident answer to the challenge of circumstances, a victory over all that would from within disorganise and disintegrate the self, and a certainty that in society and in history may be found the evidence of an eternal order, a Kingdom of

¹ *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*, p. 259. Cf. G. A. Coe, *The Psychology of Religion*, Chicago, 1916, p. 65: “Possibly the chief thing in religion, considered functionally, is the discovery and re-organisation of values. Possibly the central function of religion concerns ends rather than means.”

God beyond the bounds of time and space which is yet increasingly manifest among men upon the earth. Belief and conduct are inseparable if religion is more than a philosophy or a ritual—that is to say, if religion is a function of the whole man. Faith and reason are complementary parts of the religious life—reason as the tracing out, in strict loyalty to observed and verified fact, of the truth about God, man and Nature as far as this can be ascertained and synthesised by means of logical thought : faith as acceptance of the hypothesis which results from insight when all the relevant and verified facts have been surveyed, and which calls, not only for acceptance by the mind, but for self-committal in action, just as the scientist sets to work to test his hypothesis by actual experiment. Religion cannot be content with the achievement of personal character alone : it must have a social reference, if only because men are not hermits.

Again, while religion requires and develops freedom, it necessitates discipline too, if dissipation of the individual's energies and disruption of the community are to be avoided, and the common end is to be fulfilled. But while true discipline is ultimately self-discipline, and cannot result from simple subservience to external authority, self-discipline must be positive, a recognition of intrinsic worth which brings with it the sense of a categorical imperative, and in experience causes religious men to speak of the service that is perfect freedom, or, like Wordsworth in his moment of youthful insight, to declare :

I knew

That henceforth I must be, else erring greatly,
A dedicated spirit.

These are the issues which must be faced in middle and later adolescence, as well as all those which arise from the prospects of love, marriage, home, family, the responsibility of maintaining and bringing up children,

career (from the economic and the vocational points of view), citizenship and world-citizenship. In all of these aspects of human life energies will find expression and sentiments will be developed which may and should be organised into a rich unity within the dominant religious sentiment. It is impossible, of course, that this should be accomplished in respect of any particular experience until the experience has become a fact for the person concerned, and not merely an anticipation, or a phenomenon observed in other people's lives. Nevertheless, in the years immediately preceding his arrival at maturity the adolescent must needs be welding together the new experiences that actually come to him—many of them foretastes of what he will know more fully later on—and fashioning in its essentials and its main outlines the dominant sentiment which is to control him for the rest of his life.¹

A subjective mysticism will not serve to meet so comprehensive a need, any more than a traditional statement of doctrine or a code of morals in itself suffices as the object of a supreme sentiment. Mathematics and physical science go back in the end to the data supplied by physical phenomena, however abstract their formulæ may have become and with whatever assurance they may enable us to weigh the stars and postulate the existence of worlds which have not yet swum into our ken. We admit this in the very manner by which, in our most advanced forms of education, we teach number to tiny children. When we are concerned with the spirit of man, and not only with his body and its physical environment, we go back similarly to the historical and the personal. It is this that differentiates religions like Judaism, Christianity and Islam from metaphysical

¹ Unless, of course, some cataclysmic conversion occurs to him later in life.

faiths like Hinduism and Buddhism, or ethical systems such as Confucianism. Moral and spiritual reality is the quest of the adolescent, and it becomes the more urgent as he approaches maturity. However psychologically natural and necessary religion is to him, he cannot evolve it out of himself. It must be his answer to revelation. But revelation is the disclosure of living and eternal truth, in part, of course, through the very physical facts with which science, mathematics and æsthetic deal, but supremely in history and in men and women by whose illumination and insight, adventure and achievement, history has been shaped. It was the testimony of the Hebrew prophets that the Divine character and purpose were manifest in creation and in history. The apostles bore witness to One in whom they found the Divine, living and speaking in terms of our common manhood.

There could be no final, incontestable intellectual proof that either the prophets' testimony or the apostles' witness is true to the inmost constitution of the universe, any more than the three classical proofs of the existence of God can be held to amount to more than the supreme logical argument from probability. There is an element of faith, as has so frequently been pointed out, even in the basic assumption of physical science that the uniformity of Nature is dependable. But the Hebrews could and did point to the concrete series of events which made up their own history and the world history of their time: the great prophets were living men of such moral and spiritual quality that they themselves were part of their message, as Dr. E. F. Scott has said.¹ Christianity inherits from Judaism this insistence upon the historical and the concrete as the vehicle of eternal truth and reality. Even if the Old Testament had perished, however, and all traces of Judaism had vanished in the first century of

¹ *The New Testament Idea of Revelation*, p. 44.

our era, the foundations of the Christian faith would have been undisturbed. For Christians begin from the life of Jesus in Palestine "under Pontius Pilate," in itself a fact made only the more certain by the efforts of modern scholars like Drews, Robertson and even Loisy to demonstrate that the Gospels are based upon a sublime myth.¹

To discuss the historicity of Jesus, or indeed the theological and philosophical questions arising from the Christian belief that God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself, is beyond the scope of this book. Here we can go no further in that direction than a *credo*.² Psychologically man is essentially religious, and

¹ "No competent historian in these days doubts the historical reality of Jesus. Indeed, it is very difficult to get a competent historian even to discuss the subject seriously. For example, no one knows more about myths and legends than Sir James Frazer. He is sometimes quoted, erroneously, in support of the view that Jesus never lived. Let me quote his own words: 'As my views on this subject (*i.e.* the historical reality of Jesus) appear to have been strangely misunderstood, I desire to point out explicitly that my theory assumes the historical reality of Jesus as a great religious and moral teacher who founded Christianity and was crucified at Jerusalem under the governorship of Pontius Pilate. . . . The doubts which have been cast on the historical reality of Jesus are, in my mind, unworthy of serious attention,' *The Golden Bough*, Part vi. p. 412, 1918 ed." The Rev. Hugh Martin, art. "The Bible After Criticism," *Religion in Education*, vol. v. No. 2, April 1938.

² Cf. *The Nature of Revelation*, by Archbishop Söderblom: "The portals for revelation in the human personality are three, the intellect or understanding, the intuition of infinity, with its emphasis on feeling, and the urge of the ideal, or conscience. The three are by no means of equal value. . . . Revelation does not consist in any individual events or any statements or writings. It consists in the inner life of Christ in relation to the Father, and in His love, so divinely fixed and powerful. If, however, one has met God in Christ, one can no longer isolate Christ. The man who says: 'God is revealed in Christ,' at the same time says: 'God is revealed in Nature.' The man who says: 'God is revealed in Christ,' cannot escape saying: 'God is revealed in history.'" pp. 109, 144. Cf. also Archbishop W. Temple in *Revelation*, edited by Prof. John Baillie and the Rev.

seeks by reason of his nature a centre for that religious sentiment through which he may gain complete self-fulfilment in right relationships with God and his neighbours. Historically in Jesus Christ God is revealed, not statically but dynamically, working for that creative unity of individual personality, that fellowship of men one with another, and even, as St. Paul declares, that harmony of Nature, which all belong to the fulfilment of the Divine purpose and the fulness of the Divine life. Surely, then, human nature and divine self-revelation answer each other. To "live in accordance with Nature" psychologically is to live by the light and in the power of religion, which at its highest is, in yet another of St. Paul's phrases, to live "in Christ," to be "alive unto God."

We have said nothing thus far of sin and guilt, fear and frustration—facts of human experience which are of deep practical concern both to psychology and to religion. The most effective way of dealing with them

Hugh Martin, pp. 120-121: "The revelation is not primarily in propositions concerning Christ to which my intellect may assent; it is in Christ Himself, to Whom my whole personality must bow. This includes, of course, the homage of the intellect, which must accordingly seek to apprehend according to its own mode of activity both Christ Himself and our relation to Him; this is the work of Christian theology; it issues in the great Christian doctrines. These are of profound importance, because they point men to the actual revelation; but they are not themselves the vehicle or the content of that revelation; they are the exposition of it, as the textbook of Astronomy is the exposition of the starry heavens. The revelation is the fact—Jesus Christ Himself. The appeal exercised by this revelation is to the whole Personality. Therefore response to it cannot be reluctant; only where it is willing does it exist at all. . . . The revelation is given in a Person to persons. . . . Thus revelation exercises its authority by calling forth responsive obedience and love from those who are able to receive it. Because it is given in a Person to persons, it acts through, not either apart from or against, the free motion of their wills. There is a compulsion upon the soul, but it is exercised through freedom; God puts forth His power upon us, but our servitude is our perfect freedom."

psychologically is the religious way, which is positive, recognising their actuality but applying to them the remedy of forgiveness, restoration, the inspiration of a perfect love that casts out fear, the assurance that all things work together for good to them that love God. Psycho-analysis is ethically neutral. It traces the origin of maladjustment in the individual. But the complete person is ethical, and religion, which deals with the whole man, is concerned with sin, as well as with misfortune and weakness. Adolescents, conscious of failure and wrongdoing despite their ideals and efforts, seek a reason and a remedy far more thorough-going than psychiatry alone can offer.

The process of thinking things through and thinking them together, says Dr. W. B. Selbie, "begins with those two essentials on which Newman laid such stress, God and myself and the relation between us. In other words, religion ultimately is man's awareness of God."¹ That awareness is not simply of God as a kindly Father. He is, as Isaiah perceived in a young man's vision, high and lifted up. His love is ethical and holy, demanding and succouring, as the self-giving on Calvary makes plain. He is to be worshipped, and the way of worship is the way of deliverance, love and service.

Worship is central to religion not only because God is worthy of all adoration and praise but also because by worship He is made central to everything that a man's life contains. In psychological terms the unifying, dynamic object of the dominant sentiment in a man's life is made perpetually more vivid and powerful by the concentration of his attention upon it. "Of Him and through Him and unto Him are all things."

¹ *The Validity of Christian Belief*, p. 35.

VII

A CHAPTER FOR PARENTS

WHAT is the practical outcome of all that we have thus far said? These theories may be interesting enough in themselves, and it is important to clear our minds on the matters of fact from which all sound theories must be derived. But what actual difference does it all make to us whose chief concern is with the making of a home and the bringing up of boys and girls, not with books and ideas?

The immediate reply is definite and unqualified. Every parent has a part in the religious education of his or her children which must be played and is played, willy-nilly, consciously or otherwise.

All parents recognise their rights and responsibilities with regard to what their children are taught by other people. Whether John and Mary attend a denominational school or one where no secretarian doctrine may be inculcated, and whether the children are withdrawn from religious observance and instruction in whatever school they attend, only the parents can decide. We in this country, like the citizens in many others, cherish this as one of our most vital defences against infringement of our political and spiritual freedom. We do not always regard it as a duty to be discharged, with the most careful regard, first and foremost, to God and the child. It is possible, as the history of education shows and as our present-day experience testifies, to stir up the most violent controversies about the teaching of religion in

schools provided or maintained by the State among people whom their best friends would not accuse of being otherwise interested in religion. On the other hand there are many fathers and mothers who, having settled the question of where their children are to go to school and assured themselves that some sort of religious instruction appears in the curriculum, are content, feeling that they have done what convention (or perhaps the welfare of the boys and girls) demands. At least their children will not be ignorant of something which educated people ought to know, whether it has any genuine influence upon one's way of living or not.

There is more to be said about this. First, however, we must save ourselves from the risk of confusing education with instruction, and try to grasp the full significance of the truth which emerges from the psychological facts which we have been discussing. The inescapable contribution which all parents make to the religious development of their children is wholly independent of whether a child is or is not "taught" anything whatever, either at home or at school or at Church, if by teaching we mean, as we ordinarily do, the direct impartation of knowledge in the intellectual sense, or the practice of even such simple observances as saying prayers at bedtime and grace at meals. It is indeed independent of the parents' expressed views, whether these are sympathetic or the reverse, concerning religion in general or Christian beliefs and practices in particular. But it is so fundamental that it affects very profoundly the result of any specific teaching or training that the child receives from any source. So powerful is it that while its fruit is more often seen in the frustration of religious teaching and observance it may work in the other direction. It may actually incline the children of parents who profess unbelief to the acceptance for themselves of Christian

truth and the open following of the Christian way, if in fact the actions of father and mother speak louder than their words, and the atmosphere of the home is what from any point of view it ought to be. For the issue here is not one of creed and observance, but one of character and daily relationships. In short, it is what parents are in themselves and how they behave that matters.

It can be said without fear of exaggeration, and certainly without passing judgment in any way, that in the majority of homes there is simple indifference to religion. Not long ago the headmistress of a secondary school discovered that in sixty per cent. of the homes from which her girls came there was no copy of the Bible. It would be Pecksniffian to hold up our hands in horror at this, as though it were shocking. To infer that people who do not possess a Bible are wholly unchristian would be both illogical and unjustifiable. We take the fact as a mere and casual illustration of an increasingly common attitude. Probably a number of the parents concerned were themselves quite surprised to find that there was not a Bible in the house, and some no doubt went in to buy one next time they passed a bookseller's. After all, the Bible is still the best seller, as became evident recently when a beautifully produced edition "designed to be read as literature" was sold in such phenomenal numbers as soon as it was published. Even if some purchasers or recipients set more value upon the form than upon the contents, that is no worse than the traditional stories of family Bibles used to support aspidochelons. The relevance of our illustration is that in so many families if the Bible does not happen to be called for on some special occasion it is never missed. The analogy is fairly sound: if nothing unusual occurs to direct particular attention to religion the absence of it from among the regular interests of normal life is never noticed.

Yet our affirmation remains true. The roots of religion are not eradicated because nobody troubles to tend the plant. They inhere in those commonplace, day-by-day family situations and relationships of which we are never more than partly conscious. If we do nothing more than live together, as parents with children, on the whole happily but not without occasional difficulties, we are all the time moulding what we now see to be the raw material of religion, far below the surface of the children's growing personalities.

So it is also in the case of those parents, often the *young* fathers and mothers, who make no attempt to teach their children anything about God, worship, or the Bible because they are themselves so perplexed and uncertain. For them agnosticism is not a form of intellectual pride or stubbornness. It is genuine, arising perhaps from ignorance of what Christians really believe or of the broad general conclusions upon which most psychologists are agreed; but more often from bewilderment because current theories in both theology and psychology are so numerous and so self-contradicting. It may be due, on the one hand, to a superficial acquaintance with a few psychological ideas and, on the other, to a quite distorted notion of what the Bible is and says. Psychology they think important, but religion much less so, and it has not occurred to them that religion can and should be a subject of serious study, at least as rewarding and exacting as psychology. Nevertheless they are at any rate not unwilling that their children should be taught religion, even if to themselves the whole thing seems vague, irrelevant, or out-of-date.

The parent of a small child at a kindergarten and preparatory school attached to a training college for teachers asked why religion was taught in the school. An evening's discussion at the Parent-Teacher Association

resulted. Curiously naïve and ill-informed statements were made by some young fathers and mothers both about the Christian faith and about child-psychology. It became pathetically apparent that many of them had no clear convictions of any kind,—scientific, philosophical, or religious, by which to regulate and direct their own lives, so that though they were eager to give their children every chance of sound and healthy development they felt very much outside everything to do with religion. Towards the end of the evening one quiet member of the gathering rose and said: "It seems to me that most of us parents don't know whether there is a God or not, but we're mighty glad that there is somebody about, telling the kiddies there is." Yet even so frank a confession betrayed the failure to perceive the deeper truth, namely, that despite themselves every one of those parents was constantly doing with the children what no teacher could do, for good or for ill.

Respect is due to parents who are so anxious for their children to grow up unprejudiced and free that they determine neither to teach their children nor to allow them to be taught anything about religion "until they are old enough to think for themselves and decide on their own account." The futility of such a resolution is obvious, however, since children cannot be completely immured. As they go about they see and hear too much that is associated with religion to permit of their remaining in complete ignorance, while the very spontaneity which their parents rightly encourage makes them the more ready to ask questions and the more insistent upon obtaining reasonable answers—if not from the parents, then from anyone else who will inform them.

Why are churches unlike other buildings? Who goes there, and what happens? Why can't I go to school prayers like Gerald and Margaret? What does Good

Friday mean—and Christmas, and Easter? A picture or a story-book, something heard on the wireless or the comparing of notes with a playmate—all sorts of chance experiences, as they arise, stimulate a curiosity which is only intensified if it is met by evasion, or by refusal, however tactful, to satisfy its normal demands. And again, of course, the real futility is not upon the level of the obvious at all. It goes deeper than the vain effort to present the appearance of neutrality. It is revealed by the essential and inevitable facts of the purely natural and human parent-child relationships in the spheres of emotion and will.

If this is the situation when parents are indifferent, perplexed, or seeking to maintain a strict neutrality, it is demonstrably the same when they are confessedly religious people, who desire that their boys and girls shall grow up in the Church to which they themselves have always belonged and in the beliefs which they themselves regard as certainly true. There are pitfalls of which they are too frequently unaware, and to these we shall make further reference. For the moment, however, the point to be observed is that whatever they may teach, and whatever religious practices they may follow, it is their personal relationships with their children in apparently non-religious matters that will most probably prove in the long run more potent than anything else in shaping the children's real religious growth.

As for the folk who are aggressively opposed to all recognised forms of religion, their very violence leads the psychologist to suspect that they are reacting from some kind of shock to their most deeply rooted traditions and affections, which are more likely than not to be intensely religious. Be this as it may, they not seldom manifest personal qualities which make them exceedingly good fathers and mothers. If in the psychological sense as well

as in other respects they are such, it will follow, by reason of all the facts and arguments put forward in previous chapters, that they are predisposing their children to a religion centred upon an eternal Fatherhood. They may not like it, but they cannot help it. To suggest that this puts a premium upon theoretical ungodliness would be at once to play the sophist in argument and to ignore the fact that to speak of the careless, the unsettled, the libertarian or the atheistical, as we have done, is not to tell the whole truth about any of them. Furthermore, it would imply that there is no approximation to the ideal in real life, whereas we have reason to rejoice that there so often is.

Harmony is the law of balanced, healthy growth. When teaching, example and these subtler influences of which we have been taking account work together the conditions are as favourable to vigorous, wholesome growth as when soil, climate and wise gardenership combine in the nurture of a choice seedling. But this does not lessen the importance of those processes which are never visible, because they are always hidden in the earth, nor are those cultivators likely to be truly successful who ignore everything but twigs and leaves.

As the baby becomes a child and the child an adolescent, the parents have him less and less to themselves. Nevertheless, their share in his religious development continues to be far more effective than most of them realise, though it operates rather differently as he passes from one stage to another on his way to manhood, and influences him throughout his whole life. It is during infancy, however, that they exercise in a unique way this inalienable power and privilege of fostering or repressing, enriching or impoverishing his elemental capacities of love and hate, trust and fear. They cannot add to the sum of his emotional, intellectual and volitional energies,

or take from it, but they can ensure the right expression and direction of them or bring about the wrong. This is not to be done in odd moments of leisure, or merely by deliberate effort on particular occasions. It must be as spontaneous as the play in which men and women unbend for a while and find their own delight in that of the child. It must be as considered as when they set themselves with the greatest care to help the child in the formation of a good habit, or in learning how to avoid danger without losing curiosity and courage.

But this is, in the nature of things, a "whole-time job." A child is sensitive not only to its parents' behaviour towards himself, but also to the harmony or tension between father and mother themselves. It knows, without the evidence of blatant favouritism, whether father and mother really do love all the family alike or whether, for any reason or none, one receives more or less care and love (not merely attention, which may be necessary, or sentimental affection, which may be without much significance though it is unwise) than another. It is the parents who must help the adjustment between the older and the younger children in the family. They must also render harmless the foolish or mischievous things that people outside the family say and do when they encounter babies or tiny children. At the same time it is their function to bring children gradually into contact with the larger world, so that the children can accept the good and throw off the evil for themselves.

It is surprising that parents who care very greatly about the welfare of their little children should be so content as some are to leave them to others at this formative period, and (especially in the case of fathers) to see so little of them themselves. Sensible maids may well do less harm than foolish mistresses and mothers, but not

all are sensible. Nor can all mothers who need help afford that of a nurse properly trained in the understanding of children's minds as well as in the care of their bodies. It would be unrealistic and lacking in humour to suggest that no child has a fair chance unless it is accorded perfect conditions of development. But we may point to the necessity of making those conditions as satisfactory as they can be without opening ourselves to the charge of becoming over-serious or alarmist.

Happily parents often do by the light of Nature what the solemn, portentous psychologist spends years in discovering that they ought to do. They do it, too, with more gaiety and good sense than will result from reading a shelf-load of books or going to endless lectures. Even such parents, however, all too frequently fail to realise that what they do so constantly and "without thinking about it," goes to the roots of the child's growth in religion, as well as in health, manners and morals. Still less does it occur to them that psychology has shown "being" to be more important than "doing," in a sense much more profound and dynamic than the old copy-book maxims indicated. For it is not example, but interaction, upon which the psychologist lays so much stress.

A valuable enquiry has lately been made by Miss Beatrice Swainson and a group of training-college students into the ideas of God prevalent among some three thousand elementary school children with whom they were in daily contact. Miss Swainson found that "A belief that God was 'just like an ornerly man' was strongly insisted on by many, as if to bring God into reality. The younger children and those of D mentality showed a complete disregard of abstract and difficult ideas. Many juniors began their answers with the phrase, 'God is a good man who . . .' Even the older

children seemed to feel the necessity of belief in the human quality of God." But a little later in her account, Miss Swainson says: "The thought of God as a father shows a surprisingly low frequency. In many cases it seemed probable that the child's idea of his own father and that of God were not always reconcilable. It was significant that the percentage of girls who wrote of God as father was nearly three times that of the boys: one felt in reading their answers that the father idea appealed to them more naturally."¹ While this refers to children who are nearer their adolescence than their infancy, it reveals the outcome of a process which began in their earliest years.

At the end of the chapter in which we discussed the origins of that process we considered the comments made by Dr. Cyril Valentine and the Bishop of Ely² on the idea of fatherhood likely to form itself in the mind of a child whose experience has been unfortunate. But why should we be driven to conclude that the concept of "father" is too dangerous to be used as a means of conveying an essential truth about God? Rather would it seem that these unhappy cases only show how powerful the idea is, because it corresponds to a supremely significant experience. The true conclusion is that parents possess a power far greater than they know, and that it can be so exercised as to produce results more splendid and enduring than they imagine.

In dealing with the growth of the moral sense Professor Henri Clavier observes: "Little by little, by the aid of intellectual development and reflection, the child forges a moral ideal for itself. This ideal, which at first is personified in its parents, can rise to the height of God under the influence of education."³ It is even truer that

¹ *Religion in Education*, Vol. 6, No. 2: April, 1939.

² P. 56, *supra*.

³ *L'Idée de Dieu chez L'Enfant*, p. 88.

the parents do not merely personify the idea of God : in their relationships with their infant children they actually give life to those elements of experience which provide the only adequate material for a true conception of God such as, later, education will help the child to develop and clarify. This indeed is what Professor Clavier indicates when he says, " During its first three years the child finds within the family all the help [*i.e.* in respect of protection against exterior dangers, immediate or distant, real or imaginary] that it needs ; its parents are, for it, gods, and towards them its native religiousness turns." ¹

When the child goes to school parents cannot, or rather should not, regard his school life as something parallel with his life at home but beyond their province, except in so far as they take a general interest in his happiness and progress. For them to interfere in the organisation and government of the school, the curriculum and teaching methods, and those other aspects of school life wherein the teacher has special training and experience, would obviously be wrong. They have a right, however, to know what their boys and girls are being taught, and it might be very salutary for the school if at times, when there is reasonable ground and suitable opportunity for doing so, parents brought to the notice of teachers the perhaps unanticipated results of any particular teaching that has been given as these betray themselves when the child is at home. The headmaster of a mixed elementary Church school was visiting the home of one of his small pupils, aged six, and the parents, who were proud of their little girl's progress, made her recite to the headmaster. When she asked what she should " say " she was told to repeat one of her " Scripture pieces " learnt at school. Forthwith she declaimed the

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 80.

story of the sacrifice of Isaac. The master, embarrassed and inwardly horrified, was rather at a loss for truthful and at the same time tactful comment. After a moment's silence the child said, "Isn't He a cruel God?" Worse perhaps even than this was the appearance in a recent book of Scripture plays for little children of this same story *dramatised*, for children of six to act.

Thoughtlessness and inappropriate teaching at school are not the only unfortunate influences with which watchful parents may have to reckon. A humorous illustration of "how not to do it" comes from the early history of broadcasting. One Sunday afternoon, a clergyman told children the story from the New Testament Apocrypha that when Jesus was a child His companions made clay birds and animals which Jesus, by clapping His hands, caused to fly. Not content with this the good man went on to say, "Now children, Judas made the owls. When Jesus was betrayed by Judas in the garden the owls were so sorry and so ashamed that they never flew in the daylight again." To add one other instance of the grimmer sort, a film of the life of Christ was recently exhibited to a group of intelligent boys. Without regard to data or probability it showed soldiers and people lashing Jesus with whips as He staggered under the weight of the cross on His way to Calvary. Asked by their master what they thought of the film, they referred to this scene among others and said, "If that's what they did to Him we understand why Hitler hates the Jews."

It is not for a moment suggested that such lessons, broadcasts, films or books are typical. There is a great deal of fine work being done by teachers, broadcasters, producers and writers. It would be even more effective than it is if fathers and mothers took a more lively interest in what is being done for boys and girls and took their

share in helping children to appreciate it to the full. But teachers too often have reason to feel that parents hinder or frustrate sound work done in school by telling the children at home, or allowing them to read for themselves, precisely those crude, sentimental, frightening, or bloodthirsty stories which are left out of a good syllabus of Scripture teaching for children or a Shortened Bible for Children. Such stories are omitted, not because they are any less a part of the Bible than the material which is used, but because they reflect a very primitive stage in that history of the growth of religion which the Bible records, and they cannot be seen in perspective and properly understood until the children are considerably older, while on the other hand they are emotionally shocking and morally confusing to children, whose imaginations are extremely active or whose minds are exceedingly realistic.

When boys and girls reach the years of adolescence they will learn that the value of the Bible is enhanced by the fidelity with which it presents these very primitive ideas, enabling us to follow that growth in the knowledge of God and in morality which corresponds to God's progressive self-revelation. They will learn to distinguish between myth, legend and history, and to appreciate the abiding truth contained in each. But parents are too easily capable of sinning against the religious vitality and development of youth by their own intellectual laziness and traditionalism. It is lamentable if general indifference to religion, personal uncertainty, or the closed mind of dogmatic atheism causes fathers and mothers to fail their boys and girls at a time when frank interchange of experience and thought would mean so much on both sides: for the adolescent who has reason to feel that his parents are indulging in wilful evasion, or in flippant carelessness with regard to advancing know-

ledge, must find it hard to retain intellectual respect for people whom he most wants to respect because of his love for them. But it is a tragedy when parents of warm religious conviction, whose constant prayer is that their boys and girls may find in the Christian religion what they themselves have found, persist in maintaining reactionary views and seeking to discredit both the discoveries of scholarship and the faith of teachers who are trying to share with their pupils knowledge which in fact sustains and confirms belief in a living God, ever at work in the mind and spirit of man as well as in the processes of Nature.

It is easy to smile at the celebrated Tennessee story of an Education Authority which prohibited the teaching of evolution in science classes because this was held to conflict with the first two chapters of Genesis. That situation, however, is repeated time and again in homes where the intellectual aspect of religious truth is undervalued or repressed through over-emphasis upon its moral and mystical aspects, so that the very word evangelical has in many quarters now come to possess a persistent flavour of obscurantism. Fear lest they should lose what to them is more precious than life, and failure to understand that faith and reason are not opposed but complementary, are doubtless the deep-lying causes of much clinging to the old on the part of parents when their children are eager to press forward towards the fresh light and truth of which Puritan John Robinson spoke.

There can be less doubt still, however, that in many cases parents shirk the duty and forfeit both the pleasure and reward of keeping intellectually alert for the sake of their children, not perceiving what ill effects upon their children's moral and physical growth this self-satisfied conservatism of theirs may have. It is their privilege to remain the intellectual friends and companions of their

boys and girls, adding to their own knowledge and extending their own thought as far as they have opportunity, but not hesitating to accept from their own children truth for which there is sound evidence, though they themselves may not otherwise have become acquainted with it. At least the adolescent must be able to feel that discussion with his parents will be fair, open-minded and generous, though in the end he and they may agree to differ. Unless he can do so there will be a widening gulf between them and him, not only in religious belief, but in all the subtle relationships which demand mutual respect and confidence.

In passing, it should be said that adolescents must be set free in another important direction also. The forms of worship in which they have been brought up may not be those most suited to their temperament or their later conviction. They may, after seeing something of other churches, come back to that of their parents' allegiance with a richer appreciation and a clearer certainty than they could otherwise have possessed, and may bring with them something with which to enrich the church of their fathers. But if they do not, the vital necessity is that they should find a spiritual home for themselves and live happily in it, not feeling that they are regarded by their parents as gone astray, or as traitors to the truth, but rather assured of a community in faith, hope and love which is the very basis of the Catholic Church in the true meaning of that magnificent phrase.

We have digressed a little from the general theme of home and school influence in religion. We must not leave it altogether without touching upon a consideration which is easier to overlook than differences in the level of knowledge and thought, but is still more fraught with possibilities of good and evil, for both the child and the adolescent. When a boy or a girl is well launched

upon school life, he or she is called upon to live in two worlds at the same time. This is more patent in the case of day schools, but it is equally true in that of boarding schools, though here the alternation is less trying because it occurs in fairly prolonged periods instead of being repeated every twenty-four hours. The contrast between a home apparently based upon an entirely secular conception of life and a school community where at least there are daily prayers, and in most instances at least one period of Scripture teaching each week, may in itself be a source of perplexity to observant children, but it is by no means the most important psychologically. It is good for boys and girls to be subject to the stimulus of change. Neither home nor school can take the place of the other in the total environment required for complete education. But there may be a tension or an open clash between the two which is more than confusing, especially to the child, in whom it may produce a sense of insecurity for which he cannot account. If standards not only of behaviour but of freedom vary widely between the two, the child is in a perpetual stress of adjustment. If work and play, honesty and loyalty, aim and motive receive practically incompatible interpretations in the two sets of surroundings, the adolescent loses his bearings, unless indeed he makes the desperate attempt to subordinate one way of life to the other, and then his natural difficulties in achieving independence without sacrificing valued relationships will be greatly enhanced, for in the one environment he will seem a rebel and in the other too self-assured.

Practically everything that we have said about the largely unconscious reactions during infancy holds good of the adolescent when he finds himself frequently involved in conflicts between the demands of the two societies to which he belongs, yet often hardly knows quite where

the conflict originates, or how to resolve it without plunging into still worse warfare with either home or school. All this will influence his outlook upon religion and his experience of it. The most deplorable outcome, though fortunately not the normal one, is that he may take to an emotional form of religion as a means of escape, and thus regress to a childish fantasy in which he supposes that God will save him from all that is unpleasant, and as a result of which he will become a confirmed evader of life's challenges and adventures. Contrariwise he may lose faith in the possibility of discovering unity and purposefulness in life, so that he rejects religion on the score that what it offers is illusory.

Such a problem cannot be solved by parents alone; or by teachers alone. In various ways parents and teachers are finding means of joining forces, or at least of avoiding the unhappy position in which "ignorant armies clash by night." Parents' days, parent-teacher associations, week-end gatherings for parents at boarding-schools, and all the more widely diffused individual cultivation of mutual knowledge and understanding between all the members of a school staff (not only the head of the school or of the house) and the parents of the particular boys and girls they are teaching, are doing much for the progress of education in general. It is of little use to pay lipservice to the doctrine that the education of the whole child can be achieved only by means of the child's whole personal environment if the educators in home, school and church meet only on social occasions or for formal business. For the religious education of boys and girls close association and co-operation between all who have a share in it is imperative. It will be natural that when parents and teachers come together in friendly, informal fashion for the study of the normal development of boys and girls, as well as for the considera-

tion of special problems, the content and method of specifically religious education and the importance of worship should from time to time come under discussion. It is even more essential that everybody should recognise how all the activities of home and school, the whole atmosphere of each, and every respect in which older human beings come into intimate contact with younger ones, are part and parcel of the fundamentally religious life.

Professor Grensted has said that most, if not all, psychological and practical problems come back to the question : How shall we be other than we are ? The answer, as he proceeds to show, depends upon the master-sentiment that we are cultivating. Whatever it is, that is our real religion. And it is probably very different from what we think, or should like to admit to ourselves. " If we want to know what our own religion really is, the simplest test of all is just to ask what we are actually doing in and with our lives. We shall know our motives well enough when we take notice of the kinds of act that proceed from them. And even if we may be inclined to make some kind of self-defence, urging that these acts, as acts, are not so bad after all, this self-defence breaks down with a crash when we realise that it is not just as acts that we are judging them, but as indications of the kind of God to whom, even if He be Unknown to us, we have raised our altar." ¹ Our behaviour, conscious or unconscious, which affects so deeply the religious growth of our children, is in itself determined by our own religion, and none of us is without a religion. Professor Clavier is strictly accurate when he says, ² in comment upon Ewald's statement that a mother's example influences a child more powerfully than anything else and creates the spiritual climate in which the child must live : " The duty of the father is no less, and like

¹ *This Business of Living*, p. 60. *Op. cit.* p. 118.

² *L'Idée de Dieu chez L'Enfant*, p. 118.

the mother he must be for his children religion in action." Parents are literally that, whether their religion be good or bad, conscious or not. And if they recognise the necessity not only of being "other than they are" in the ordinary conduct of life, but also of being sure that what they are unconsciously does not contradict for their children what they teach and what they believe to be the practical ideal of parenthood, their only resource is a master-sentiment centred in a real "Fatherhood of which every family in heaven and on earth is named"—not an abstract conception or a Platonic idea, but existential, as the Barthians have taught us to say, or, in less philosophical language, a personal reality.

"We are too careless of posterity," wrote William Penn in his *Fruits of Solitude*, "not considering that as they are, so the next generation will be. If we would amend the world, we should mend ourselves, and teach our children to be, not what we are, but what they should be." Being human we are not perfect, and we are not likely to be, even judging by our own standards. However much we value example, we are wise in refusing to think that our own will always be such as we desire our children to follow. Nevertheless it remains true that what we are must in measure determine, not simply by force of example, but, as we have said, by deep and often unconscious interaction, what they will be. But if we again are governed and directed in the hidden depths of our personalities by knowledge, love and service of a God who is Father and Who has spoken to men in a Son, is there no ground for belief that these hidden processes and relationships will be according to the pattern of that Fatherhood? Is this not in effect the Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit, which is the Spirit of the Father and the Spirit of Sonship?¹

¹ "He hath sent forth the Spirit of sonship into our hearts, whereby we cry Abba, Father."

Are we now arguing in a circle? Have we abandoned psychological discussion and taken to sermonising? On the contrary, it is psychological investigation itself to which we owe our understanding of the way in which these forces work. Psychology cannot prove their existence, or measure values in any but a pragmatic fashion. From such and such effects it is reasonable to argue that such and such causes are operative, since we do not find that either is present when the other is absent, or *vice-versa*. Certainly psychologists, including Freud himself, insist that unity of personality, freedom from conflict and illusion, wholeness and happiness can be achieved only on the condition that we perceive and adjust ourselves to what is real. Psychologists also tell us that these ends are attained only as we yield ourselves to something beyond ourselves and greater than ourselves, a master-sentiment. If the parent-child relationship is fundamental to all human experiences, from birth to death, as Freud's very exaggerations in his interpretation of it help to convince us, is it not a living principle of the real Universe, and may we not fling ourselves upon it at its fullest and best, instead of treating it as responsible for all our ills because of the way in which we can pervert and distort it? Only by doing so shall we in simple psychological fact make our parenthood safe for our children.

VIII

A CHAPTER FOR TEACHERS

PARENTS and teachers are both impatient of the theorist who talks at them through a window. They feel that experience has given them a practical understanding of children and adolescents which more than makes up for any lack of academic psychology or theology. Of course they are right, but sometimes not wholly so. Empiricism in practice is the penalty of refusal to pay due attention to scientific enquiry. The virtues of special training in any sphere are indeed easily over-rated, but the man or woman with gifts and experience will be the more effective in using them if his or her practical wisdom is adequately based upon sound systematic knowledge. No art is really separable from the science which is relevant to it.

A fine scorn of the academic, however, does not by itself account for the attitude of many parents and teachers towards the application of psychological enquiry or educational theory in the sphere of religion. They put religious education in a category by itself because they feel so deeply its unique quality as mystical experience, and they fear lest the essence of it may be lost by any treatment of it which suggests that it is a "subject" like others in the curriculum or the examination syllabus. But they may be the victims of a mischievous half-truth, for while religion and worship cannot be taught like domestic science or mathematics, religious knowledge consists, in one aspect, of facts, interpretations and

formulated beliefs, just as it can and should be applied in definite action. It is no less true that a knowledge of human characteristics and psychological processes may and should be an aid to the shaping of that true education which deals with the whole personality and not only with intellectual attainments. This chapter, like the last, is an attempt to look at things from the inside, as it were. To be a psychologist who has also had a theological training is an advantage, but to have, in addition, the experience of parent and teacher is a still greater one.

A strong temptation to spend ourselves upon the technical matter of curriculum and method perpetually besets those of us whose business is to teach. Applicability to the daily task of form teaching is one of the best tests of what has been said in the foregoing chapters. Nevertheless, this is not a book on the practice of education so much as an attempt to discern the nature of that religious growth which the educator, be he parent or teacher, must needs foster, whether he wishes or not, but which he can do more than anyone else to direct, if he knows what he is doing. Consequently, while not losing sight of material and technique, we shall be concerned chiefly with the form or the school as a little community of living people. How, as individuals and as a group, are the boys and girls in fact influenced by the religious teaching that we are imparting, and by ourselves as teachers? Is it true, or is it only a cherished myth, that schools may teach values and principles which belong to the very essence of religion even though there is no period for religious instruction in the time-table, and corporate worship is either not regarded as desirable, or is rendered impossible for the school as a whole, because insufficient accommodation is available?

We need add no question as to whether formal Scripture teaching and school prayers constitute any

guarantee of genuine education in the Christian religion. There are too many young people, thoroughly loyal to their old school in every other regard, who tell us that by the time they left it they had had more than enough of teaching that was meaningless and forms of worship that were perfunctory. Of course, there is magnificent work being done in schools—finer Christian education in every sense of the word than is being given anywhere else except in the very best of homes and churches. A marked advance has been made during the last ten years in the teaching of Scripture in schools of all types. But there are still schools where it is simply inadequate, unmethodical, and in a word such as any school would be ashamed of if history, science, or games were the “subject.” Evidence leaps from the pages of any bundle of School Certificate papers. University teachers are perpetually confronted by illustrations of an ignorance which is certainly not due to sheer laziness or muddle-headedness among boys and girls at school. The Rev. P. Gardner Smith, addressing the Conference of Modern Churchmen on the Teaching of the Old Testament, said in this connection: “Even young men who come up to the University with the intention of being ordained seldom know more than such chapters of the Old Testament as are appointed to be read in church, while many others know practically nothing. Only three or four years ago an undergraduate bearing a very famous name in my own College asked his supervisor who this Jehovah was whom he had met in a modern poem. He came from one of our best known public schools, where presumably the problem of teaching the Old Testament had been solved by not teaching it at all.”¹

Thus far we may merely have been reiterating truisms.

¹ *Modern Christian Education*, pp. 323-4, Special Conference Number of *The Modern Churchman*, October, 1938.

It is necessary to dispose of the obvious, however, in order that we may get nearer to the heart of the matter. Of course, all depends upon the teacher. This again may seem to be a commonplace until we recognise that in the first instance all depends, not upon his competence as a scholar, his skill as a craftsman, or his enthusiasm, but upon the fact that so much of what was said in the preceding chapter of the parent-child relationship is true of the teacher-pupil relationship. The teacher is, in fact, a *surrogate* parent whenever he has children under his charge. In truth it may be doubted whether anybody in whom the parental instinct is not strong will ever make a first-class master or mistress. But the teacher may also be described as a semi-detached parent. Bound up with the genetic relationship between parents and the offspring to whom they have given life itself there is a mental and spiritual inter-dependence which has no equivalent in any bond between master and boy, or mistress and girl. The excellence of Mr. Chips is avuncular, not paternal. Therein lies much of its value, especially, as we noted, at the stages of primary and secondary adolescence. Nevertheless, the teacher, like the parent, evokes responses and reactions of which neither he nor his pupil may be conscious, and yet which are of great potency in moulding and directing the pupil's personality, character and religious development.

It is a matter of ordinary observation that, as the Consultative Committee of the Board of Education remarks in the Spens Report : "The attitude which a pupil takes up towards his first teacher of a new subject may influence his attitude to that subject for the rest of his life. If he dislikes the teacher, he may dislike the subject. On the other hand, if he likes the teacher, he may become an enthusiastic student of the subject. In fact, the intellectual and emotional aspects of mental

life cannot be separated.”¹ This applies *a fortiori* to the acquirement of religious knowledge. Progress in the study of the Bible, Church History and the Christian Faith is stimulated or retarded as much by the general attitude of masters and mistresses to boys and girls as by their obvious belief or unbelief in what they are teaching, their own enjoyment of the subject, or boredom with it, and their scientific artistry or their ineptitude in presenting it. But even assuming that they are successful above the average in arousing interest, imparting knowledge and eliciting activity on the part of the boys and girls themselves, the child when he comes to them is in large part the product of attractions and repulsions, fixations and inhibitions, complexes and sentiments derived from his infantile experiences while he was still fashioning his conception of himself and his world out of his relationships with his parents and the rest of the family. And the teachers now play their own part in this organic process. Their teaching is therefore addressed not only to the child as he comes into their hands, but to the child as he is becoming under this unwitting influence which they exert.

Teachers, however, have to do with great numbers of children in the course of a few years. If they treat them as individuals, and not as a mass made up of a certain number of standard types, they will soon find themselves reflecting upon the differing effects which the same activities and attitudes on their own part produce upon boys and girls who outwardly seem very much alike. Without becoming morbidly introspective they will thus discover clues to their own actual motives and actions, as well as to the real differences between their pupils. If the school staff is a fellowship of people concerned with

¹ *Report on Secondary Education with Special Reference to Grammar Schools and Technical High Schools*, p. 132.

what is happening in the lives of the boys and girls for whose education in the fullest sense they are so largely responsible, the Staff Common Room will be something more than a place for the exchange of necessary official information and casual talk. It will be a place where the mutual understanding of teachers and taught will be enhanced, because boys and girls are seen from angles other than that of the individual teacher, who again is saved from subjectivity in his estimation of his own work and personal relationships.

In this, as in their "semi-detachment," teachers have an advantage which parents, restricted to the upbringing of their own families, cannot enjoy. It is a compensation for that closer bond with children which teachers must needs lack, and it is the basis upon which they may make their particular contribution, unconscious as well as conscious, to the development of all that lies deepest in their pupils' personalities. Without the spirit of community in this sense no school can properly fulfil its functions. Indeed without it no school can truly be said to exist. And in this sense education and religion are inseparable. As before, it becomes evident that the one relevant question to ask about a school is not whether it teaches religion at all, but what kind of actual religious tendencies it generates by its common life and directs by its teaching.

It would be interesting, and it might be profitable, to pursue the question of what happens when the teaching of all religious doctrines is excluded from a nation's schools. The enquiry must be wholly speculative, however. In countries where, after a political revolution, religion in general and Christianity in particular have been officially regarded as pernicious superstitions, inimical to freedom and progress, and the teaching of religion has been forbidden under the severest of penalties,

an "ideology" has taken its place, as Marxist Communism has done in Russia and Nazi racialism has partially done in Germany. Where religion has been excluded from the schools as a result of sectarian controversies and suspicions, or because the political influence of ecclesiastical bodies has been thought to threaten the integrity of the State, the religious education of youth has been carried on by the family and the Church, as in France with the *laïcisme* of its educational system, or in the United States with its policy of neutrality. But at the same time, there has developed in the schools an insistent sense of the need of a philosophy which will unify educational activities and give meaning to the whole process. It may be that the vogue of scientific humanism, education for citizenship, and other interpretations of the significance of human life has been in no small measure due to this desire to find something which could be taught in schools without the danger of partisan propaganda or ecclesiastical conflicts.

The school is part of a larger human community and humanity is incurably religious. The teacher, therefore, though he may be unable conscientiously to teach a particular creed or faith, will inevitably, even in dealing with "secular" subjects, be implicitly imparting his own religion through everything that he says and does, and, as we have seen, by what he essentially is. Even in a predominantly Christian country he may be inhibited by State regulation from teaching any specific religious knowledge and doctrine. He cannot help reflecting his personal convictions and aims, and if he is a Christian, he will reflect, because they are to a greater or a less degree his own, the beliefs and purposes common to the varying Christian Churches in the community of which the school is a part. We cannot here enter into the vexed question of the position of a teacher under the differing require-

ments and limitations of the several types of school which co-exist, for example, in Great Britain or (with fewer variations) in the United States, and which must continue to co-exist so long as freedom and democracy remain the principles which govern the life of the nation. It is sufficient to say that no standard of professional honour and of loyalty to obligations is higher than that of teachers in relation to controversial subjects, and that many of the existent difficulties could be solved by a little more courageous legislation and by the administrative action which this would make possible.

It is equally beyond our scope to discuss the situation in totalitarian States, or in countries such as India or China, where the great majority of the people are non-Christian, but Christian schools, as well as schools in which one of the other great world religions is taught, are free to participate in the common enterprise of education, whether they are also free (as in many instances they are) to teach definite Christian beliefs and observances or not. We must needs confine ourselves to the task of teachers who have the opportunity and the desire to take their share in helping boys and girls both to understand the Bible and to grow up in the Christian faith and the Christian way of life.

Every good syllabus, and especially every "Agreed Syllabus" adopted by Local Education Authorities, makes provision for the teaching of the Bible throughout the whole of the child's school life, from the nursery class to the upper sixth form. The biblical material, selected and graded to correspond with the interests and capacities of the successive age groups, forms a complete whole, so that if any section is dropped out there is bound to be some injury to logical, psychological and religious development. Apart altogether from the necessity of avoiding sectarianism in State schools the first essential

is that children should know what the Bible contains, whether it be imaginative stories or the no less fascinating description of actual people and events ; history on a world scale, or moral teaching at various levels of insight ; the words of Hebrew prophets spoken to their own time, or the letters of apostolic missionaries to the men and women still emerging from paganism into the life of the primitive Christian community. Above all they must know the story of Jesus as the Gospels tell it with such vivid directness and conviction.

In the chapter of the Spens Report devoted to Scripture teaching, the reference is of course to boys and girls of secondary school age, but what the Consultative Committee there says should be accepted as a fundamental principle in teaching the Bible to children of any age, and to adults also, as well as to adolescents :

“ The approach to the study of Scripture which we have in mind is historical and objective, the temper and the method of the teaching being such that the teacher's primary purpose will have been attained when he or she has made the pupil understand the meaning of the book which is being studied ; and by ‘ meaning ’ is to be understood the meaning, so far as it can be understood, for those who wrote the book and for those for whom it was written.”

The Committee goes on to make it clear that “ objective ” teaching does not imply restriction to literary criticism and historical background. Further, says the Report, “ it can hardly be disputed that the best teacher is one whose interest in the subject and desire to teach it proceed from religious faith.” And again, study of the Bible will almost certainly give rise to incidental questions on the part of children and adolescents which involve discussion of the most perplexing individual, social and world problems that press upon us in our

situation at the present day. Nor will the Bible by itself be all there is to teach, for the Spirit of God has been at work throughout the two thousand years since the New Testament was written. But, as the Committee maintains, Scripture taught with this true objectivity "is the best foundation for any other religious education given in the school concurrently or subsequently." And to this we may add that simple corporate worship is an essential counterpart of Scripture teaching in religious education. Religion is an experience, not simply a body of knowledge or a series of beliefs, and life with a vital awareness of God as Creator, Lord and Father is not to be understood without the practice of prayer and praise.

It would divert us from our present purpose if we were to say more about the choice and presentation of material, the ways in which the activity of the pupils themselves may be stimulated and guided, or the arrangement of school prayers, though all the psychological arguments in our earlier chapters have a direct bearing upon these elements in religious education on a Christian basis. It is sufficient to consider what is involved in ordinary Scripture teaching and normal school worship, because these are common to all schools, primary or secondary, State maintained or aided, public or private, day or boarding, if they include the direct teaching of the Christian religion at all.

What happens, then, when we tell children in the fantasy stage stories of how the Jews believed that God, and no other, made the world in which we live, or stories of Jesus as One who went about doing good and healing the sick, stories He himself told, and stories which show the kind of life He lived in His early days? What happens when, with boys and girls demanding true stories, we recall the prophet heroes of the Old Testament and the missionary heroes of the New, of Jesus the Lord

of all good life, and of the men and women whose loyalty to Him has enabled them to do exploits in every generation from His day to our own? What happens when we show primary adolescents the great sweep of religious thought and action beginning with the adventure of Abraham and not yet ended, in one sense culminating in Jesus Christ, in another continuously creative of new life in men and a new order in the world, as we can all see by reading our newspapers as well by listening to broadcast talks on Church History? What happens when we study with thoughtful, critical boys and girls in the middle years of adolescence, the facts about the Bible itself; how it came to be written and why it has been preserved as, in the words of the Coronation Ceremony, "the most precious thing this world affords"; what it teaches about economic and social relationships as well as about the nature, purpose and action of God; and whether the moral standards of the New Testament are an ethic propounded for a brief interval of human life on the earth before the coming of a cataclysmic Kingdom of God, or whether Jesus brought into the world a revelation which is also a dynamic for all time? What happens, above all, when teachers and taught say together, before the day's work and play begin, "Our Father. . . .?"

Clearly we have added to their stock of intellectual knowledge. In doing so we have inevitably set their imaginations at work, and stimulated them to reason and question. But is that all? Can it ever be all?

These are not, as they may seem, rhetorical questions. They are meant to link the familiar things we do with the less familiar psychological processes described in the preceding chapters. For, however objectively we go about it, we cannot introduce children and adolescents to historical facts, or even mythical and legendary stories such as the Bible contains, without making a

far-reaching difference to their whole personalities. Through the intellectual content of what they learn they must necessarily experience challenges and appeals to their emotional and volitional life. But that life is already compact of desire and conflict, perplexities and purposes, loves and hates. It is perpetually undergoing change, as psycho-physical development takes place, and relationships with parents, with members of the family, with ourselves, and with society increase in range and variety.

The making of transferences and the formation of sentiments are not processes which will occur only when we bethink ourselves of setting them going in these growing minds, as we might spasmodically wind up a piece of clockwork, or start a car whenever it pleases us to make a journey. They are spontaneous, normal functions of every human being, cumulative and continuous. Writing about the importance of transference in psycho-analysis Freud remarks : " An analysis without transference is an impossibility. It must not be supposed, however, that transference is created by analysis and does not occur apart from it. Transference is merely uncovered and isolated by analysis. It is a universal phenomenon of the human mind, it decides the success of all medical influence, and in fact dominates the whole of each person's relations to his human environment." ¹ When, therefore, we teach Scripture and conduct school worship, we are offering to these boys and girls, of whatever age, facts and ideas about which their thought and their emotions become organised, and towards which all the energies of their personalities are directed or " transferred " : we are presenting objects for sentiment-formation, and because of the particular nature of that which we present we are going far towards determining what their master-sentiment shall be, that master-

¹ *An Autobiographical Study*, p. 76.

sentiment which integrates and controls all their energies and capabilities, of body, mind and spirit. Yet our presentation is objective. We are helping boys and girls to learn what certain people in history meant when they recorded particular events or embodied their experience in poetry and philosophy.

It is quite true that the process is similar when we are teaching mathematics, the language of a European people, or any other subject in the curriculum. When, however, we are dealing with the Old and New Testaments there is in the very material itself something wider and deeper, for it concerns the life of men and women in its concrete wholeness. But even this is not the ultimate reason for its psychological significance. Its importance and its potency are due to the fact that it is the direct correlate of those instincts and emotions which, even during infancy, as Freud and the psycho-analysts have shown us, are the most powerful driving forces native to human personality. The facts and ideas about which the whole Bible revolves, and which are at the heart of Christian worship, are psychologically the most natural, and therefore the most wholesome, objects of that master-sentiment which is in itself the surpeme transference.

The majority of teachers are uneasy, and rightly, about creeds and traditional dogmas. A little more thought about the nature and origin of both would perhaps make us less suspicious of the form or the phraseology and more concerned with the essence of these historic affirmations. They were actually attempts to crystallise in the language of their time the common faith of the whole Christian community and to reject those heresies which, as the word implies, were usually dangerous, not because they were wholly false, but because they were half-truths. The Apostles' Creed is accepted by all the great Churches of Christendom and

may be taught in British schools without offending against the Cowper-Temple clause prohibiting sectarianism. It was not formulated by the Apostles. It seems to have been built up during the first three centuries from confessions used by various Christian Churches, and one or two very late phrases have been added to it. A very "advanced" scholar, whose long life has been spent in fearless defence of freedom from every kind of cramping orthodoxy and barren formalism, has lately pointed out that all the essentials of the Apostles' Creed are to be found in the Synoptic Gospels. It follows that we cannot teach the Gospels, however objectively, without its becoming clear that this faith inspires them. Dr. J. W. Hunkin, Bishop of Truro, has summed up the essentials of the Creed thus :¹

I believe in

God—

The Father ;

Jesus Christ, His Son, our Lord ;

The Holy Ghost ;

The Church ;

Forgiveness ;

The Life Eternal.

If we consider these clauses carefully we shall see that they correspond to precisely those elements in our human experience and relationships, especially during infancy, childhood and adolescence, upon which the psychologists lay so much stress. We speak of a parent-child bond, of a guilt-sense and how it is to be dealt with, of a community in which alone the individual may find complete self-realisation by the exercise of his other-regarding propensity, of the object of a master-sentiment, and of a life not frustrated by death. Unless they are pure

¹ *Is it Reasonable to Believe ?* p. 14.

projections of infantile fantasy they must be centred in tangible reality. They are so centred in the Jesus of history, the Christ of the Gospels.¹ But if we understand what the Christ of the Gospels meant by all that He said and did we must know that these elements of the Christian faith inhere in His teaching and His witness. They spring from no other source than His certainty of God as Father, and His impartation of His Spirit to men and women who lived with Him in Palestine and who became conscious that through what He wrought they were set free from the tyranny of sin and the fear of death.

At every stage in our teaching of the Bible, therefore, we are educating boys and girls into an understanding of a reality which does not conflict with their most vital impulses but fulfils them. We are enabling them to transfer their infantile affections for their parents to a Father who is not the antithesis of normal human parenthood but the author and sustainer of it. We are directing their hero-worship, and later their quest for something which will give unity, meaning and purpose to their lives, not to a philosophic idea of the good, the beautiful and the true, but to the divine goodness, truth and beauty made man. We are offering to them the pattern of a perfect society not in an ideology, but as it was wrought out at the cost of His life by that same Man who said, "the Kingdom of God is amongst you."

There is here nothing of subtle propaganda, intentional or otherwise. It demands no weighty equipment of profound theological learning. No special technique is required. All good teaching is interesting teaching, but it

¹ For the outcome of modern historical and literary criticism applied to the Gospels see E. F. Scott, *The Validity of the Gospel Record*, and C. H. Dodd, *History and the Gospel*.

is not thoroughly educative unless it stimulates children to discover fresh interests for themselves. For then the teacher achieves something far more important than the mere arresting and holding of the children's attention. He aids the natural process of growth, which depends upon finding wholesome food for healthy appetites. Instead of repressing the activity of powerful propensities he enables his pupils to exercise them in ways which make not only for instinctual and emotional satisfaction but also for harmony and for the attainment of clearly perceived, eagerly desired goals, individual and social. It is in this way that sentiment-formation takes place. The most significant difference between a sentiment and a complex is that a sentiment can be cultivated by conscious attention to the object in which it is centred, whereas a complex is wholly in the unconscious. Attention, as all the textbooks repeat till we are weary of the words, follows interest. But artificial interest soon flags, as we know by sad experience. Vital interest depends upon making a living connection between natural energies and an object intrinsically such as to call them, as it were automatically, into fuller play.

The teacher cannot make that connection. All that he can do is, knowing the nature of the energies to which appeal is to be made, to present objectively, as something unquestionably real, the fact or idea which is correlative to the propensities, abilities and purposes that the boy or girl needs to develop. He must, therefore, make his presentation as interesting as he can by means of his craftsmanship, as well as by reason of his own conviction and enthusiasm. The unforgiveable sin in teaching Scripture even more than in teaching other subjects, and from a professional point of view alone, is the sin of *dullness*. But when facts and ideas are thus set forth with

due clarity and vividness, albeit as objectively as can be, they must and do stimulate and enable the child or the adolescent to make that transfer of interest and purpose from limited and only partially adequate, or false and conflicting, objects to one which satisfies both by the demand it makes and the succour it affords.

Thus it is, as we have already seen, that the child in the realist stage of his growth must begin to make the transference necessary if he is to be saved from a parent fixation, or from fatal disillusionment because he finds that the father and mother whom he continues to love are not perfect and omnipotent as in his infancy they seemed to him to be. In this way also the adolescent boy or girl must find an objective focus for those energies and desires which make the period after puberty a time of instability and yet "a crowded hour of glorious life." And so also when middle adolescence comes, with its moral and intellectual stresses and strains, the hearts and minds of boys and girls must be illuminated by a "master-light of all their seeing," which reveals the meaning of human life and makes clear their call to this or that life-work. It is precisely here that the function of the teacher is of such inestimable importance, though it cannot be isolated from that of the parents.

If we were to make as explicit and objective the assumptions and aims of the non-Christian or sub-Christian philosophies of life which so often constitute our real religion, and consequently permeate all our work as teachers, we should probably not dare to teach them overtly and definitely as the facts and ideas contained in the Bible should be taught. We could not give them the same objectivity, for we should recognise their inadequacy and falsity. Our very psychological knowledge would suffice to show that growing minds could not attain to fulness of life, purposeful harmony, happiness and social

value if these facts and ideas were made the centre about which our boys' and girls' master-sentiment was organised. But we cannot evade the certainty that, whether implicitly or explicitly, we are constantly as teachers setting before those whom we teach the essentials of a religion, true or false. Our salvation is that, as we have already indicated, we can choose, in accordance with our own reasonable and intuitive perception of values, the object of our own master-sentiment, and can cultivate it by keeping it steadily before our minds. As in the case of boys and girls, so with ourselves, emotional forces are engendered and directed by this deliberate keeping of facts and ideas in the focus of our thought, and the will finds resultant expression in appropriate action.

There has been much debate about formal training and the transfer of the effects of training from one mental function to another. Here there is a far more vital issue. For this is the transfer which we are all, beyond question, furthering or impeding in our teaching of religion and our common worship with boys and girls at school. Dr. Hamley has said in discussing the transfer of training: "In all transfer there is communication. Transfer of training is not the communication of 'elements,' but of life; it is not a process, but a living process. Methods, procedures, ideals, principles and patterns of thought are not inert entities; they are mental experiences impregnated with life. As Nunn has expressed it, in another connection; 'The prime contribution of the heroes of science to the world's cultural wealth is not the scientific method but the scientific life. Our business, then, is to teach the realisation of the life, not the mastery of method.'"¹ How much more true this is of the other, greater transfer with which we have been concerned in these pages, and how much more true of the religious

¹ *Spens Report*, Appendix v. p. 447.

life (whereof the scientific life is but a part), is self-evident. It is in this magnificent task of guiding the religious development of the growing mind that parents and teachers are partners. They share it with the Father everlasting.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

AN adequate bibliography of the subject would demand more space than is available in a book of this kind. The following list, however, indicates books in which particular aspects of the subject may be followed up :

- ADLER, ALFRED : *The Science of Living* (Allen & Unwin. 1930).
 — : *The Education of Children* (Allen & Unwin. 1930).
 — : *Social Interest, A Challenge to Mankind* (Faber & Faber. 1938).
 — AND ASSOCIATES : *Guiding the Child* (Allen & Unwin. 1930).
 AICHORN, AUGUST : *Wayward Youth* (Foreword by Sigmund Freud) (Putnam. 1936).
 ALLERS, RUDOLF : *The Psychology of Character* (Cheap Edition) (Unicorn Press. 1939).
 BAILLIE, J., AND MARTIN, H. (Ed.) : *Revelation* (Faber & Faber. 1937).
 BERDYAEV, NICOLAS : *The Destiny of Man* (Blès).
 BOARD OF EDUCATION (CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE) : *Report on The Education of the Adolescent* (1926).
 — : *Report on The Primary School* (1931).
 — : *Report on Infant and Nursery Schools* (1933).
 — : *Report on Secondary Education with Special Reference to Grammar Schools and Technical High Schools* (Spens Report. 1938).
 — : *Report on Differentiation of Curricula for Boys and Girls Respectively in Secondary Schools* (1923).
 BOARD OF EDUCATION : *Handbook of Suggestions for the Consideration of Teachers and others concerned in the work of Public Elementary Schools* (1937).
 All the above, H.M. Stationery Office.
 BOVET, P. : *Le Sentiment Religieux et la Psychologie de l'Enfant* (Paris, Delachaux et Niestlé S.A.). Eng. Trans. *The Child's Religion*; Green, G. H. (Dent. 2928). (O.P.)
 BROWN, WM. : *Science and Personality* (Oxford University Press. 1929).
 — : *Psychology and Psychotherapy* (3rd ed., Edward Arnold. 1934).
 — : *Mind, Medicine, and Metaphysics* (O.U.P. 1936).
 BUBER, M. : *I and Thou* (T. & T. Clark. 1937).
 BÜHLER, CHARLOTTE : *From Birth to Maturity* (Kegan Paul. 1935).
 BÜHLER, KARL : *The Mental Development of the Child* (Kegan Paul. 1930).
 BUSHNELL, H. : *Christian Nurture* (Strachan & Low. 1866).
 CATTELL, R. B. : *Psychology and the Religious Quest* (Nelson. 1938).
 — : *Cracked Personalities in Childhood and After* (Nisbet. 1938).
 CLAVIER, H. : *L'Idée de Dieu chez l'Enfant* (Paris : Fischbacher. 1926).
 COADE, T. F. : Article in *Education of To-day* (see s.v. Laborde).

- GOE, G. A. : *The Psychology of Religion* (University of Chicago Press, Third Impression, 1917).
- COLE, L. : *Psychology of Adolescence* (Allen & Unwin. 1936).
- COOK, S. A. : *The "Truth" of the Bible* (S.P.C.K. 1938).
- DALBIEZ, R. : *La Méthode Psychanalytique et la Doctrine Freudienne* (Paris : Desclée de Brouwer et Cie. 2 vols. 1936).
- DE BURGH, W. G. : *Towards a Religious Philosophy* (Macdonald & Evans. 1937).
- : *From Morality to Religion* (Macdonald & Evans. 1938).
- DODD, C. H. : *History and the Gospel* (Nisbet. 1938).
- EWEN, J. H. : *Aids to Psychology* (Baillière, Tindall & Cox. 1929).
- FLEMING, S. : *Childhood and Puritanism* (O.U.P. 1933).
- FORSYTH, D. : *Psychology and Religion* (Watts. 1935).
- FOX, C. : *The Mind and its Body* (Kegan Paul. 1931).
- : *Educational Psychology* (3rd ed., Kegan Paul. 1936).
- FRAZER, SIR J. : *The Golden Bough* (Macmillan. Abridged Edition. 1923).
- FREUD, ANNA : *Introduction to Psycho-analysis for Teachers* (Allen & Unwin. 1931).
- : *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence* (Hogarth Press. 1937).
- FREUD, SIGMUND : *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis* (Allen & Unwin. 1922).
- : *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis* (Hogarth Press. 1933).
- : *Totem and Taboo* (Kegan Paul).
- : *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (International Psycho-analytical Press. 1922).
- : *The Ego and the Id* (Hogarth Press. 1927).
- : *An Autobiographical Study* (Hogarth Press. 1935).
- : *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (Hogarth Press. 1936).
- GRENSTED, L. W. : *Psychology and God* (Longmans, Green. 1930).
- : *This Business of Living* (S. C. M. Press. 1939).
- GRIFFITHS, RUTH : *A Study of Imagination in Early Childhood, and its Function in Mental Development* (Kegan Paul. 1935).
- HADFIELD, J. A. : *Psychology and Morals* (Methuen. 1923).
- HALDANE, J. S. : *The Sciences and Philosophy* (Hodder & Stoughton).
- : *The Philosophical Basis of Biology* (Hodder & Stoughton. 1931).
- HEYWOOD, B. : *This is Our Faith* (Hodder & Stoughton. 1938).
- HOWE, E. GRAHAM : *Morality and Reality* (Gerald Howe. 1934).
- HUNKIN, J. W. : *Is it Reasonable to Believe ?* (Hodder & Stoughton. 1935).
- INSTITUTE OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATION : *The Religious Education of Children under the Age of Seven Years, considered from the Standpoint of Modern Psychology* (1938).
- : *The Religious Education of Pupils Eleven to Sixteen Years of Age*. (1939).
- ISAACS, SUSAN : *The Children we Teach* (University of London Press. 1932).
- : *Intellectual Growth in Young Children* (Routledge. 1930).
- : *Social Development in Young Children* (Routledge. 1933).
- JAMES, E. O. : *Comparative Religion* (Methuen. 1938).
- JAMES, WILLIAM : *The Variety of Religious Experience* (Longmans, Green. 1904).

- JONES, W. L. : *A Psychological Study of Religious Conversion* (Epworth Press. 1937).
- JORDAN, G. J. : *A Short Psychology of Religion* (Cape. 1927). (O.P.)
- JUNG, C. G. : *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology* (Baillière, Tindall & Cox. 1916).
- : *The Psychology of the Unconscious* (Kegan Paul. 1922).
- : *Two Essays in Analytical Psychology* (Baillière, Tindall & Cox. 1928).
- : *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* (Kegan Paul. 1933).
- : *Psychology and Religion* (O.U.P. 1938).
- KENNEDY, J. : *The God Whom We Ignore* (Hodder & Stoughton. 1938).
- KLEIN, M. : *The Psycho-analysis of Children* (Hogarth Press. 1932).
- KRETSCHMER, E. : *Physique and Character* (Kegan Paul. 1925).
- LABORDE, E. D. (Ed.) : *Education of To-day* (Cambridge University Press. 1935).
- LEUBA, J. H. : *A Psychological Study of Religion, its Origin, Function and Future* (Macmillan (N.Y.). 1912).
- : *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism* (Kegan Paul. 1925).
- : *God or Man?* (Kegan Paul. 1934).
- LUCCOCK, H. E. : *Christianity and the Individual* (Hodder & Stoughton. 1937).
- MACAULAY, A. B. : *The Death of Jesus, in Three Aspects* (Hodder & Stoughton. 1938).
- MCDUGALL, W. : *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (Methuen. 1920).
- : *The Energies of Men* (Methuen. 1932).
- : *Religion and the Science-s of Life* (Methuen. 1934).
- : *Psycho-analysis and Social Psychology* (Methuen. 1936).
- MACMURRAY, J. : *The Clue to History* (S.G.M. Press. 1938).
- MAJOR, A. H. D. (Ed.) : *Modern Christian Education* (Blackwell).
- MATTHEWS, W. R. (Ed.) : *The Christian Faith* (Eyre & Spottiswoode. 1936).
- MILLER, E. : *The Generations* (Faber & Faber. 1938).
- MILLER, H. CRICHTON : *The New Psychology and the Teacher* (Jarrolds).
- MONTESSORI, M. : *The Secret of Childhood* (Longmans, Green. 1936).
- MUMFORD, E. E. READ : *Understanding Our Children* (formerly *The Dawn of Character*) (Longmans, Green. 1937).
- MYERS, A. J. W. : *Horace Bushnell and Religious Education* (Manthorne & Burrack, Boston. 1937).
- NOCK, A. D. : *St. Paul* (Butterworth. 1938).
- NORSWORTHY AND WHITLEY : *The Psychology of Childhood* (Macmillan. 1937).
- NUNN, SIR T. P. : *Education, its Data and First Principles* (Arnold. 1934).
- NYGREN, A. : *Agape and Eros, Part I.* (S.P.C.K. 1932).
- OMAN, J. : *The Natural and the Supernatural* (C.U.P. 1931).
- OTTO, R. : *The Kingdom of God and the Son of Man* (Lutterworth Press. 1938).
- PHILLIPS, M. : *The Education of the Emotions through Sentiment Development* (Allen & Unwin. 1937).
- PIAGET, J. : *The Language and Thought of the Child* (Kegan Paul. 1932).
- : *Judgment and Reasoning in the Child* (Kegan Paul. 1928).
- : *The Child's Conception of Causality* (Kegan Paul. 1930).

- POINCARÉ, H. : *Science and Method* (Nelson).
- SCOTT, E. F. : *The New Testament Idea of Revelation* (Nicholson & Watson. 1935).
- : *The Validity of the Gospel Record* (Nicholson & Watson. 1938).
- SIMPSON, P. GARNEGIE : *Essentials* (Hodder & Stoughton. 1930).
- SELBIE, W. B. : *The Validity of Christian Belief* (Nicholson & Watson. 1939).
- SMITH, E. W. : *The Secret of the African* (S.C.M. Press. 1929).
- : *The Golden Stool : Some Aspects of the Conflict of Cultures in Modern Africa* (Holborn Publishing House. 1926).
- SMITH, H. BOMPAS : *Growing Minds* (U.L.P. 1937).
- SMITH, J. W. D. : *Psychology and Religion in Early Childhood* (S.C.M. Press. 1936).
- SODERBLOM, N. : *The Nature of Revelation* (O.U.P. 1933).
- SPEARMAN, C. : *The Nature of "Intelligence" and the Principles of Cognition* (Macmillan. 1927).
- : *The Abilities of Man, their Nature and Measurement* (Macmillan. 1927).
- STARBUCK, E. D. ; *The Psychology of Religion* (Walter Scott. 1901).
- STUART, GRACE : *The Achievement of Personality in the Light of Psychology and Religion* (S.C.M. Press. 1938).
- SUTTIE, IAN D. : *The Origins of Love and Hate* (Kegan Paul. 1935).
- TERESHCHENKO, N. M. IOVETZ- : *Friendship—Love in Adolescence* (Allen & Unwin. 1936).
- THOULESS, R. H. : *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion* (C.U.P. 1923).
- VALENTINE, CYRIL H. : *The Treatment of Moral and Emotional Difficulties* (S.C.M. Press. 1937).
- WALLAS, GRAHAM ; *The Art of Thought* (Cape. 1926).
- WARNECK, J. : *The Living Forces of the Gospel* (Anderson & Ferrier).
- WHEELER, OLIVE : *Youth: The Psychology of Adolescence* (U.L.P. 1929).
- : *Creative Education and the Future* (U.L.P. 1938).
- WRIGHT, R. S. : *Asking Them Questions* (Milford, O.U.P. 1936).
- YEAXLEE, BASIL A. : *Spiritual Values in Adult Education* (Milford, O.U.P. 2 vols. 1925). (O.P.)
- : *The Approach to Religious Education* (S.C.M. Press. 1931).
- (Ed.) : *Religion in Education* (S.C.M. Press. Quarterly).

INDEX

- ACTS, Book of the, 118, 135
 Adler, A., 9, 10 f., 13, 42 f., 63 f., 95, 170; *quoted*, 10 f.
 Adolescence, stages of, 119 f., 167; characteristics of, 89, 125 ff., 129, 131 f., 144 f., 150 ff., 160; sex in, 129 f.; a new birth at, 125; and the Christian faith, 160 f.
Agape and Eros, 52 n.
 Allers, R., 55 n.; *quoted*, 56 n.
 Animism, 46, 102 f.
 Anthropology, 44 ff., 83, 103 f.
 Apocrypha, 118, 191
 Archibald, Hamilton, 82
 Arnold, Matthew, 23
 Arts and Crafts, 129
 Augustine, St., 9, 114, 137
 Awe, religious, 47, 54.

 BARTH, Karl, 47
 Behaviourism, 8 f., 20, 33, 35
 Berdyaev, N., 38 n.; *quoted*, 125
 Bible, the, 3, 5, 14, 26, 117, 146, 157, 180 f., 191 f., 202, 204, 206, 210, 214
 Biology, 22, 123 f., 141 ff., 168 f.
 Birnbaum, D. F., *quoted*, 12
 Boarding-school, 163 f.
 Bose, Sir J., 32
 Bovet, P., 24, 51, 54; *quoted*, 40 f., 49, 53, 110 f.
 Brain, the, 66, 79
 Broadcasts to schools, 189 f., 208
 Brown, Wm., 24; *quoted*, 24 f., 73 f., 133 n.
 Buber, M., *quoted*, 38
 Buddha, Gautama, and Buddhism, 117, 151, 174
 Bühler, Charlotte, 68, 158; *quoted*, 159
 Bühler, K., 66 n.
 Bunyan, John, 84, 137
 Burt, C., 40; *quoted*, 127 f.

 CANTON, W., 59
 Cathexis, 122 n.
 Cattell, R. B., 14 n.; *quoted*, 27, 102, 105, 109 n.
 Censor, the, 93

 Character, 77 f., 88, 94 ff., 125, 135, 162, 166, 169, 172, 180
 China, 205
 Christianity, 4 ff., 29, 51, 107, 114, 135, 159
 Church, the, 2, 5; 44, 183, 192, 204, 210; and State, 204 ff., 211; History, 135, 201, 208
 Clavier, Henri, *quoted*, 16 n., 39, 63, 187 f., 195
 Coe, G. A., *quoted*, 171 n.
 Cole, Luella, 149 n.
 Communism, 4, 158, 165, 204
 Conduct, ideals of, 77, 172
 Confucianism, 174
 Consultative Committee (Board of Education), Reports *quoted*, 40, 127, 201 f., 206 f., 215
 Conversion, 136 ff., 147, 152, 167; sex and, 142
 Cook, S. A., *quoted*, 46 n., 49 n.
 Creeds, 180, 211; and Cowper-Temple Clause, 211
 Crichton-Miller, Dr. H., 24, 42

 DALBIEZ, R., *quoted*, 16 f., 19 n.
 Dante, 84
 Day school, 163 f.
 de Burgh, W. G., *quoted*, 17 ff.
 Dewey, J., 78
 Dictators, 145, 151
 Doubt, religious, 152 ff., 158, 160
 Durkheim, 104

 EDUCATION, 5, 6, 12; Board of, *Handbook of Suggestions*, *quoted*, 129; (*see also* Consultative Committee); religious, 57, 178 f., 187, 194, 198 ff., 203; secularised, 203 f.
 Ego-ideal, the, 53 ff., 77 f., 93 ff., 105, 108 f., 116 (*see also* Super-ego)
 Eidetic imagery, 60 f.
 Ely, Bishop of (Dr. Heywood), 187; *quoted*, 56
 Emotions, the, 27, 30, 33 ff., 40, 48, 57, 127 f., 133 f., 194, 210
 Ewen, J., *quoted*, 123

 FAITH, 19, 113 f., 160, 172, 174

- Fantasy, 60 ff., 71, 74, 85 ff., 92, 93, 194; constructive element in, 65, 71; religion as, 25, 43
- Fascism, 4, 158, 165
- Father, longing for a, 53, 106
- Father-mother relationships, 41, 54, 185
- Filial instinct, 49, 54 f., 106, 196
- Films, religious, 189 f.
- Forsyth, D., 15, 24
- Fox, C., 167
- France, 205
- Francis of Assisi, St., 84, 137
- Frazer, Sir James, *quoted*, 175 n.
- Freud, Anna, 89 n.; *quoted*, 95 f., 141
- Freud, Sigmund, 9, 13, 16, 19, 24, 51, 53, 85 f., 88, 78, 93 ff., 103 ff., 120 ff., 134 ff., 163, 210; and religion, 9, 45, 51, 53, 102, 108 f., 112, 170, 197; *quoted*, 51 n., 53, 73 n., 94, 102, 144, 209.
- Friendships, adolescent, 130, 135, 151, 159
- GERMANY, 4 f., 155, 204
- Gestalt psychology, 76, 78, 84, 132, 138, 161, 170
- Glands, endocrine, 123 f.
- God, 5, 10, 43 f., 102, 133, 177, 182, 195; existence and reality of, 18, 22 f., 39, 44, 53, 79 ff., 114, 144, 174; as personal, 16, 22 f., 37 ff., 85, 117, 169; as Creator and Lord, 29, 37, 112, 122, 207; as Father, 29, 37, 46 ff., 51 ff., 55 ff., 82, 85 ff., 107, 112, 115, 122, 135, 143, 187, 196, 207, 212; in Christ, 4, 7, 29, 37, 107, 114 f., 137 f., 146, 175; as "Other," 47; in history, 117 f., 174; Kingdom of, 85, 122, 136, 172, 212; children's ideas of, 186 f., 189
- Gospels, the, 57, 118, 135, 175, 206, 211 f.
- Grensted, L. W., 24, 74, 195; *quoted*, 72 n., 114 n.
- Griffiths, Ruth, 64, 67, 87; *quoted*, 65
- Guilt, sense of, 96, 101 ff., 176 f., 211
- Gunkel, Prof., 14
- HADFIELD, J. A., 24, 170
- Hadow Reports, 89, 149
- Haldane, J. S., 168
- Hall, Stanley, 82
- Hamley, H. R., *quoted*, 215
- Hebrews, the, 47 n., 83, 114, 117, 135, 174
- Herd-instinct, 34
- Hinduism, 117, 174
- Hitler, Adolf, 151
- Holy Spirit, the, 135, 196, 212
- Home and School, 163, 181, 193 f.
- Howe, Graham, 48
- Humanism, Scientific, 23
- Huxley, J., 25
- Id, the, 92 ff., 110
- Imagination, 48, 59 f., 64 f., 74, 85; creative, 67, 154; as primitive thinking, 65
- India, 205
- Infancy, characteristics of, 31 ff.; and origin of religious ideas, 39, 49, *et passim*
- Inferiority, 43, 63
- Insight and intuition, 78, 84, 138, 166
- Instincts, 9, 16, 26 f., 34 f., 41, 57, 73 f., 93 f., 166, 170, 210
- Introjection, 77, 95, 109
- Iovetz-Tereshchenko, N. M., *quoted*, 135
- Isaacs, Susan, 67; *quoted*, 98 ff., 106
- Islam, 173
- JACKS, M. L., *quoted*, 145 f., 160 f.
- James, E. O., *quoted*, 104 n.
- James, William, 136 f., 139; *quoted*, 147
- Jarrow, Bishop of, *quoted*, 26
- Jeans, Sir J., 6, 25
- Jesus Christ, 3 ff., 7, 29, 37, 57 f., 82, 85 f., 107, 115 ff., 135 ff., 146, 151, 157, 161, 189, 206 ff.; in history, 29, 118, 135, 175 f., 212
- Jordan, G. J., *quoted*, 165
- Judaism, 117, 173 f.
- Jung, C. G., 9 f., 13, 31, 52 f., 115; *quoted*, 10, 15, 21, 28, 51, 139, 170
- KENNEDY, J., *quoted*, 156 f.
- Kingsley, C., 4
- Klein, M., *quoted*, 96 n.
- Kretschmer, E., *quoted*, 123 f.
- LATENCY, 62, 147; period, 65 f., 89, 94 ff., 99, 107, 109, 120 f.
- Learning, 32, 69, 78, 81
- Lenin, 151
- Leuba, J., 15; *quoted*, 22 f., 142
- Libido, 50 f., 52 n., 94 ff., 144

- Love, interpretations of, 33 f., 41 f., 49 f., 52 n., 54 f., 135, 184
 Loyalties, 98, 105, 135
 Luther, Martin, 137
 Luccock, H., *quoted*, 37
 MACAULAY, A. B., *quoted*, 113
 McDougall, Wm., 9, 26, 34, 136, 168; *quoted*, 21 f., 72 f., 169 f.
 Macmurray, J., *quoted*, 117
 Martin, Hugh, *quoted*, 175 n.
 Marx, Karl, 4, 165, 204
 Master-sentiment, 131 f., 139, 143, 166, 173, 197, 209, 211
 Meaning, in experience of infancy, childhood, and adolescence, 33, 36 f., 60, 63, 85 f., 101, 166, 168, 171
 Melanchthon, 137
 Mill, J. S., *quoted*, 38
 Miller, E., 36, 44, 50, 70 n.; *quoted*, 78 f., 107 f.
 Milton, John, 45, 84
 Mohammed, 151
 Montessori, M., 69, 78
 Moral Self, the, 78 f., 94 ff., 98 ff., 155
 Mother Julian of Norwich, 137
 Mumford, Mrs. E. Read, *quoted*, 61, 66 f.
 Mussolini, Benito, 151
 Myths, and their value, 83 ff., 103, 116 ff., 175, 208
 NATHANAEL, 137
 Nazism, 204
 Nock, A. D., 137 n.
 Norsworthy and Whitley, *quoted*, 81
 Numinous, the, 47, 54, 55 n., 85, 155
 Nunn, Sir T. P., 167; *quoted*, 215
 Nygren, A., *quoted*, 52
 OAKHAM, H., 60
 Edipus-complex, 42 f., 50, 56, 94 f., 103 f., 144
 Oman, J., *quoted*, 65
 Other-regarding propensity, the, 34, 52, 74; and sex, 121, 124 f., 143, 159, 170, 211
 Otto, Rudolf, 47, 54, 55 n., 85, 136 n.
 PARENTS, 30, 36, 40 ff., 48, 63, 77 f., 95 f., 106, 108 f., 144, 152, 167, 211, ch. VII., *passim*; and children's knowledge of God, 43 f., 48 f., 55 ff., 79 f., 82, 87, 109 ff., 143 ff.
 Parent-teacher Associations, 181, 194
 Paul, St., 29, 84, 137 ff., 143, 160, 166, 176
 Pavlov, 6
 Penn, W., *quoted*, 91, 196
 Phillips, M., *quoted*, 133 f.
 Philosophy, 15, 17 ff., 20
 Piaget, J., 79, 99, 111
 Plato, 31, 83 f.
 Play, 69 f., 98, 108, 129
 Pleasure-principle, the, 92, 163
 Polycarp, 137
 Power, demand for, 57, 63, 65, 99
 Pratt, J. B., 24, 115
 Prayer (*see also* Worship), 57, 115
 Primitive man, 45 f., 83; thinking, 65; religion, 45 f., 102, 190
 Projection, 49, 70 f., 74, 79 f., 111, 116, 154
 Propensities and abilities (*see also* Instincts), 26 f., 34 f., 52, 73 f., 101, 170
 Prophets, the Hebrew, 117 f., 174, 206 f.
 Psychiatry and religion, 13, 20 f., 25, 115, 177
 Psychology a descriptive science, 15, 17, 19; dynamic, 9, 168 ff.; Gestalt (*see s.v.*); and philosophy, 15, 18 f.
 Puberty, 66, 88, 119 ff., 125, 147, 159, 214
 Puritan teaching, 141, 191
 Purpose, 125, 131 ff., 135, 166, 194
 RAVEN, C. E., 37
 Realism, age of, 91 ff., 99, 107 f., 115
 Reality-principle, the, 9, 38, 74 f., 92 f., 108, 116, 163
 Reason, 27 f., 48, 172
 Reasoning, a child's, 65, 71, 79, 90 f., 111 f.
 Recapitulation theory, the, 82, 107
 Regression, 20, 53, 118
 Religion, defined and described, 5, 13, 16 n., 23, 25 ff., 48, 159, 207; universality of, 15, 21; innate capacity for, 24, 39; raw material of, 48, 53, 55, 108, 141, 181; primitive, 45 f., 102, 190; and sex, 22, 104 n., 135, 141 f.; a sentiment, 27 f., 39, 132, 143, 166 (*see also* Sentiments, Master-sentiment); regarded as illusion, 14, 20, 53, 108 f., 170; and child's daily experience, 79, 85 f.; our real, 195

- Religions, non-Christian, 27, 116 f.
 173 f., 205
 Religious experience, reality and
 validity of, 14, 19, 22, 27, 37 f.,
 167; a means of knowledge, 17
 Revelation, 3, 5, 19, 29, 114 f., 174,
 175 n., 190
 Russia, 4 f., 154, 204
- SCHOOL and Home, 163, 181, 193 f.
 School-leaving age, importance of,
 148 f., 160 ff.
 Schweitzer, A., 45
 Scott, E. F., *quoted*, 138, 174
 Scripture, the teaching of, 179,
 188 f., 190, 193, 199, 205 f., 209,
 213 f. (*see also* Teaching, reli-
 gious)
 Security, demand for (infancy,
 childhood and adolescence), 41,
 47, 52, 55 n., 77, 95 ff., 101, 130,
 143, 155
 Selbie, W. B., *quoted*, 177
 Self-regarding propensity, 34, 52 n.,
 73 f., 125, 170
 Sentiments, defined, 27 f., 114 n.,
 136, 168, 213; in adolescence,
 125, 131 ff., 167 f.; religious,
 27 f., 39, 132, 135, 139, 143,
 166 ff., 176
 Sex, 10, 22, 34, 54, 135, 163;
 differences, 127 f.; and guilt,
 104; and personality, 122 f.;
 central in adolescence, 121;
 other-regarding, 124 f.; creative,
 121 f., 129, 142; and religion,
 142 f.; instruction, 104, 120 f.
 Sexuality, Freud's interpretation,
 33, 51 n., 54 f., 65, 94, 121 f., 129,
 170; infantile, 42, 50 n., 52, 94,
 119 ff., 125
 Shakespeare, 23; *quoted*, 119
 Shand, 136
 Simpson, P. Carnegie, *quoted*, 159
 Sin, 98, 104 f., 138, 141, 176 f.
 Smith, Bompas, *quoted*, 68 f.
 Smith, J. W. D., *quoted*, 86 ff.
 Smith, P. G., *quoted*, 200
 Social sense, 96 f., 103; and re-
 ligion, 11, 53
 Söderblom, Abp. N., *quoted*, 175 n.
 Spearman, C., 68, 78
 Spens Report, *quoted*, 201 f., 206 f.,
 215
 Starbuck, E. W., 137, 140; *quoted*,
 140 f.
- Sublimation, 122, 129, 143
 Suggestion, 72 ff., 79 f., 112, 116,
 162
 Sunday schools, 89, 156 f.
 Sun-Yat-Sen, 151
 Super-ego, 78, 93 ff., 106, 108 ff.
 (*see also* Ego-ideal)
 Sutcliffe, Ian D., 24, 34, 41 f., 51, 54,
 77, 170; *quoted*, 55
 Swainson, Beatrice M., *quoted*, 186 f.
 Syllabuses of Scripture Teaching,
 190, 205
- TEACHERS, 181, 188 f., 191, 194,
 ch. VIII., *passim*
 Teaching, religious, 81, 85, 141,
 143, 157, 181, 188 f. (*see also*
 the Teaching of Scripture)
 Temperament, 123 f., 139, 166
 Tennyson, *quoted*, 82
 Thinking, primitive, 65
 Thouless, R. H., *quoted*, 73
 Timothy, 137
 Totalitarian States, 4 ff., 151, 154 f.,
 158, 165, 204
 Transfer of training, 215
 Transference, psychological, 91, 96,
 101, 106, 209 ff., 212, 214 ff.
 Truro, Bishop of (Dr. Hunkin),
quoted, 211
- Unconscious mind, the, 10, 31, 48,
 73, 75, 93 ff.
 United States of America, 205
- VALENTINE, C. W., 187; *quoted*,
 56 f.
- WATSON, J., 8 f., 33 f., 41
 Wells, H. G., *quoted*, 165
 Wesley, J., 137, 140
 Wheeler, O., 160
 Wigley, T., *quoted*, 72 n.
 Will, the, 27 f., 97, 101, 134
 Wish-fulfilment, 112
 Wordsworth, *quoted*, 172
 Work, 69 f., 159, 165
 Worship, 85, 177, 192, 199 f., 208 ff.
 Wright, R. Selby, *quoted*, 161
- YORK, Abp. of (Dr William Temple),
 56; *quoted*, 175 n.
- ZINZENDORF, 137

CROOKED
PERSONALITIES
IN CHILDHOOD & AFTER

AN INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOTHERAPY

by

RAYMOND B. CATTELL

PH.D.

Author of *A Guide to Mental Testing*, etc.

"Both the student and the layman will find this book most valuable."

British Journal of Psychology

"Presents the principles of psychotherapy in a very clear and readable form, admirably illustrated by up-to-date information."

Time and Tide

"Throughout, case histories keep the reader in close touch with reality . . . a book which can be most emphatically recommended."—*British Weekly*

7/6 net

N I S B E T

TYPES OF MODERN THEOLOGY

FROM SCHLEIERMACHER TO BARTH

by

H. R. MACKINTOSH

D.D.

"An intensely stimulating, because at the same time profoundly revealing, study of the ebb and flow of German theological ideas for the last century and a half."

Church Times

"We could imagine no better introduction to the study and understanding of modern theological problems. We hope it may become a textbook in every theological college."—Dr. W. B. SELBIE in the

Congregational Quarterly

Second Impression

10/6 net

NISBET